1. Albert Kesselring was a German military officer and convicted war criminal who served in the Luftwaffe during World War II.
151 Facts About Albert Kesselring
1. 2.
Albert Kesselring joined the Bavarian Army as an officer cadet in 1904, serving in the artillery branch.
3.
Albert Kesselring completed training as a balloon observer in 1912.
4.
Albert Kesselring served in the after the war, but was discharged in 1933 to become head of the Department of Administration at the Ministry of Aviation, where he became involved in the re-establishment of the German aviation industry and the laying of the foundations for the, serving as its chief of staff from 1936 to 1938.
5.
Albert Kesselring conducted a defensive campaign against Allied forces in Italy, being involved in ordering several massacres, until he was injured in an accident in October 1944.
6.
Albert Kesselring accepted the honorary presidency of three veterans' organisations: the, consisting of veterans; the, the veterans' association of the Afrika Korps; and, most controversially, the right-wing before dying in 1960.
7.
Albert Kesselring was born in Marktsteft, Bavaria, on 30 November 1885, the son of Carl Adolf Kesselring, a schoolmaster and town councillor, and his wife Rosina, Carl's second cousin.
8.
Albert Kesselring remained with the regiment until 1915, except for periods at the Military Academy from 1905 to 1906, after which he received his commission as a, and at the School of Artillery and Engineering in Munich from 1909 to 1910.
9.
In 1910, Albert Kesselring married Luise Anna Pauline Keyssler, the daughter of an apothecary from Bayreuth.
10.
Albert Kesselring's superiors considered posting him to the School of Artillery and Engineering as an instructor because of his expertise in "the interplay between tactics and technology".
11.
Albert Kesselring distinguished himself in the Battle of Arras in 1917, "by his tireless and assiduous work, and by the preparation of clear and carefully constructed orders", despite being on duty for over twenty hours, and succeeded in halting the British advance.
12.
Albert Kesselring served on the Eastern Front on the staff of the 2nd Bavarian Landwehr Division.
13.
Albert Kesselring was released, but his superior, Major Hans Seyler, censured him for having "failed to display the requisite discretion".
14.
From 1919 to 1922, Albert Kesselring served as a battery commander with the 24th Artillery Regiment.
15.
Albert Kesselring joined the on 1 October 1922 and was posted to the Military Training Department at the Ministry of the Reichswehr in Berlin.
16.
Albert Kesselring remained at this post until 1929 when he returned to Bavaria as commander of Wehrkreis VII in Munich.
17.
Albert Kesselring helped re-organise the Ordnance Department, laying the groundwork for the research and development efforts that would produce new weapons.
18.
Albert Kesselring was involved in secret military manoeuvres held in the Soviet Union in 1924 and the so-called Great Plan for a 102-division army, which was prepared in 1923 and 1924.
19.
Albert Kesselring was discharged from the in 1933 against his wishes, and appointed head of the Department of Administration at the Reich Commissariat for Aviation, the forerunner of the Reich Air Ministry, with the rank of in 1934.
20.
Albert Kesselring was involved in the re-establishment of the aviation industry and the construction of secret factories, forging alliances with industrialists and aviation engineers.
21.
Promotion in the was rapid; Albert Kesselring was promoted to on 1 October 1934, and on 1 April 1936.
22.
At the age of 48, Albert Kesselring learned to fly, following the old military doctrine that officers should not ask their men to do anything they would not do themselves.
23.
Albert Kesselring later stated that first-hand knowledge of all aspects of aviation was essential to being able to command airmen, although he was well aware that latecomers like himself did not impress the old pioneers or the young aviators.
24.
Albert Kesselring's tenure was marred by personal and professional conflicts with his superior, Erhard Milch, and Kesselring asked to be relieved.
25.
Albert Kesselring requested a transfer to a field command, and the head of the, Hermann Goring, gave him command of in Dresden.
26.
Albert Kesselring was promoted to in 1937, and became commander of in 1938, until January 1940.
27.
Albert Kesselring was succeeded in his role by Hans-Jurgen Stumpff.
28.
Albert Kesselring strongly supported the program to produce a long-range heavy bomber.
29.
In March 1939 Albert Kesselring expressed his doubt this could be done accurately at night or in bad weather.
30.
Albert Kesselring had 1,105 aircraft in comparison to Alexander Lohr's 729 with in support of Gerd von Rundstedt's Army Group South.
31.
Albert Kesselring himself was shot down during the campaign, the first of the five times he was shot down during World War II.
32.
Albert Kesselring insisted that only military targets were attacked, but the lack of precision munitions made the bombing indiscriminate and militarily ineffective.
33.
Albert Kesselring's was not involved in the preparations for the campaigns in the west.
34.
Albert Kesselring preferred the seizure of the Moerdijk bridges to breach Fortress Holland.
35.
Albert Kesselring promised his air fleet would prevent the French Army advancing from Antwerp and intervening.
36.
On 14 May 1940, responding to a call for assistance from Student and demands for the bombing of the city by Georg von Kuchler, commanding the 18th Army, Albert Kesselring ordered the bombing of Rotterdam city centre.
37.
Albert Kesselring controlled formations in the Netherlands, Belgium, and France north of the Seine.
38.
Albert Kesselring was initially responsible for the bombing of southeastern England and the London area, but as the battle progressed, command responsibility shifted, with Hugo Sperrle's assuming responsibility for the night-time "blitz" attacks while conducted the main daylight operations.
39.
Albert Kesselring advocated capturing Gibraltar, encouraging the British Government to negotiate, and then turning against London if necessary.
40.
Albert Kesselring urged Goring to carry out an all-out attack, based on the unproven assertion that Fighter Command had been virtually destroyed.
41.
Albert Kesselring was instructed to concentrate on ports in Eastern England and carry out at least 50 airstrikes in London per night.
42.
Albert Kesselring arranged with Goring for to be allocated additional transport to allow it to keep up with fast-moving armoured columns.
43.
Albert Kesselring's mission was to gain air superiority, and if possible air supremacy, as soon as possible while still supporting ground operations.
44.
Albert Kesselring reported that in the first week of operations had accounted for 2,500 Soviet aircraft in the air and on the ground.
45.
Albert Kesselring wrote that within days, he was able to fly over the front in his Focke-Wulf Fw 189 reconnaissance aircraft to observe the terrain and advance.
46.
When enemy counterattacks threatened, Albert Kesselring threw the full weight of his force against them.
47.
Albert Kesselring now had to convince the Army that air support should be concentrated at critical points.
48.
Albert Kesselring's fleet claimed 915 aircraft destroyed and 60 locomotives in 1,574 sorties.
49.
Albert Kesselring rated the opposition from both fighters and anti-aircraft guns.
50.
Albert Kesselring was uncharacteristically pessimistic about the results of the raids.
51.
In November 1941, Albert Kesselring was appointed Commander-in-Chief South and was transferred to Italy along with his staff, which for the time being functioned as his Commander-in-Chief South staff.
52.
Albert Kesselring ordered attacks on the island's airfields, ports and infrastructure, along with Malta Convoys, which provided food and war materials to the island.
53.
Albert Kesselring hoped to thereby secure the Axis line of communication with North Africa.
54.
Albert Kesselring was able to relieve Rommel's logistical problems by pushing a supply convoy through the British minefields.
55.
Albert Kesselring was critical of Rommel's performance in the Battle of Bir Hakeim, a vital position held by the 1st Free French Brigade that formed the southern pivot of the British Gazala Line.
56.
Rommel called for, and Albert Kesselring provided, air support, but the infantry assaults failed to capture the position.
57.
Albert Kesselring attributed this to faulty coordination between the ground and air attacks.
58.
Cavallero's diary and Friedrich von Mellenthin's account in Panzer Battles support this version of events, but on 24 June 1942 Bastico and Albert Kesselring approved Rommel's request to pursue the British Eighth Army into Egypt.
59.
Albert Kesselring claimed he had recognised and pressed for the elimination of Malta by invasion, and blamed Rommel, the OKW and the Italians for the failure to act.
60.
Albert Kesselring considered Rommel to be a great general leading fast-moving troops at the corps level of command, but felt that he was too moody and changeable for higher command.
61.
Albert Kesselring was briefly considered as a possible successor to Wilhelm Keitel as Chief of Staff of the OKW in September 1942, with Friedrich Paulus replacing Alfred Jodl as Chief of the Operations Staff at OKW.
62.
That Albert Kesselring was considered for this appointment demonstrated the high regard in which Albert Kesselring was held by Hitler.
63.
Albert Kesselring's command included the troops in Greece and the Balkans until the end of the year, when Hitler created another army group headquarters under Wilhelm List, naming him Wehrmacht Commander-in-Chief South East.
64.
Albert Kesselring ordered Walther Nehring, the former commander of the Afrika Korps who was returning to action after recovering from wounds received at the Battle of Alam el Halfa, to proceed to Tunisia to take command of a new corps.
65.
Albert Kesselring ordered Nehring to establish a bridgehead in Tunisia and then to press west as far as possible so as to gain freedom to manoeuvre.
66.
Albert Kesselring now concentrated on shoring up his forces by moving the required tonnages of supplies from Italy but his efforts were frustrated by Allied aircraft and submarines.
67.
In return, Albert Kesselring had held up the Allies in Tunisia for six months.
68.
Albert Kesselring was one of the most popular generals of World War II with the German rank and file.
69.
Albert Kesselring's popularity was enhanced by frequent, often unannounced, visits to the front line.
70.
Hans von Luck wrote that Albert Kesselring was respected because he was the only senior commander to visit the front in North Africa.
71.
Albert Kesselring expected that the Allies would next invade Sicily, as a landing could be made there under fighter cover from Tunisia and Malta.
72.
Albert Kesselring reinforced the six coastal and four mobile Italian divisions there with two mobile German divisions, the 15th Panzergrenadier Division and the Hermann Goring Panzer Division, both rebuilt after being destroyed in Tunisia.
73.
Albert Kesselring therefore pinned his hopes on an immediate counterattack, which he ordered Paul Conrath of the Hermann Goring Panzer Division to carry out the moment the objective of the Allied invasion fleet was known, with or without orders from the island commander, Alfredo Guzzoni.
74.
Albert Kesselring hoped that the Allied invasion fleet would provide good targets for U-boats, but they met with few successes.
75.
Unable to provide much more in the way of air support, Albert Kesselring gave Hube command of the heavy flak units on the island, although this was contrary to Luftwaffe doctrine.
76.
Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin later wrote that he thought that Albert Kesselring was pursuing an "eye-catching defensive success" after the disaster in Tunisia.
77.
In spite of the Allies' superiority on land, at sea, and in the air, Albert Kesselring was able to evacuate not only 40,000 men, but 9,605 vehicles, 94 guns, 47 tanks, 1,100 tons of ammunition, 970 tons of fuel, and 15,000 tons of stores.
78.
Albert Kesselring was able to achieve near-perfect coordination among the three services under his command while his opponent, Eisenhower, could not.
79.
Albert Kesselring was not informed of these plans for the time being.
80.
Albert Kesselring claimed in his memoirs that Hitler's assessment was that "Albert Kesselring is too honest for those born traitors down there".
81.
Albert Kesselring was ordered to withdraw from southern Italy and consolidate his forces with Rommel's Army Group B in Northern Italy, where Rommel would assume overall command.
82.
Albert Kesselring was appalled at the prospect of abandoning Italy, which he felt was completely unnecessary, as he was certain that Italy south of the northern Apennine Mountains could be held for six to nine months.
83.
Albert Kesselring submitted his resignation on 14 August 1943, but Karl Wolff, the Supreme SS and Police Leader in Italy, intervened on Albert Kesselring's behalf with Hitler.
84.
Albert Kesselring ordered the 3rd Panzergrenadier Division and 2nd Parachute Division to close on the city, while a detachment made an unsuccessful attempt to seize the Italian Army staff at Monterotondo in a coup de main operation.
85.
Rommel deported Italian soldiers, except for those willing to serve in German units, to Germany for forced labour, whereas Italian units in Albert Kesselring's area were initially disbanded and their men permitted to go home.
86.
Albert Kesselring felt that Hitler would have been willing to allow Italy to withdraw from the war had the Allies agreed to respect its neutrality and not use it as a base for operations against Germany.
87.
Albert Kesselring claimed in his memoirs that his command was already "written off", but he intended to fight.
88.
Albert Kesselring therefore adopted a risky strategy of making a series of landings in Italy rather than concentrating his forces.
89.
Albert Kesselring inadvertently misled him better than the best deception plan could have.
90.
At the Battle of Salerno in September 1943, Albert Kesselring launched a full-scale counterattack against the US Fifth Army landings there with Heinrich von Vietinghoff's Tenth Army.
91.
On 17 September 1943, Albert Kesselring gave Vietinghoff permission to break off the attack and withdraw.
92.
Albert Kesselring estimated that it could be held with just eleven divisions, with a couple of mobile divisions in reserve to guard against an Allied amphibious landing, whereas the position in the Northern Apennines would require up to twenty divisions.
93.
Albert Kesselring accepted the risk of being outflanked by an amphibious landing, which he believed would be Eisenhower's best move.
94.
Albert Kesselring was not aware that the necessary amphibious lift had been sent to the Indian Ocean for Operation Buccaneer, a landing in southern Burma, which was eventually cancelled.
95.
Albert Kesselring gave an optimistic assessment of the situation in Italy and gave reassurances that he could hold the Allies south of Rome on the Gustav Line.
96.
Albert Kesselring further promised that he could prevent the Allies from reaching the Northern Apennines for at least six months.
97.
On 21 November 1943, Albert Kesselring resumed command of all German forces in Italy, combining Commander-in-Chief South, a joint command, with that of Army Group C, a ground command.
98.
Albert Kesselring rushed his reserves, the 29th and 90th Panzergrenadier Divisions, to the Cassino front.
99.
Albert Kesselring wrote in his memoirs that he felt that he had been out-generalled when the Allies landed at Anzio.
100.
Albert Kesselring's forces were unable to crush the Allied beachhead, and in his memoirs, Kesselring blamed himself, OKW and Mackensen for avoidable errors.
101.
Albert Kesselring appealed to the to move more supplies by sea and urged his corps and division commanders to conserve ammunition.
102.
Whether Clark would have been able to trap Albert Kesselring had he tried still remains an open question.
103.
Albert Kesselring supported the Italian declaration of Rome as an open city on 14 August 1943, after Rome was bombed for the first time on 19 July with over 700 civilian deaths.
104.
Albert Kesselring tried to preserve the monastery of Monte Cassino by avoiding its military occupation even though it offered superb observation over the battlefield.
105.
Albert Kesselring was aware that some artworks taken from Monte Cassino for safekeeping wound up in the possession of Hermann Goring.
106.
Albert Kesselring received regular updates on efforts to preserve cultural treasures and his personal interest in the matter contributed to the high proportion of art treasures that were saved.
107.
Albert Kesselring responded by authorising the "massive employment of artillery, grenade and mortars, armoured cars, flamethrowers and other technical combat equipment" against the partisans.
108.
Albert Kesselring authorised construction of transit camps to hold suspected partisans and civilians.
109.
Three days later, Albert Kesselring issued an order authorising reprisals against the civilian population and public executions of captured partisan leaders.
110.
Four days later Albert Kesselring instructed Wolff to conduct an "anti-partisan week".
111.
Albert Kesselring was taken to hospital in Ferrara, and did not return to his command until January 1945.
112.
Albert Kesselring had served with distinction in the German artillery, and the air force and had been on the General Staff prior to the war.
113.
Albert Kesselring was well-qualified, both as a commander and an administrator, and he conducted the Axis operations in Italy with great skill for two years, after which he was transferred to the Western Front in Germany.
114.
Albert Kesselring was quick to reorganise his forces and shift reserves to meet our attacks.
115.
Albert Kesselring still described Hitler's analysis of the situation as "lucid", according to which the Germans were about to inflict a historical defeat upon the Soviets, after which the victorious German armies would be brought west to crush the Allies and sweep them from the continent.
116.
Therefore, Albert Kesselring was determined to hold in the west and await a victory in the east.
117.
Albert Kesselring endorsed Hitler's order that deserters should be hanged from the nearest tree.
118.
Nonetheless, Albert Kesselring insisted that the positions had to be held.
119.
The German position soon crumbled and Albert Kesselring later wrote that Hitler reluctantly sanctioned a withdrawal.
120.
Albert Kesselring was aware of them, having previously consented to them, although he had not informed his own staff.
121.
Lemelsen initially refused, as he was in possession of a written order from Albert Kesselring which prohibited any talks with the enemy without his explicit authorisation.
122.
Albert Kesselring ordered Hausser to supervise the SS troops to ensure that the surrender was carried out in accordance with his instructions.
123.
Albert Kesselring then surrendered to an American major at Saalfelden, near Salzburg, in Austria on 9 May 1945.
124.
Albert Kesselring was taken to see Major General Maxwell D Taylor, the commander of the US 101st Airborne Division, who treated him courteously, allowing him to keep his weapons and field marshal's baton, and to visit the Eastern Front headquarters of Army Groups Centre and South at Zeltweg and Graz unescorted.
125.
On 15 May 1945, Albert Kesselring was taken to Mondorf-les-Bains where his baton and decorations were taken from him and he was incarcerated.
126.
Albert Kesselring was held in American POW camps before being transferred to British custody in 1946.
127.
Albert Kesselring testified at the Nuremberg trial of Goring, but his offers to testify against Soviet, American and British commanders were declined.
128.
Albert Kesselring's name headed the list of German officers blamed for a long series of atrocities perpetrated by the German forces.
129.
Albert Kesselring was arraigned on two charges: the shooting of 335 Italians in the Ardeatine massacre, and incitement to kill Italian civilians.
130.
Albert Kesselring did not invoke the "Nuremberg defence".
131.
Rather, Albert Kesselring maintained that the order to kill ten Italian civilians for each German soldier killed by partisans was "just and lawful".
132.
Albert Kesselring was found guilty and shot on 1 December 1945.
133.
Churchill remarked that "Albert Kesselring was a good general, with a competent staff" in Triumph and Tragedy, the final volume of his History of the Second World War.
134.
In May 1947, Albert Kesselring was moved from Mestre prison near Venice to Wolfsberg, Carinthia.
135.
Albert Kesselring resumed his work on a history of the war that he was writing for the US Army Historical Division.
136.
Albert Kesselring contributed studies of the war in Italy and North Africa and the problems faced by the German high command.
137.
In July 1952, Albert Kesselring was diagnosed with a cancerous growth in his throat.
138.
Albert Kesselring's release unleashed a storm of protest in Italy.
139.
In 1952, while still in the hospital, Albert Kesselring accepted the honorary presidency of three veterans' organisations.
140.
Albert Kesselring's release caused an outcry and indignation in the Italian Parliament.
141.
Albert Kesselring reacted provocatively, asserting that he had saved the lives of millions of Italians by not following certain orders and that they ought to build him a monument.
142.
Albert Kesselring's memoirs were published in 1953, as.
143.
Albert Kesselring protested what he regarded as the "unjustly smirched reputation of the German soldier".
144.
Albert Kesselring enthusiastically supported the European Defence Community and suggested that the "war opponents of yesterday must become the peace comrades and friends of tomorrow".
145.
Albert Kesselring met with former comrades-in-arms and prison-mates, some of them former SS members, causing embarrassment to the Austrian government, which ordered his deportation.
146.
Albert Kesselring ignored the order and completed his tour, before leaving a week later, as he had intended.
147.
Albert Kesselring was an expert witness for the "Generals' Trials".
148.
Albert Kesselring died in a sanatorium at Bad Nauheim in West Germany, on 16 July 1960 at the age of 74, following a heart attack.
149.
Albert Kesselring was given a quasi-military funeral and buried in Bergfriedhof Cemetery in Bad Wiessee.
150.
Josef Kammhuber spoke on behalf of the and, expressing the hope that Albert Kesselring would be remembered for his earlier accomplishments rather than for his later activities.
151.
Albert Kesselring was ordered to search castles that had been used by high-ranking German officers and found the baton.