Cognitive semantics holds that language is part of a more general human cognitive ability, and can therefore only describe the world as people conceive of it.
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Cognitive semantics holds that language is part of a more general human cognitive ability, and can therefore only describe the world as people conceive of it.
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Techniques native to cognitive semantics are typically used in lexical studies such as those put forth by Leonard Talmy, George Lakoff and Dirk Geeraerts.
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Classic theories in Cognitive semantics have tended to explain the meaning of parts in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, sentences in terms of truth-conditions, and composition in terms of propositional functions.
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Cognitive semanticists argue that truth-conditional semantics is unduly limited in its account of full sentence meaning.
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An account in cognitive semantics called the dynamic construal theory makes the claim that words themselves are without meaning: they have, at best, "default construals, " which are really just ways of using words.
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Along these lines, cognitive semantics argues that compositionality can only be intelligible if pragmatic elements like context and intention are taken into consideration.
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Cognitive semantics has sought to challenge traditional theories in two ways: first, by providing an account of the meaning of sentences by going beyond truth-conditional accounts; and second, by attempting to go beyond accounts of word meaning that appeal to necessary and sufficient conditions.
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Frame Cognitive semantics, then, seeks to account for these puzzling features of lexical items in some systematic way.
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Third, cognitive semanticists argue that truth-conditional semantics is incapable of dealing adequately with some aspects of the meanings at the level of the sentence.
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Some theorists in the cognitive semantics tradition have challenged both classical and prototype accounts of category structure by proposing the dynamic construal account, where category structure is always created "on-line"—and so, that categories have no structure outside of the context of use.
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However, by at least one line of argument, truth-conditional Cognitive semantics seems to be able to capture the meaning of belief-sentences like "Frank believes that the Red Sox will win the next game" by appealing to propositional attitudes.
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