184 Facts About Erwin Rommel

Johannes Erwin Eugen Rommel was a German field marshal during World War II.

Erwin Rommel later commanded the German forces opposing the Allied cross-channel invasion of Normandy in June 1944.

Erwin Rommel was a supporter of Adolf Hitler, at least until near the end of the war, if not necessarily sympathetic to the party and the paramilitary forces associated with it.

In 1944, Erwin Rommel was implicated in the 20 July plot to assassinate Hitler.

Erwin Rommel was given a choice between committing suicide, in return for assurances that his reputation would remain intact and that his family would not be persecuted following his death, or facing a trial that would result in his disgrace and execution; he chose the former and committed suicide using a cyanide pill.

Erwin Rommel was given a state funeral, and it was announced that he had succumbed to his injuries from the strafing of his staff car in Normandy.

Erwin Rommel has become a larger-than-life figure in both Allied and Nazi propaganda, and in postwar popular culture.

Erwin Rommel was born on 15 November 1891, in Heidenheim, 45 kilometres from Ulm, in the Kingdom of Wurttemberg, Southern Germany, then part of the German Empire.

Erwin Rommel was the third of five children to Erwin Rommel Senior and his wife Helene von Luz, whose father, Karl von Luz, headed the local government council.

Erwin Rommel had one older sister who was an art teacher and his favourite sibling, one older brother named Manfred who died in infancy, and two younger brothers, of whom one became a successful dentist and the other an opera singer.

At age 18, Erwin Rommel joined the Wurttemberg Infantry Regiment No 124 in Weingarten as a Fahnrich, in 1910, studying at the Officer Cadet School in Danzig.

Erwin Rommel graduated in November 1911 and was commissioned as a lieutenant in January 1912 and was assigned to the 124th Infantry in Weingarten.

Erwin Rommel was posted to Ulm in March 1914 to the 49th Field Artillery Regiment, XIII Corps, as a battery commander.

Erwin Rommel returned to the 124th when war was declared.

Erwin Rommel successfully employed the tactics of penetrating enemy lines with heavy covering fire coupled with rapid advances, as well as moving forward rapidly to a flanking position to arrive at the rear of hostile positions, to achieve tactical surprise.

Erwin Rommel was promoted to Oberleutnant and transferred to the newly created Royal Wurttemberg Mountain Battalion of the Alpenkorps in September 1915, as a company commander.

Erwin Rommel's battalion, consisting of three rifle companies and a machine gun unit, was part of an attempt to take enemy positions on three mountains: Kolovrat, Matajur, and Stol.

Erwin Rommel achieved this remarkable success by taking advantage of the terrain to outflank the Italian forces, attacking from unexpected directions or behind enemy lines, and taking the initiative to attack when he had orders to the contrary.

In January 1918, Erwin Rommel was promoted to Hauptmann and assigned to a staff position in the 64th Army Corps, where he served for the remainder of the war.

Wherever possible, Erwin Rommel avoided the use of force in these confrontations.

Erwin Rommel decided against storming the nearby city of Lindau, which had been taken by revolutionary communists.

Erwin Rommel was then posted to the Ruhr, where a red army was responsible for fomenting unrest.

On 1 October 1920, Erwin Rommel was appointed to a company command with the 13th Infantry Regiment in Stuttgart, a post he held for the next nine years.

Erwin Rommel was then assigned to an instruction position at the Dresden Infantry School from 1929 to 1933; during this time, in April 1932, he was promoted to major.

In September 1935, Erwin Rommel was moved to the War Academy in Potsdam as an instructor, serving for the next three years.

Schirach appealed directly to Hitler; consequently, Erwin Rommel was quietly removed from the project in 1938.

Erwin Rommel had been promoted to Oberst, on 1 August 1937, and in 1938, following the Anschluss, he was appointed commandant of the Theresian Military Academy at Wiener Neustadt.

In October 1938, Hitler specially requested that Erwin Rommel be seconded to command the Fuhrerbegleitbatallion.

Erwin Rommel memorised logarithm tables in his spare time and enjoyed skiing and other outdoor sports.

Ian F Beckett writes that by 1938, Rommel drifted towards uncritical acceptance of Nazi regime, quoting Rommel's letter to his wife in which he stated "The German Wehrmacht is the sword of the new German world view" as a reaction to speech by Hitler.

Searle comments that Erwin Rommel knew the official stand of the regime, but in this case, the phrase was ambiguous and there is no evidence after or before this event that he ever sympathised with the antisemitism of the Nazi movement.

Erwin Rommel was promoted to Generalmajor on 23 August 1939 and assigned as commander of the Fuhrerbegleitbatallion, tasked with guarding Hitler and his field headquarters during the invasion of Poland, which began on 1 September.

Erwin Rommel attended Hitler's daily war briefings and accompanied him everywhere, making use of the opportunity to observe first-hand the use of tanks and other motorised units.

Erwin Rommel received a promotion to a general's rank from Hitler ahead of more senior officers.

Erwin Rommel obtained the command he aspired to, despite having been earlier turned down by the army's personnel office, which had offered him command of a mountain division instead.

Erwin Rommel was active in the forward areas, directing the efforts to make a crossing, which were initially unsuccessful because of suppressive fire by the French on the other side of the river.

Erwin Rommel brought up tanks and flak units to provide counter-fire and had nearby houses set on fire to create a smokescreen.

Erwin Rommel sent infantry across in rubber boats, appropriated the bridging tackle of the 5th Panzer Division, personally grabbed a light machine gun to fight off a French counterattack supported by tanks, and went into the water himself, encouraging the sappers and helping lash together the pontoons.

Erwin Rommel was surprised to find out only his vanguard had followed his tempestuous surge.

Erwin Rommel ordered the 5th Panzer Division to move to the west and the 7th Panzer Division to the east, flanked by the SS Division Totenkopf.

Erwin Rommel was the only divisional commander present at the planning session for Fall Rot, the second phase of the invasion of France.

On 6 February 1941, Erwin Rommel was appointed commander of the new Afrika Korps, consisting of the 5th Light Division and of the 15th Panzer Division.

Gariboldi, who had ordered Erwin Rommel to stay in Mersa El Brega, was furious.

Erwin Rommel knew that by capturing the port he could greatly reduce the length of his supply lines and increase his overall port capacity, which was insufficient even for day-to-day operations and only half that needed for offensive operations.

Erwin Rommel requested reinforcements, but the OKW, then completing preparations for Operation Barbarossa, refused.

The Allies kept up the pressure, and Erwin Rommel was forced to retreat all the way back to the starting positions he had held in March, reaching El Agheila in December 1941.

On 5 January 1942, the Afrika Korps received 55 tanks and new supplies and Erwin Rommel started planning a counterattack, which he launched on 21 January.

Between December 1941 and June 1942, Erwin Rommel had excellent information about the disposition and intentions of the Commonwealth forces.

Early in the afternoon of 26 May 1942, Erwin Rommel attacked first and the Battle of Gazala commenced.

Erwin Rommel's forces captured 32,000 Commonwealth troops, the port, and huge quantities of supplies.

Erwin Rommel strongly argued that the Panzerarmee should advance into Egypt and drive on to Alexandria and the Suez Canal, as this would place almost all the Mediterranean coastline in Axis hands and, according to Rommel, potentially lead to the capture from the south of the oil fields in the Caucasus and Middle East.

Erwin Rommel knew that delay would only benefit the British, who continued to receive supplies at a faster rate than Erwin Rommel could hope to achieve.

Erwin Rommel continued his pursuit of the Eighth Army, which had fallen back to heavily prepared defensive positions at El Alamein.

Erwin Rommel continued to attempt to advance for two more days, but repeated sorties by the Desert Air Force meant he could make no progress.

Erwin Rommel now realised the war in Africa could not be won.

Physically exhausted and suffering from a liver infection and low blood pressure, Erwin Rommel flew home to Germany to recover his health.

The increasing Allied air superiority and lack of fuel meant Erwin Rommel was forced to take a more defensive posture than he would have liked for the second Battle of El Alamein.

This, Erwin Rommel hoped, would allow his infantry to hold the line at any point until motorised and armoured units in reserve could move up and counterattack any Allied breaches.

Meanwhile, Erwin Rommel concentrated his attack on the Allied salient at Kidney Ridge, inflicting heavy losses.

However, Erwin Rommel had only 150 operational tanks remaining, and Montgomery had 800, many of them Shermans.

Erwin Rommel, who believed that the lives of his soldiers should never be squandered needlessly, was stunned.

Erwin Rommel later said the decision to delay was what he most regretted from his time in Africa.

Heavy rains slowed movements and grounded the Desert Air Force, which aided the withdrawal, yet Erwin Rommel's troops were under pressure from the pursuing Eighth Army and had to abandon the trucks of the Italian forces, leaving them behind.

Erwin Rommel continued to retreat west, aiming for 'Gabes gap' in Tunisia.

Erwin Rommel defended his decision, pointing out that if he tried to assume a defensive position the Allies would destroy his forces and take the airfields anyway; the retreat saved the lives of his remaining men and shortened his supply lines.

Erwin Rommel immediately turned back against the British forces, occupying the Mareth Line.

On 23 July 1943, Erwin Rommel was moved to Greece as commander of Army Group E to counter a possible British invasion.

Hitler met with Erwin Rommel and Kesselring to discuss future operations in Italy on 30 September 1943.

Erwin Rommel insisted on a defensive line north of Rome, while Kesselring was more optimistic and advocated holding a line south of Rome.

Erwin Rommel had wrongly predicted that the collapse of the German line in Italy would be fast.

On 4 November 1943, Erwin Rommel became General Inspector of the Western Defences.

Erwin Rommel was given a staff that befitted an army group commander, and the powers to travel, examine and make suggestions on how to improve the defences.

Erwin Rommel argued that the German armour should be held in reserve well inland near Paris, where they could be used to counter-attack in force in a more traditional military doctrine.

Erwin Rommel feared the piecemeal commitment of their armoured forces would cause them to become caught in a battle of attrition which they could not hope to win.

Erwin Rommel believed their only opportunity would be to oppose the landings directly at the beaches, and to counterattack there before the invaders could become well established.

The chain of command was convoluted: the air force and navy had their own chiefs, as did the South and Southwest France and the Panzer group; Erwin Rommel needed Hitler's permissions to use the tank divisions.

Erwin Rommel had millions of mines laid and thousands of tank traps and obstacles set up on the beaches and throughout the countryside, including in fields suitable for glider aircraft landings, the so-called Erwin Rommel's asparagus.

Erwin Rommel and Hitler's views on the matter is a matter of debate between authors, with both seeming to change their positions.

Erwin Rommel moved those armoured formations under his command as far forward as possible, ordering General Erich Marcks, commanding the 84th Corps defending the Normandy section, to move his reserves into the frontline.

Erwin Rommel drove defensive preparations all along the coast of Northern France, particularly concentrating fortification building in the River Somme estuary.

Erwin Rommel was recalled and returned to his headquarters at 10pm.

Erwin Rommel believed that if his armies pulled out of range of Allied naval fire, it would give them a chance to regroup and re-engage them later with a better chance of success.

On 17 July 1944, as Erwin Rommel was returning from visiting the headquarters of the I SS Panzer Corps, a fighter plane piloted by either Charley Fox of 412 Squadron RCAF, Jacques Remlinger of No 602 Squadron RAF, or Johannes Jacobus le Roux of No 602 Squadron RAF strafed his staff car near Sainte-Foy-de-Montgommery.

Erwin Rommel was thrown from the car, suffering injuries to the left side of his face from glass shards and three fractures to his skull.

Erwin Rommel was hospitalised with major head injuries.

One piece of evidence that points to the possibility that Erwin Rommel came to support the assassination plan was General Eberbach's confession to his son while in British captivity which stated that Erwin Rommel explicitly said to him that Hitler and his close associates had to be killed because this would be the only way out for Germany.

Erwin Rommel von Witzleben, who would have become commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht had the plot succeeded, was a field marshal, but had been inactive since 1942.

Neurath and Strolin suggested opening immediate surrender negotiations in the West, and, according to Speidel, Erwin Rommel agreed to further discussions and preparations.

Around the same timeframe, the plotters in Berlin were not aware that Erwin Rommel had allegedly decided to take part in the conspiracy.

Erwin Rommel would have known this, having commanded Hitler's army protection detail in 1939.

Erwin Rommel was in favour of peace negotiations and repeatedly urged Hitler to negotiate with the Allies which is dubbed by some as "hopelessly naive" considering no one would trust Hitler.

Butler, using Ruge's recollections, reports that when told by Hitler himself that "no one will make peace with me", Erwin Rommel told Hitler that if he was the obstacle for peace, he should resign or kill himself, but Hitler insisted on fanatical defence.

Reuth, based on Jodl's testimony, reports that Erwin Rommel forcefully presented the situation and asked for political solutions from Hitler, who rebuffed that Erwin Rommel should leave politics to him.

Brighton comments that Erwin Rommel seemed devoted, even though he did not have much faith in Hitler anymore considering he kept informing Hitler in person and by letter about his changing beliefs despite facing a military dilemma as well as a personal struggle.

Rundstedt encouraged Erwin Rommel to carry out his plans but refused to do anything himself, remarking that it had to be a man who was still young and loved by the people, while Erich von Manstein was approached by Erwin Rommel but categorically refused, although he did not report them to Hitler either.

On 17 July 1944, Erwin Rommel was incapacitated by an Allied air attack, which many authors describe as a fateful event that drastically altered the outcome of the bomb plot.

Erwin Rommel was first implicated when Stulpnagel, after his suicide attempt, repeatedly muttered "Erwin Rommel" in delirium.

Erwin Rommel began to contemplate this plan some months after El Alamein and carried it out with a lonely decision and conviction, and in the end, had managed to bring military leaders in the West to his side.

However, Hitler knew that having Erwin Rommel branded and executed as a traitor would severely damage morale on the home front.

Erwin Rommel thus decided to offer Rommel the chance to take his own life.

Erwin Rommel opted to commit suicide, and explained his decision to his wife and son.

Five minutes later Burgdorf gestured to the two men to return to the car, and Doose noticed that Erwin Rommel was slumped over, having taken the cyanide.

Erwin Rommel died before being taken to the Wagner-Schule field hospital.

Erwin Rommel's grave is located in Herrlingen, a short distance west of Ulm.

Erwin Rommel found that taking initiative and not allowing the enemy forces to regroup led to victory.

Erwin Rommel is praised by numerous authors as a great leader of men.

Erwin Rommel was aggressive and often directed battle from the front or piloted a reconnaissance aircraft over the lines to get a view of the situation.

Some pointed out that Erwin Rommel's division took the highest casualties in the campaign.

Erwin Rommel spoke German with a pronounced southern German or Swabian accent.

Erwin Rommel was not a part of the Prussian aristocracy that dominated the German high command, and as such was looked upon somewhat suspiciously by the Wehrmacht's traditional power structure.

Erwin Rommel felt a commander should be physically more robust than the troops he led, and should always show them an example.

Erwin Rommel expected his subordinate commanders to do the same.

Erwin Rommel was direct, unbending, tough in his manners, to superiors and subordinates alike, disobedient even to Hitler whenever he saw fit, although gentle and diplomatic to the lower ranks.

Erwin Rommel often went directly to Hitler with his needs and concerns, taking advantage of the favouritism that the Fuhrer displayed towards him and adding to the distrust that Kesselring and the German High Command already had of him.

In general, Erwin Rommel was a target of criticism and a scapegoat for defeat rather than a glorified figure, with certain generals trying to replace him as the heroic leader or hijack the Erwin Rommel myth for their own benefit.

Paolo Colacicchi, an officer in the Italian Tenth Army recalled that Erwin Rommel "became sort of a myth to the Italian soldiers".

Erwin Rommel himself held a much more generous view about the Italian soldier than about their leadership, towards whom his disdain, deeply rooted in militarism, was not atypical, although unlike Kesselring he was incapable of concealing it.

James J Sadkovich cites examples of Rommel abandoning his Italian units, refusing cooperation, rarely acknowledging their achievements and other improper behaviour towards his Italian allies, Giuseppe Mancinelli, who was liaison between German and Italian command, accused Rommel of blaming Italians for his own errors.

Many authors describe Erwin Rommel as having a reputation of being a chivalrous, humane, and professional officer, and that he earned the respect of both his own troops and his enemies.

Remy states that Erwin Rommel treated his Italian opponents with his usual fairness, requiring that the prisoners should be accorded the same conditions as German civilians.

Italian internees were sent to Germany for forced labour, but Erwin Rommel was unaware of this.

Remy states that although Erwin Rommel had heard rumours about massacres while fighting in Africa, his personality, combined with special circumstances, meant that he was not fully confronted with the reality of atrocities before 1944.

When Erwin Rommel learned about the atrocities that SS Division Leibstandarte committed in Italy in September 1943, he allegedly forbade his son from joining the Waffen-SS.

Bruce Watson comments that whatever racism Erwin Rommel might have had in the beginning, it was washed away when he fought in the desert.

Erwin Rommel saying that using the Indians was unfair should be put in perspective, considering the disbandment of the battle-hardened 4th Division by the Allies.

Nevertheless, according to the website of the 28th Maori Battalion, Erwin Rommel always treated them fairly and he showed understanding with regard to war crimes.

Der Spiegel comments that Erwin Rommel was simply in denial about what happened around him.

Erwin Rommel did not directly intervene, though he advised the Italian authorities to do whatever was necessary to eliminate the danger of riots and espionage; for the German general, the rear areas were to be kept "quiet" at all costs.

Bernhard again cites discussion among the German and Italian authorities about Erwin Rommel's position regarding countermeasures against local insurrection to show that Erwin Rommel fundamentally approved of Italian policy in the matter.

Bernhard opines that Erwin Rommel had informal power over the matter because his military success brought him influence on the Italian authorities.

The Museum states that Erwin Rommel was certainly aware that planning was taking place, even if his reaction to it isn't recorded, and while the main proposed Einsatzgruppen were never set in action, smaller units did murder Jews in North Africa.

Ben H Shepherd comments that Rommel showed insight and restraint when dealing with the nomadic Arabs, the only civilians who occasionally intervened into the war and thus risked reprisals as a result.

Erwin Rommel's war is always part of Hitler's war of worldviews, whether Erwin Rommel wanted it or not.

Historian Jean-Christoph Caron opines that there is no evidence that Erwin Rommel knew or would have supported Rauff's mission; he believes Erwin Rommel bore no direct responsibility regarding the SS's looting of gold in Tunisia.

In North Africa Erwin Rommel's troops laid down landmines, which in decades to come killed and maimed thousands of civilians.

Captain Horst van Oppenfeld says that Erwin Rommel did not concern himself with the racial decrees and he had never experienced any trouble caused by his ancestry during his time in the DAK even if Erwin Rommel never personally interfered on his behalf.

German troops worked almost round-the-clock under very harsh conditions, with Erwin Rommel's rewards being accordions.

Erwin Rommel was one of the commanders who protested the Oradour-sur-Glane massacre.

Erwin Rommel was famous in his lifetime, including among his adversaries.

General Klaus Naumann, who served as Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr, agrees with the military historian Charles Messenger that Erwin Rommel had challenges at the operational level, and states that Erwin Rommel's violation of the unity of command principle, bypassing the chain of command in Africa, was unacceptable and contributed to the eventual operational and strategic failure in North Africa.

Lieb remarks that Erwin Rommel displayed real mental agility, but the lack of an energetic commander, together with other problems, caused the battle largely not to be conducted in his concept, although the result was still better than Geyr's plan.

Lieb opines that while his harshest critics often said that Erwin Rommel was overrated or not suitable for higher commands, envy was a big factor here.

Erwin Rommel was among the few Axis commanders who were targeted for assassination by Allied planners.

In France, Erwin Rommel ordered the execution of one French officer who refused three times to cooperate when being taken prisoner; there are disputes as to whether this execution was justified.

French historian Petitfrere remarks that Erwin Rommel was in a hurry and had no time for useless palavers, although this act was still debatable.

Erwin Rommel was then executed by the 25th Infantry Regiment.

Butler believes that "it's almost impossible to imagine" Erwin Rommel authorising or countenancing such actions.

Also according to Gershom, the German consul in Tripoli knew about the process and trucks used to transport supply to Erwin Rommel were sometimes used to transport Jews, despite all problems the German forces were having.

Michael FitzGerald comments that the treasure should be named more accurately as Rauff's gold, as Erwin Rommel had nothing to do with its acquisition or removal.

Rick Atkinson criticises Erwin Rommel for gaining a looted stamp collection and a villa taken from Jews.

Butler notes that Erwin Rommel was one of the few who refused large estates and gifts of cash Hitler gave to his generals.

Erwin Rommel directed Rommel's photo shoots and filed radio dispatches describing the battles.

Erwin Rommel became a symbol that was used to reinforce the German public's faith in an ultimate Axis victory.

Goebbels supported the decision, noting in his diary that Erwin Rommel was "undoubtedly the suitable man" for the task.

When Erwin Rommel was seriously wounded on 17 July 1944, the Propaganda Ministry undertook efforts to conceal the injury so as not to undermine domestic morale.

Erwin Rommel was interested in propaganda beyond the promotion of his own image.

Erwin Rommel has even thought and brought out practical suggestions for each program and subject.

Erwin Rommel protested the use of propaganda at the cost of explicit military benefits though, criticising Hitler's headquarters for being unable to tell the German people and the world that El Alamein had been lost and preventing the evacuation of the German forces in Northern Africa in the process.

In 1943, he surprised Hitler by proposing that a Jew should be made into a Gauleiter to prove to the world that Germany was innocent of accusations that Erwin Rommel had heard from the enemy's propaganda regarding the mistreatment of Jews.

In 1944, Erwin Rommel himself told Ruge and his wife that Hitler had a kind of irresistible magnetic aura and was always seemingly in an intoxicated condition.

Erwin Rommel had entrusted himself to me and would never forget me for my excellent advice.

Amid growing doubts and differences, he would remain eager for Erwin Rommel's calls : he once almost grabbed the telephone out of Linge's hand.

Erwin Rommel was an ambitious man who took advantage of his proximity to Hitler and willingly accepted the propaganda campaigns designed for him by Goebbels.

In 1918, Erwin Rommel refused an invitation to a prestigious officer training course, and with it, the chance to be promoted to general.

Erwin Rommel was thus attracted by the Common Man theme which promised to level German society, the glorification of the national community, and the idea of a soldier of common background who served the Fatherland with talent and got rewarded by another common man who embodied the will of the German people.

The historian Peter Lieb states that it was not clear whether the threat of defeat was the only reason Erwin Rommel wanted to switch sides.

Erwin Rommel even began to think that it was lucky that his Afrika Korps was now safe as POWs and could escape Hitler's Wagnerian ending.

Erwin Rommel is a National Socialist; he is a troop leader with a gift for improvisation, personally courageous and extraordinarily inventive.

When Erwin Rommel lost faith in the final victory and Hitler's leadership, Hitler and Goebbels tried to find an alternative in Manstein to remedy the fighting will and "political direction" of other generals but did not succeed.

Himmler, who played a decisive role in Erwin Rommel's death, tried to blame Keitel and Jodl for the deed.

Franz Halder, after concocting several schemes to rein in Erwin Rommel through people like Paulus and Gause to no avail, concluded that Erwin Rommel was a madman with whom no one dared to cross swords because of "his brutal methods and his backing from the highest levels".

Hitler realised that Erwin Rommel attracted the elites' negative emotions to himself, in the same way he generated optimism in the common people.

Maurice Remy concludes that, unwillingly and probably without ever realising it, Erwin Rommel was part of a murderous regime, although he never actually grasped the core of Nazism.

Erwin Rommel was a Nazi general in some aspects, considering his support for the leader cult and the Volksgemeinschaft, but he was not an antisemite, nor a war criminal, nor a radical ideological fighter.

The seeds of the myth can be found first in Erwin Rommel's drive for success as a young officer in World War I and then in his popular 1937 book Infantry Attacks, which was written in a style that diverged from the German military literature of the time and became a best-seller.

When Erwin Rommel came to North Africa, it was picked up and disseminated in the West by the British press as the Allies sought to explain their continued inability to defeat the Axis forces in North Africa.

The British military and political figures contributed to the heroic image of the man as Erwin Rommel resumed offensive operations in January 1942 against the British forces weakened by redeployments to the Far East.

Erwin Rommel was chosen because he embodied the decent soldier, cunning yet fair-minded, and if guilty by association, not so guilty that he became unreliable, and additionally, former comrades reported that he was close to the Resistance.

Cornelia Hecht notes that despite the change of times, Erwin Rommel has become the symbol of different regimes and concepts, which is paradoxical, whoever the man he really was.

When Erwin Rommel's alleged involvement in the plot to kill Hitler became known after the war, his stature was enhanced in the eyes of his former adversaries.

Erwin Rommel was often cited in Western sources as a patriotic German willing to stand up to Hitler.

Erwin Rommel's marriage was a happy one, and he wrote his wife at least one letter every day while he was in the field.

In 2021, the Student Council of the Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nurnberg decided to change the name of their Sud-Campus into Erwin Rommel-Campus, emphasising that the city of Erlangen stands behind the name and the university needs to do the same.

The Erwin Rommel Museum opened in 1989 in the Villa Lindenhof in Herrlingen.