Gettier problem, in the field of epistemology, is a landmark philosophical problem concerning the understanding of descriptive knowledge.
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Gettier problem, in the field of epistemology, is a landmark philosophical problem concerning the understanding of descriptive knowledge.
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Gettier himself was not actually the first to raise the problem named after him; its existence was acknowledged by both Alexius Meinong and Bertrand Russell, the latter of which discussed the problem in his book Human knowledge: Its scope and limits.
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Gettier problem sees, in the valley ahead, a shimmering blue expanse.
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Edmund Gettier's formulation of the problem was important as it coincided with the rise of the sort of philosophical naturalism promoted by W V O Quine and others, and was used as a justification for a shift towards externalist theories of justification.
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John L Pollock and Joseph Cruz have stated that the Gettier problem has "fundamentally altered the character of contemporary epistemology" and has become "a central problem of epistemology since it poses a clear barrier to analyzing knowledge".
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Gettier problem's paper used counterexamples to argue that there are cases of beliefs that are both true and justified—therefore satisfying all three conditions for knowledge on the JTB account—but that do not appear to be genuine cases of knowledge.
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Therefore, Gettier problem argued, his counterexamples show that the JTB account of knowledge is false, and thus that a different conceptual analysis is needed to correctly track what we mean by "knowledge".
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Gettier problem's case is based on two counterexamples to the JTB analysis, both involving a fictional character named Smith.
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Main idea behind Gettier problem's examples is that the justification for the belief is flawed or incorrect, but the belief turns out to be true by sheer luck.
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Gettier problem is formally a problem in first-order logic, but the introduction by Gettier of terms such as believes and knows moves the discussion into the field of epistemology.
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Gettier problem's cases involve propositions that were true, believed, but which had weak justification.
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For example, one might argue that what the Gettier problem shows is not the need for a fourth independent condition in addition to the original three, but rather that the attempt to build up an account of knowledge by conjoining a set of independent conditions was misguided from the outset.
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The Gettier problem always arises when the given justification has nothing to do with what really makes the proposition true.
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Gettier problem concludes that there will always be a counterexample to any definition of knowledge in which the believer's evidence does not logically necessitate the belief.
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One might respond to Gettier problem by finding a way to avoid his conclusion in the first place.
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However, it can hardly be argued that knowledge is justified true belief if there are cases that are justified true belief without being knowledge; thus, those who want to avoid Gettier problem's conclusions have to find some way to defuse Gettier problem's counterexamples.
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Or, demonstrate a case in which it is possible to circumvent surrender to the exemplar by eliminating any necessity for it to be considered that JTB apply in just those areas that Gettier problem has rendered obscure, without thereby lessening the force of JTB to apply in those cases where it actually is crucial.
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Such accounts, of course, face the same burden as causalist responses to Gettier problem: they have to explain what sort of relationship between the world and the believer counts as a justificatory relationship.
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