214 Facts About Hubert Gough

General Sir Hubert de la Poer Gough was a senior officer in the British Army in the First World War.

Hubert Gough experienced a meteoric rise during the First World War, from command of a cavalry brigade in August 1914, to division command at the First Battle of Ypres that autumn, to a corps at the Battle of Loos a year later.

Hubert Gough's tenure was marked by controversy around his leadership style, his perceived reputation as "a thruster", and the efficiency of the organisation of his Army, especially relative to the reputation for caution and efficiency of Herbert Plumer's Second Army.

Fifth Army bore the initial brunt of the German spring offensive in March 1918, and Hubert Gough was relieved of his command.

Hubert Gough gradually re-emerged as an influential figure in military circles and public life, writing two volumes of memoirs.

Hubert Gough was a senior commander in the London Home Guard in the Second World War and lived long enough to be interviewed on television in the early 1960s.

Hubert Gough was educated at Eton College then at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst.

Hubert Gough was gazetted into the 16th Lancers as a second lieutenant on 5 March 1889.

Hubert Gough was promoted to lieutenant on 23 July 1890, and set out for India that autumn.

Hubert Gough was promoted captain on 22 December 1894 at the relatively early age of 24.

Hubert Gough returned to England in June 1898, and sat the examination for entrance to the Staff College, Camberley.

Hubert Gough married Margaret Louisa Nora Lewes on 22 December 1898.

Hubert Gough started at Staff College, Camberley on 9 January 1899 but did not complete the course.

Hubert Gough was deployed to Natal, initially as instructor to one of the Rifle Associations.

Hubert Gough then served as ADC to Lord Dundonald, who was commanding mounted troops in Natal.

Hubert Gough led his regiment to assist Buller's third attempt to cross the Tugela, and in the fourth attempt.

Hubert Gough led the first British troops into Ladysmith, in defiance of written orders from Dundonald and there met his brother Johnnie who had been besieged inside the town.

Hubert Gough's meeting with George Stuart White was widely portrayed.

Hubert Gough was invalided home with a wounded right hand in January 1902,.

Hubert Gough returned as a Regular Army captain in the 16th Lancers on 23 August 1902, but the following month was appointed brigade major of the 1st Cavalry Brigade at Aldershot on 24 September 1902 with promotion to the substantive rank of major on 22 October 1902.

Hubert Gough was appointed an instructor at the Staff College on 1 January 1904 and served there until 1906 under Colonel Henry Rawlinson as commandant.

Hubert Gough was promoted brevet colonel on 11 June 1906 and substantive lieutenant colonel on 18 July 1906, but continued to serve at the Staff College in his position.

Hubert Gough was appointed commanding officer of the 16th Lancers on 15 December 1907.

Hubert Gough was still the youngest lieutenant colonel in the army.

Hubert Gough was then placed on the half-pay list on 19 December 1910 and was promoted to full colonel on the same date.

On 1 January 1911 Hubert Gough was removed from half-pay and promoted to temporary brigadier general and appointed general officer commanding of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade at the Curragh, taking over from Major General The Hon.

Hubert Gough was one of the leading officers who threatened to accept dismissal in the ensuing Curragh incident.

Hubert Gough sent a telegram to his brother Johnnie, Haig's Chief of Staff at Aldershot.

Hubert Gough did not attend the second meeting in the afternoon, at which Paget confirmed that the purpose of the move was to overawe Ulster rather than fight.

Hubert Gough was suspended from duty and he and 2 of his 3 colonels were summoned to the War Office to explain themselves.

Hubert Gough sent a telegram to the elderly Field-Marshal Roberts, purporting to ask for advice, although possibly designed to goad him into further action.

At the outbreak of war in August 1914, Hubert Gough took the 3rd Cavalry Brigade to France, under the command of Allenby.

Hubert Gough's brigade fought at the Battle of Mons.

Hubert Gough's brigade fought at the Battle of Le Cateau.

Hubert Gough was promoted to the rank of major-general on 26 October 1914, backdated to 15 September, the date on which his division had been formed.

Hubert Gough's division returned to the front line at Hooge, near Ypres, on 12 February 1915.

Haig specifically asked for Hubert Gough to be attached to his forces in case he succeeded in "breaking the enemy line" at Neuve Chapelle ; Hubert Gough's division was in GHQ Reserve for that battle.

Hubert Gough was appointed GOC of the 7th Division on 18 April 1915, part of Rawlinson's IV Corps, itself part of Haig's First Army; Hubert Gough may have been appointed as a counterbalance to Rawlinson, with whom Haig had a wary relationship.

Hubert Gough's division was in reserve at Second Ypres.

Hubert Gough expected to be disciplined by Rawlinson, but instead his division was redeployed to the sector of Monro's I Corps, where diversionary attacks were to be mounted to assist the French.

The next day Hubert Gough made little further progress despite assistance from almost every First Army gun in range.

Hubert Gough was appointed GOC I Corps, still part of Haig's First Army, and promoted temporary lieutenant-general on 13 July 1915.

Hubert Gough proposed that 9th Scottish Division should "rush" the German positions on his left just before dawn after a barrage and gas attack, while the following night 7th Division would push through the Quarries to Citie St Elie.

Hubert Gough was away from his headquarters for two hours that morning trying to discover why 28 Brigade on his left were not making progress.

Hubert Gough made little mention of this episode in his memoirs, while the divisional history was scathing about it.

Nick Lloyd argues that Hubert Gough displayed the aggression and impatience for which he was later to become notorious.

Hubert Gough began a corps-level inquiry into the lessons of the battle, which after a discussion with Haig was followed by an army-level inquiry.

Hubert Gough's inquiry found that British attacks had been stymied by lack of grenades, but had come close to achieving a breakthrough in areas where the wind had carried British chlorine gas over the German lines.

Hubert Gough was appointed GOC Reserve Corps, which was to exploit any breakthrough achieved at the Somme, on 4 April 1916.

Hubert Gough spent most of the next two months supervising the training of the cavalry divisions.

Hubert Gough's staff had to liaise with XIII and XV Corps to draw up contingency plans in case "things went as we hoped for" and with Lieutenant General Claud Jacob, whose II Corps was earmarked for the exploitation.

Haig told Hubert Gough he was "too inclined to aim at fighting a battle at Bapaume" but should instead be ready to push on, before the Germans had a chance to attack him from the North.

Haig would have preferred Hubert Gough to take command of the two left hand corps prior to the attack but instead, that evening, approved Rawlinson's plan for Hubert Gough to set up HQ at Albert as soon as the Pozieres Heights had fallen.

Research by Stephen Badsey among the surviving evidence suggests that the final plan was probably for Hubert Gough to exploit any breakthrough achieved in the initial attack with the 25th Division, followed by two of the three cavalry divisions, then the II Corps.

Hubert Gough visited Rawlinson in the afternoon but was told that there would be no breakthrough that day, so he ordered cavalry to return to billets.

Sheffield wrote that the attack was "a complete shambles", but Hubert Gough was not entirely to blame and that it typified the "chaos" of British operations at that stage.

Hubert Gough was promoted to the temporary rank of general on 7 July 1916, aged just 45.

Hubert Gough had to be dissuaded from launching 1st Australian Division against Pozieres at 24 hours notice.

Walker later wrote of how he had had to demand extra artillery, and only obtained permission to attack from the south east rather than the south west as Hubert Gough wanted after taking Edward "Moses" Beddington, a staff officer whom Hubert Gough trusted, with him to reconnoitre the position.

Haig advised Hubert Gough to "go into all the difficulties carefully", as that division had not fought in France before.

Hubert Gough defended the ANZACs to Haig against "tittle-tattle" at GHQ by officers who had "no idea of the real worth of the Australians".

Hubert Gough later claimed he had given Walker no choice but had himself ordered the change in the direction of the attack.

Hubert Gough used his corps as "postboxes", whereas Rawlinson was more tolerant of debate and discussion.

Hubert Gough was reluctant to allow corps their normal role of control of artillery and in planning operations.

Hubert Gough clashed badly with Philip Howell, Chief of Staff of II Corps.

Hubert Gough thought Howell a "great thorn" who spent much time "trying to argue", avoiding fighting and disobeying orders.

Hubert Gough ordered further attacks to seize the German OG1 and OG2 trenches north of Pozieres, and to take Mouquet Farm.

Bean blamed Legge for not standing up to Hubert Gough, and wrote that Brudenell White blamed himself for not doing so, although Sheffield argues that this is not entirely fair, as Legge, a "colonial", should have had more support from Corps level.

Haig recorded that Hubert Gough had demanded "reasons in writing" from Legge, after the failure of the Australian attack.

Hubert Gough had written to Birdwood demanding an explanation and asking if the attack would have succeeded given "greater energy and foresight on the part of the higher commanders".

Hubert Gough now planned to capture Thiepval by converging attacks by the ANZACs from the east and by II Corps to the south west.

Hubert Gough almost pushed Maj-Gen Robert Fanshawe to the point of resignation.

However, Hubert Gough took responsibility for not having cancelled the operation when it was clear surprise had been lost.

Hubert Gough had lost an ADC wounded next to him as he observed attacks, his third during the war.

Hubert Gough had submitted an ambitious plan for the capture of Courcelette on his right flank.

Hubert Gough wrote that many corps and division commanders were "incompetent" and that "considerable exercise of firmness" was needed to get them to obey orders.

Hubert Gough's plan was for 18th Division to capture Thiepval and Schwaben Redoubt, 11th Division to capture Mouquet Farm and Zollern and Stuff Redoubts while on the right 1st and 2nd Canadian divisions were to attack from Courcelette to Regina Trench which lay just beyond the ridge line.

Hubert Gough allocated all seven of his tanks to the Canadians.

Hubert Gough recommended aiming for deep advances into enemy positions, with troops attacking up to five consecutive preassigned objectives, with waves aiming for predetermined objectives in a conveyor-belt approach.

Hubert Gough recommended that each division attack with two brigades and hold a third brigade in reserve, ready to take the third objective, by which time the first two brigades would have been reorganised to take the fourth objective.

Hubert Gough wanted commanders to keep as far forward as possible, even if it was not possible to keep in contact with their superiors by telephone, in order not to have to waste time sending junior officers forward to reconnoitre and report back.

Hubert Gough agreed with Haig's suggestion that "the deterioration of the Enemy's fighting qualities" meant that it was not necessary for British troops to be protected by a barrage once they had captured an enemy position, as this would hamper reserves from pushing on to the next objective.

Hubert Gough was to attack Loupart Wood from the south and Beaumont Hamel from the west.

Wilson, whom Hubert Gough had disliked since the Curragh incident, commanded IV Corps first alongside then under Hubert Gough in 1916.

Wilson commented in his diary on reports of Hubert Gough micro-managing divisions and even brigades.

Haig cautioned Hubert Gough to wait for three days of fine weather before attacking again.

Hubert Gough complained that Brigadier-General Radcliffe "made unnecessary difficulties".

Haig urged Hubert Gough to wait for dry weather before proceeding.

Hubert Gough later recorded that the first murmurings against Haig's leadership were beginning to be heard in London.

Hubert Gough then consulted his corps commanders : Jacob was persuaded to try for deeper objectives as Fanshawe and Congreve wanted.

Staff officers and patrols inspected the ground and Hubert Gough visited six divisional commanders and ten brigadiers, seeing two battalion commanders at each brigade headquarters.

Hubert Gough had asked his corps commanders to make similar inquiries.

Hubert Gough found no consensus as to whether or not the ground was dry enough.

Hubert Gough ordered further attacks the next day, leading to the vicious local struggles for Munich and Frankfort Trenches.

Brigadier-General Home of the Cavalry Corps noted that the rumours that Hubert Gough was to be promoted to Commander-in-Chief in Haig's place were "too comic as I don't think they could ever make him do what they wanted".

Hubert Gough forced 2nd Division to attack for two consecutive days despite protests from its commander and chief of staff that the ground was impassable.

Kiggell later wrote to Edmonds "the later stages of the fight were hardly justified, but Hubert Gough was so keen and confident the C-in-C decided to permit them".

On his copy of the report, against the comment that copies of Hubert Gough's remarks were to be sent to the two divisional commanders, Fanshawe wrote "I hope not all of them" and protested in the margin that he had been in telephone contact with divisions throughout.

Hubert Gough practised top-down command to a degree which was unusual in the British Army of that era, with its culture, evolved in an army designed for fighting small colonial wars, of leaving decisions to "the man on the spot".

Sheffield argues that Hubert Gough's behaviour was to some extent an attempt to answer the dilemma noted by Malcolm.

Hubert Gough himself had a tendency to ignore orders from above when it suited him, the very tendency he abhorred in his own subordinates.

Some of Hubert Gough's ideas were adopted in other armies: Fourth Army's document Artillery Lessons of the Battle of the Somme reflected Hubert Gough's prescriptive approach rather than the delegation encouraged under Field Service Regulations, or practised by Rawlinson during the Somme.

On 1 January 1917, Hubert Gough was promoted to permanent lieutenant general, while continuing to hold the temporary rank of full general.

Brigadier-General Cumming later recalled Hubert Gough's visit to the headquarters of 91 Brigade in February 1917.

Hubert Gough had a reputation for "terroris those under him to the extent that they are afraid to express their opinions for fear of being ".

Hubert Gough was allowed to expand Fifth Army's role in Arras beyond what had originally been intended.

Hubert Gough commanded the southern part of the offensive.

Hubert Gough told the Army commanders that he was not entirely clear what the BEF would be doing for the rest of the year but that he wanted to "shift the centre of gravity up to the Second Army".

Hubert Gough later wrote highly of Maxse, Jacob and Congreve, his corps commanders in 1917, although not of Watts.

Hubert Gough agreed with Maxse's proposal for attacks just before sunset and advancing further than the Black Line to the River Steenbeck.

Hubert Gough agreed that opportunities had gone to waste at Arras as the initial attack had not been pressed hard enough.

Simpson comments that as adequate field artillery support on the first day would only extend as far as the Green Line in places, "a repulse was almost inevitable" for those units which pushed on further, and that Hubert Gough still did not appear to realise that an offensive might stall because of stronger German resistance and counter-attacks, rather than from lack of initiative among junior officers.

When Plumer, after consultation with his corps commanders, declined to be rushed in this way, Haig placed II and VIII Corps under Hubert Gough's command, ordering him to prepare to seize the area around Stirling Castle.

Hubert Gough planned a four-phase attack across a front of 8 miles : "a series of organised battles".

All available heavy artillery was to be ready to lay a protective barrage in front of the fourth objective, where Hubert Gough expected that resistance by German reserves would be met.

Brigadier-General "Tavish" Davidson, Director of Military Operations at GHQ, now proposed that Hubert Gough make jumps of "not less than 1,500 yards and not more than 3,000 yards ", while recommending jumps of only about a mile.

Haig was principally concerned that Hubert Gough was not giving sufficient weight to the attack on Gheluveld Plateau.

Hubert Gough repeated this advice to Haig over dinner although he was concerned that Haig would not insist hard enough.

Aylmer Haldane recorded in his diary his lack of keenness at going to Fifth Army and wrote that Hubert Gough was "very impetuous and difficult to get on with" as well as "excitable and thoughtless and impatient".

Hubert Gough was granted three extra days for bombardment as it had taken longer than expected to get heavy artillery into place.

Haig urged Hubert Gough to stick to "the original plan" and consolidate the ground gained and prepare for the next advance "only after adequate bombardment and after dominating the enemy artillery".

Davidson objected to hurried preparations, the use of "part worn" troops, and recommended Hubert Gough wait for two or three days of good flying weather to allow "careful and accurate shooting".

Part of the reason for the failure of the attack on Westhoek to hold ground east of the village, was that Hubert Gough had dispersed his artillery along the rest of his front in readiness for the next big push.

The French on Hubert Gough's left, heavily equipped with artillery and facing weaker German defences, achieved their targets for a cost of only 350 casualties, while Cavan's XIV Corps on Hubert Gough's left achieved its objectives against tired German forces which were in the process of being relieved.

When Hubert Gough accused the troops in question of not being able to hold onto their gains because they "were Irish and did not like the enemy's shelling", Haig was not impressed by Hubert Gough "playing the Irish Card" and noted that the men had been exhausted and that the bombardment had been ineffective.

Hubert Gough later came to regret the "Irish card" comments when he learned the facts.

Hubert Gough demanded Gough get the facts and then "talk the matter over with him".

Hubert Gough saw Gough later the same day and informed him that he was to undertake subsidiary attacks to assist Plumer.

Plumer's biographer describes it as "a bloody fiasco" in which some of Hubert Gough's men were left standing up to their knees in water for up to ten hours before zero hour.

However, Hubert Gough protested that two of the divisions were soon to leave the salient, and that for the sake of their "training and morale" they should be made to retake ground which they had recently lost to counterattacks.

Kiggell reported that "some of Hubert Gough's subordinates" did not give an honest answer as to the likely success of attacks and remarked to Neil Malcolm of the order to make only limited attacks: "We did not expect you to pursue the matter so vigorously".

Lord Derby warned Haig of Hubert Gough's growing unpopularity, among Canadian troops and at home in the UK.

Hubert Gough moved his HQ to Nesle in mid December 1917.

In January 1918 Lt-Col Armitage recorded that in his meeting with Smuts and Hankey "Hubert Gough, compared with other army commanders, did not come convincingly out of that interview as his views were somewhat narrow and he failed to put before Smuts the perilous position on his front".

Yet Smuts' own account of the meeting recorded that he learned more about conditions at the front from Hubert Gough than from other generals, while Hankey recorded that Hubert Gough was "a terrific fellow, oozing with character and Irish humour".

Hubert Gough had only eleven divisions rather than the seventeen he demanded.

At a corps commanders' conference on 3 February, Hubert Gough warned them that intelligence had deduced that von Hutier, who had recently taken Riga in September 1917, was opposite them.

Hubert Gough badgered Haig and Petain and was assured that Humbert's French Third Army at Clermont was earmarked to reinforce him.

Davidson proposed building a fortified bridgehead around the Somme crossings at Brie and Peronne, and wanted Hubert Gough to fortify the River Tortille, which runs roughly northeast from Peronne to the Canal du Nord.

Lord Bertie suggested to Haig that Hubert Gough be appointed Governor of Gibraltar.

Hubert Gough was active in inspecting units to encourage the construction of defences.

Hubert Gough requested that men from 20th and 50th Divisions be used to help dig defences, but this was vetoed by GHQ.

Hubert Gough had a reasonable idea of the size and timing of the German attack from air reconnaissance and interrogation of prisoners, although many at GHQ believed the attack would not be until a few days or weeks.

Hubert Gough argues that Gough ought to have demanded to speak to Haig personally, which was his right but not the etiquette of the time.

Hubert Gough was disinclined to speak to Lawrence or Davidson again, and disappointed not to hear directly from Haig himself that day.

Hubert Gough attempted to halt Maxse's withdrawal when he heard of it, but it was too late.

Hubert Gough spent much of that day visiting Maxse and Watts, and reconnoitring the ground east of Amiens which his troops would have to hold next.

Hubert Gough later realised that they had been on their way to the Doullens Conference at which Foch was appointed generalissimo.

Hubert Gough had to send a messenger, Paul Maze, to Humbert's headquarters, with orders to get back XVIII Corps artillery which had been lent temporarily to the French, with orders not to leave until he had obtained written orders for its return.

Hubert Gough spent much of the afternoon with Watts, whose sector was being strongly attacked.

Hubert Gough thought him "peremptory, rude and excited", but such a manner was common in French generals, whose subordinates sometimes answered back in similar vein.

Hubert Gough telephoned Haig to complain, adding that French troops were falling back at a much faster rate than his own.

Haig recorded that Hubert Gough complained that Foch had been "most impertinent" to him.

Hubert Gough had never lost his head, was always cheery and fought hard.

Byng, on hearing this news had moved 1st Cavalry Division south of the Somme and returned it to Hubert Gough's command pending the arrival of 61st Division by hastily organised motor transport.

The next day Haig received a telegram from Lord Derby ordering that Hubert Gough be dismissed altogether on the grounds of "having lost the confidence of his troops".

Hubert Gough's formations had retreated over 40 miles and communications often broke down.

Martin Kitchen takes a more critical view, pointing out that troops were initially under orders not to retire from the forward zone, that there were no adequate lines of communications between corps, and that Hubert Gough caused further trouble by issuing orders direct to lower formations, even down to brigade level.

Byng wrote to the editor of the Daily Express that Hubert Gough was "talking too much and had better keep quiet".

Hubert Gough resisted the temptation to breach King's Regulations by airing his views in public as Maurice had done or to brief Opposition MPs.

Hubert Gough was not in London for the peace ceremonies, and it is unclear whether he knew that he was one of the senior officers whom Lloyd George deliberately did not invite.

Hubert Gough was initially angry that this was not a full exoneration and implied that he might be employed in his permanent rank of lieutenant-general, but eventually accepted because of the praise given to Fifth Army.

Hubert Gough was appointed Chief of the Allied Military Mission to the Baltic on 19 May 1919.

Hubert Gough was privately briefed by the Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon not to let Churchill push him into intervention, and not to let troops supported by England occupy Petrograd, which might cause friction with future Russian governments.

The Iron Division backed off from their plans to attack Russia, and after initial attempts to defy British demands were persuaded by Hubert Gough's firm stand to depart for Germany by rail.

However, White Russian opinion was angered by the independence of Finland, Estonia and Latvia, and emigre groups in London, both imperialist and social democrat, put it about that Hubert Gough was in the pay of the Bolsheviks, while gossips talked again of his "responsibility" for Third Ypres.

Hubert Gough was sacked at the Prime Minister's insistence on 25 October 1919 and returned home, and neither sought nor was offered further military employment.

Hubert Gough was a signatory to joint statement issued with other officers and advisors who had served in Russia, who on 23 February 1920 indicated their support of peace between the British and the Bolshevik Russia.

Hubert Gough retired from the Army as a full general on 26 October 1922, although owing to an administrative error he was initially told that he would receive the pension of a full colonel, his substantive rank as of August 1914.

Hubert Gough's name was proposed to the Cabinet early in 1921 by William O'Brien as a potential Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.

Hubert Gough initially found that his recent "difficulties" in France would make it difficult for him to pick up company directorships.

Hubert Gough became a director of the Ashley Trading Company, initially selling US-manufactured wallpaper paste in Britain.

The reputation which Hubert Gough had won on his commercial trip to Baku in 1919 enabled him to obtain several directorships, including Siemens Brothers and Caxton Electrical Development Company.

Hubert Gough was involved in the management and fundraising of King's College Hospital and St Mary's Hospital, London.

In March 1930 Hubert Gough was approached by Lord Birkenhead to assist with the writing of a chapter on the March 1918 crisis in his forthcoming book Turning Points in History.

The book was published in October 1930 and the book's praise of Hubert Gough's handling of the March 1918 Offensive was widely quoted in newspaper reviews.

Hubert Gough angrily denied Bean's account of the events at Pozieres in July 1916 and Bean's claim that he was "temperamentally" prone to hasty attacks without proper reconnaissance.

Hubert Gough approached the King's adviser Lord Stamfordham as to whether His Majesty would be willing to mark the anniversary of March 1918 with a public tribute to the Fifth Army, only to be brushed aside by another Royal adviser Clive Wigram with the news that the King would prefer Gough, like Haig, not to write his memoirs.

Hubert Gough was dissuaded from sending a copy to the King, but sent a copy to the Prince of Wales, receiving a handwritten note in reply.

Hubert Gough made no mention of his dispute with Walker on 18 July 1916, although he pointedly omitted him from a list praising officers commanding Australian formations.

Ahead of the publication of the 1918 volume, Hubert Gough dined twice with Lloyd George and his historical adviser Liddell Hart.

Hubert Gough was initially impressed by the former Prime Minister's charisma, and was almost persuaded that he had had nothing to do with his sacking in April 1918, until he remembered that both Esher and Birkenhead had told him the truth years earlier.

Hubert Gough complained to Edmonds that other Army and corps commanders did not issue enough detailed guidance to their subordinates.

The Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin declined to do so in response to a Question in the Commons, although he acknowledged that Hubert Gough's reputation had been vindicated.

In 1939, prior to the outbreak of war, Hubert Gough was initially appointed a "conducting officer" to supervise the evacuation of women and children to Kent and Sussex, but was asked to resign after it was pointed out that to use a distinguished general in this role was a gift to German propaganda.

Hubert Gough later rejoined the organisation as a "duty officer" and served as a member of an "emergency squad" standing by to give assistance in the event of air raids, while continuing to write newspaper articles.

In May 1940 Hubert Gough joined the LDV and was put in command of the Chelsea Home Guard, which he organised from scratch.

Hubert Gough had no idea how to conduct the action Haig required and would not take advice.

Wynne agreed that Haig had originally intended a breakthrough, but wrote that he had learned from Davidson that Haig had changed his mind after his meeting with the politicians, after which he had issued renewed orders for Hubert Gough to "wear down the enemy" but "have an objective".

Wynne argued that Hubert Gough had placed too much emphasis on the "objective" rather than the "wearing down".

Hubert Gough pointed out that a sleeper roadway earmarked for exploiting cavalry had been prepared long before he had been appointed to command the offensive and that appointing him was evidence of Haig's desire for ambitious objectives.

Hubert Gough accused Cavan of inventing a claim that he had begged Gough to let II Corps "bang through on the right" and a footnote to that effect was deleted from the History, although Cavan's claim is in fact confirmed by letters at the time; Percy Beddington, then GSO1 of a division, later chief of staff Fifth Army, later felt that Gough should have devoted a further two divisions to attacking the Gheluveld Plateau.

Hubert Gough claimed that it was he who had realised the mistake.

Hubert Gough claimed that any entries in Haig's diary urging a step-by-step advance had been "written up after the event".

Hubert Gough should have been sacked for them without a pension.

Hubert Gough and his wife Mary then had four daughters: Myrtle Eleanore born 4 April 1904, Anne born 1906, Joyce born 6 November 1913, and Denise born 26 March 1916.

In common with many generals of the era, Hubert Gough was a man of strong religious faith.

Hubert Gough published another volume of memoirs, Soldiering On, in 1954.

In March 1963, shortly before his death, Hubert Gough was interviewed on television, using the opportunity to criticise his old nemesis Wilson.

Hubert Gough died in London on 18 March 1963 at the age of 92.

Hubert Gough suffered from bronchial pneumonia for a month before his death occurred.

Hubert Gough was a man of whom there were extreme opinions; he was the only senior general who regularly visited forward trenches.

Hubert Gough was the youngest of the Army Commanders by five years.

Oliver wrote that Hubert Gough brought "something of the nature of religious fervour into his profession".

Hubert Gough is often described as having had a "peppery" personality.

Hubert Gough's admiring biographer Anthony Farrar-Hockley pointed out that during the Battle of the Somme Hubert Gough had captured more difficult ground than Rawlinson, had taken more prisoners but had suffered only half as many casualties.

Farrar-Hockley pointed out that not only did Hubert Gough not have enough artillery to succeed at Ypres in August 1917, but argues that the limited advances advocated by "Tavish" Davidson were no cheaper in lives and did not stand any chance of achieving breakthrough or capturing German guns.

Simkins argues that Hubert Gough might have been more successful in the semi-open warfare of the Hundred Days.

Les Carlyon concurs that Hubert Gough was unfairly dealt with in 1918 but regards his performance during the Great War in generally unflattering terms, citing documented and repeated failings in planning, preparation, comprehension of the battle space and a lack of empathy with the common soldier.

Nicholas Ridley comments that the suggestion that Hubert Gough effectively committed murder is, on the face of it, absurd and an example of the problems of relying on uncorroborated decades-old eyewitness testimony.

Hubert Gough, overruling the Divisional Commander's recommendation for clemency, recommended that the execution proceed.

Farrar-Hockley argues that Hubert Gough was a popular figure until Bullecourt.

Hubert Gough was notorious for his "encounters" with subordinates.

Hubert Gough was "looked on as a bit of a freak".