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facts about jakob suritz.html

74 Facts About Jakob Suritz

facts about jakob suritz.html1.

Jakob Suritz, known by the Russian version of his name, Yakov Zakharovich Surits, was a Soviet diplomat best known for serving as the Soviet ambassador to France during the Danzig crisis.

2.

Jakob Suritz's father, Zakhary Suritz owned a jewelry store, and his mother, Reizi Suritz was a house wife.

3.

Jakob Suritz was at first active in the main Jewish socialist group in the Russian empire, the General Jewish Labour Bund, which he joined in 1902.

4.

Jakob Suritz had no experience as a diplomat and was only recruited because he was fluent in German and French.

5.

Subsequently, Jakob Suritz was sent to Kabul to serve as the first Soviet minister to Afghanistan.

6.

Jakob Suritz was described having "arrived like a hurricane" in Kabul in December 1919 as he sent out to convince the Emir Amanullah Khan that he should align Afghanistan with Soviet Russia against the British empire.

7.

From 1920 to 1922, Jakob Suritz was a member of the Turkestan Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

8.

From 29 May 1922 to 27 April 1923, Jakob Suritz served as the Soviet minister in Oslo.

9.

From 14 June 1923 to 19 June 1934, Jakob Suritz served as the Soviet ambassador to Turkey.

10.

Jakob Suritz was close to President Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and arranged for him along with his premier Ismet Inonu to attend a lavish banquet at the Soviet embassy in 1927 to honor the 10th anniversary of the October revolution.

11.

At one ball at the Cankaya Mansion, Kemal was careful enough to place himself between Jakob Suritz seated on his left and the British ambassador, Sir George Clerk, seated on his right to symbolize his desire to be desire to keep Turkey in-between the Soviet Union and Great Britain.

12.

In 1929, Jakob Suritz negotiated and signed a secret alliance with Turkey.

13.

Jakob Suritz greeted Marshal Voroshilov as he landed in Istanbul while a 25-gun salute was fired in his honor.

14.

On 26 October 1934, Jakob Suritz arrived at the Reich Chancellery to present his credentials as the ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Adolf Hitler.

15.

Jakob Suritz had a difficult time in Berlin as a Jew and a Communist, and frequently had to invoke diplomatic immunity in his disputes with the German authorities.

16.

However, within the diplomatic community in Berlin, Jakob Suritz was well regarded as an intellectual who had a passion for collecting French Impressionist paintings.

17.

On 29 May 1935, Jakob Suritz reported to Litvinov that he had met the Reichsbank president Dr Hjalmar Schacht, whom he described as being "very friendly and spoke about the necessity of an improvement in mutual relations".

18.

On 28 November 1935, Jakob Suritz reported that he met a number of German officials, whom he listed as the Foreign Minister, Baron Konstantin von Neurath; the Luftwaffe commander, Hermann Goring; the War Minister, Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg; and the Propaganda Minister Dr Josef Goebbels.

19.

Jakob Suritz stated that Dr Schacht was interested in having the Soviet Union export raw materials to Germany that the Reich lacked such as oil, copper, manganese, and high-grade iron to assist with rearmament, which offered a potential way to affect a change in German foreign policy.

20.

On 10 December 1935, Jakob Suritz told the German diplomat Fritz von Twardowski that he "had strict instructions to do everything within my power to bring about, at least outwardly, an improvement in mutual relations".

21.

Jakob Suritz told Twardowkski he was interested in an economic agreement that might improve relations in the long-term.

22.

On 13 December 1935, Jakob Suritz wrote in a report to Litvinov that there were two factions within the German state, one associated with the Nazi party and another that consisted of the military, the industrialists and the Reichsbank who wanted better German-Soviet relations for the purposes of trade.

23.

On 17 December 1935, Jakob Suritz wrote to the deputy foreign commissar Nikolay Krestinsky that there was "in Reichswehr and industrial circles a growing belief in the unproductiveness and erroneousness of National Socialism's anti-Soviet course".

24.

On 11 September 1936, Jakob Suritz wrote in a report to Moscow that the Soviet Union should make a formal note of protest against what had been said at the Nuremberg Party Rally and that the Soviet Union should cease the export of certain raw materials to punish the Reich.

25.

Jakob Suritz's recommendations were rejected on the grounds that Soviet intervention in the Spanish Civil War had led to tensions with Britain, and the prospect of worsening German-Soviet relations and with it a German-Soviet war would lead to more pressure from Britain to end the intervention in Spain at a time when the Soviet Union was attempting to improve relations with Britain.

26.

On 14 December 1936, Jakob Suritz was summoned to meet Goring.

27.

Jakob Suritz noted that Goring made no offers to improve political relations other saying repeatedly that more trade would inevitably improve political relations.

28.

On 27 January 1937, Jakob Suritz reported to Litvinov that he met Dr Schacht, who was in favor of a new German-Soviet economic treaty to dramatically improve trade.

29.

However, Jakob Suritz stated that Dr Schacht had imposed a number of political preconditions first, namely the end of Soviet intervention in the Spanish Civil War; the end of support for the Front populaire government led by Leon Blum in France; and for the Soviet Union to renounce the alliances it had signed with France and Czechoslovakia.

30.

Jakob Suritz stated that Schacht's offer was so one-sided that it should rejected immediately.

31.

On 4 February 1937, Litvinov reported to Stalin that Kandelaki and Jakob Suritz had met Schacht, but he expressed a negative view of the talks, as he argued that Schacht was only seeking improved trade to assist with German rearmament.

32.

Jakob Suritz was ordered to negotiate, but to keep the French ambassador Andre Francois-Poncet and the Czechoslovak minister Vojtech Mastny informed as well.

33.

The British historian Geoffrey Roberts argued that the talks with Dr Schacht were only intended to improve relations, and were not the beginning of an effort to seek an alliance with Germany as otherwise Jakob Suritz would have been ordered to keep the talks secret from Francois-Poncet and Mastny.

34.

On 7 April 1937, Jakob Suritz was assigned as the new Soviet ambassador to France.

35.

In 1937, Jakob Suritz was reassigned to the Soviet embassy in Paris.

36.

Jakob Suritz viewed French politics in Marxist terms as he believed that the French haute bourgeoisie, driven by an obsessive fear of a Communist revolution were turning towards fascism, and that the Franco-Soviet alliance was not a real one.

37.

Jakob Suritz wrote that for the French haute bourgeoisie, class interests trumped national interests and that the French were heading toward a "complete capitulation to Hitler and Mussolini".

38.

Besides for pressuring the staff talks to resume, Jakob Suritz was highly critical of the Front populaire government led by the Socialist Premier Leon Blum, especially its policy of non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War.

39.

On 26 August 1938, Jakob Suritz reported to Litvinov that all intelligence indicated that Germany planned to invade Czechoslovakia that September.

40.

In September 1938, Jakob Suritz reported to Litvinov that he learned "from a very solid source" within the French government that the British government was pressuring France not to resume the Franco-Soviet staff talks.

41.

When Jakob Suritz asked Bonnet the next day in a telephone call for the full text of the declaration, Bonnet refused, saying it was a private matter between him and the German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop.

42.

Besides for Mandel, Jakob Suritz was in contact with Raymond Patenotre, the minister of national economy, and Cesar Campinchi, the minister of the marine.

43.

On 21 December 1938, Patenotre told Jakob Suritz that he was "an advocate of close co-operation with the Soviet Union" and had heard a rumor that the Soviet Union was planning to renounce the Franco-Soviet alliance, which for him "would be nothing short of a catastrophe for France".

44.

On 10 February 1939, Jakob Suritz reported that talked with the Socialist leader Leon Blum who told him of his belief that Daladier and Bonnet were leading France "to a new Sedan".

45.

Jakob Suritz reported with approval that Mandel was "the complete opposite of Blum", whom Jakob Suritz disparaged as a well meaning, but weak willed intellectual.

46.

Jakob Suritz is keeping quiet now, but his hatred of Bonnet has not weakened.

47.

Jakob Suritz told Bonnet that Romania was an ally of France, not the Soviet Union, and he expected France to take the lead if Germany should invade Romania.

48.

On 4 April 1939, Litvinov in a message to Jakob Suritz told him "we do not need advice as how to protect our own interests".

49.

On 14 April 1939, Jakob Suritz told Bonnet that the Soviet Union would be willing to defend Romania in the event of German aggression and was willing to join an alliance with France and Britain to keep Germany out of Eastern Europe.

50.

On 14 April 1939, Bonnet met with Jakob Suritz to suggest to him a Franco-Soviet mutual assistance pact to protect Poland and Romania.

51.

On 18 April 1939, Jakob Suritz reported to Litvinov after meeting Bonnet "that his first impression is very favorable".

52.

Jakob Suritz described Bonnet as very devious and cunning, and reported to Moscow he was playing his own game.

53.

Jakob Suritz stated that he was not entirely certain just what Bonnet was trying to do, but it appeared that he wanted better Franco-Soviet relations as a bargaining chip to improve relations with Germany, and that ultimately he was willing to recognize Eastern Europe as being in the German sphere of influence.

54.

Jakob Suritz told Bonnet and St Leger that the French alliances and the British "guarantees" of Poland and Romania were insufficient.

55.

Likewise, Jakob Suritz stated that the Sanacja military dictatorship in Poland might collapse or ally itself with Germany.

56.

Jakob Suritz stated that only a full military alliance with Britain and France would be acceptable to his government and that the Soviet Union did not feel protected by the Anglo-French security commitments to Poland and Romania.

57.

Jakob Suritz privately felt that Molotov's negotiating tactics were too heavy-handed as true to his surname he proceeded to relentlessly hammer home the message to the French ambassador Emile Naggiar and the British ambassador Sir William Seeds that only an alliance on Soviet terms would be acceptable to him and he had no interest in any compromises.

58.

However, Jakob Suritz never warned Molotov that his abuse of Naggiar was not helping the "peace front" talks, out of fear of Molotov.

59.

On 27 May 1939, when Seeds along with the French charge d'affairs Jean Payart met with Molotov to present the offer of an alliance, Molotov had already read the full text which Jakob Suritz had forwarded to him and was well prepared to offer his objections.

60.

Jakob Suritz wrote that British offer of an alliance of sorts would be to accept being a "blind companion" as he charged that under Chamberlain's offer, the Soviet Union would be obligated to declare war on Germany in the event of a German attack on the United Kingdom, but not vice versa.

61.

However, Jakob Suritz advised against rejecting Chamberlain's offer, which he felt to be playing into the hands of Bonnet and Chamberlain.

62.

Jakob Suritz believed it was possible to tie the French to such an alliance, but felt that the British were the weakest link as he believed that Chamberlain was seeking some sort of understanding with Hitler.

63.

When Jakob Suritz gave him a negative reply, Daladier stated: "We need to conclude quickly, the more so, that now I do not see any serious disagreements".

64.

Jakob Suritz stated that he believed that Hudson was acting for Chamberlain and he accused the Chamberlain government of a "capitulation" to Japan with respect to the Tinstin crisis.

65.

Jakob Suritz wrote that the Chamberlain government was not to be trusted as he wrote that the British had no willingness to confront the Axis states such as Japan and Germany.

66.

Jakob Suritz reported to Moscow that Bonnet had an extraordinary capacity for lies as he crossly noted that Colonel Beck had not granted the Red Army transit rights into Poland.

67.

Jakob Suritz served as the Soviet ambassador to the League of Nations.

68.

Jakob Suritz who seemed embarrassed by his country's actions in attacking Finland did not attend Holsti's speech and instead hide himself away in a hotel.

69.

Jakob Suritz defended his government's actions at the League during the Winter War and was unable to prevent the Soviet Union from being expelled from the League of Nations on 14 December 1939, the first and only nation to be ever be expelled from the League.

70.

On 28 March 1940, Jakob Suritz was declared persona non grata after he sent an uncoded telegram to Stalin where he praised him for having foiled the "plans of the Anglo-French warmongers" by defeating Finland in the Winter War.

71.

In 1940, Time declared: "Since 1919 bulging, bearded Jacob Jakob Suritz has been No 1 Soviet diplomat, with a brilliant record in Afghanistan, Turkey, Germany and League of Nations wrangles".

72.

In May 1946, Jakob Suritz arrived in Rio de Janeiro as the first ever Soviet ambassador to Brazil.

73.

Jakob Suritz was involved in polemics with the Brazilian authorities over charges that the Soviet Union was engaged in espionage in Brazil and the refusal of President Eurico Gaspar Dutra to allow him to attend parties at the Catete Palace as other ambassadors did.

74.

Jakob Suritz did not stay long in Rio as Brazil severed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in October 1947.