122 Facts About Manuel Noriega

1.

Manuel Noriega became chief of military intelligence in Torrijos's government, and after Torrijos's death in 1981, consolidated power to become Panama's de facto ruler in 1983.

2.

Manuel Noriega served as a conduit for illicit weapons, military equipment, and cash destined for US-backed forces throughout Latin America.

3.

In 1988, Manuel Noriega was indicted by federal grand juries in Miami and Tampa on charges of racketeering, drug smuggling, and money laundering.

4.

Manuel Noriega was captured and flown to the US, where he was tried on the Miami indictment, convicted on most of the charges, and sentenced to 40 years in prison, ultimately serving 17 years after a reduction in his sentence for good behavior.

5.

Manuel Noriega was extradited to France in 2010, where he was convicted and sentenced to seven years of imprisonment for money laundering.

6.

Manuel Noriega relied upon military nationalism to maintain his support, and did not espouse a specific social or economic ideology.

7.

Manuel Noriega was known for his complicated relationship with the US, being described as being its ally and nemesis simultaneously.

8.

Manuel Antonio Noriega Moreno was born in Panama City, into a relatively poor pardo, or mixed-race, family with Native Panamanian, African, and Spanish heritage.

9.

Manuel Noriega's date of birth is generally given as February 11,1934, but is a matter of uncertainty.

10.

Manuel Noriega was born in the neighborhood of El Terraplen de San Felipe.

11.

Manuel Noriega's mother, who was not married to his father, has been described as a cook and a laundress, while his father, Ricaurte Manuel Noriega, was an accountant.

12.

Manuel Noriega was educated first at the Escuela Republica de Mexico, and later at the Instituto Nacional, a well-regarded high school in Panama City that had produced a number of nationalist political leaders.

13.

Manuel Noriega was described as an "oddly serious child," a bookish student always neatly dressed by his godmother.

14.

Manuel Noriega began living with Luis, who introduced him to politics, including recruiting him into the Socialist Party's youth wing.

15.

Manuel Noriega is reported to have begun his association with the US intelligence services at this time, providing information about the activities of his comrades.

16.

Manuel Noriega intended to become a doctor, but was unable to secure a place in the University of Panama's medical school.

17.

Manuel Noriega married Felicidad Sieiro in the late 1960s, and the couple had three daughters: Lorena; Sandra; and Thays.

18.

Manuel Noriega was repeatedly unfaithful to his wife, who at one point expressed a desire for a divorce, though she changed her mind later.

19.

Manuel Noriega graduated from Chorrillos in 1962 with a specialization in engineering.

20.

Manuel Noriega returned to Panama and joined the Panama National Guard.

21.

Diaz Herrera and Manuel Noriega became both friends and rivals for Torrijos's favor.

22.

In 1964 Manuel Noriega had been posted to the province of Chiriqui, where Torrijos and Diaz Herrera were stationed.

23.

The mistreatment of Arias's supporters sparked public outrage, and led to Manuel Noriega being suspended for ten days, an item of information that was picked up by the US intelligence services.

24.

In 1966, Manuel Noriega was again involved in a violent incident, allegedly raping a 13-year-old girl and beating her brother.

25.

At the school Manuel Noriega participated in courses on infantry operations, counterintelligence, intelligence, and jungle warfare.

26.

Manuel Noriega took a course in psychological operations at Fort Bragg in North Carolina.

27.

Manuel Noriega's job required him to penetrate and disrupt the trade unions that had formed in the United Fruit Company's workforce, and he proved adept at this work.

28.

Manuel Noriega's new superior officer Boris Martinez was a fervent anti-communist, and enforced strict discipline on Noriega.

29.

In 1967 the administration of US President Lyndon B Johnson concluded that Noriega would be a valuable asset, as he was a "rising star" in the Panamanian military.

30.

Later, as the de facto leader of Panama, Manuel Noriega maintained a close relationship with the School of the Americas, partly due to the school's presence in Panama.

31.

Manuel Noriega was proud of his relationship with the school, and wore its crest on his military uniform for the rest of his career.

32.

Manuel Noriega was an important supporter of Torrijos during this conflict.

33.

Manuel Noriega was promoted to captain a month after the coup attempt: just 18 months later, in August 1970, Torrijos promoted him to the position of lieutenant colonel and appointed him chief of military intelligence.

34.

Torrijos's relationship with Manuel Noriega was symbiotic; Torrijos provided the political acumen, while Manuel Noriega enforced his unpopular decisions with force, when necessary.

35.

Manuel Noriega would provide intelligence and carry out covert operations that were critical to Torrijos successfully negotiating the release of the Panama Canal from the US.

36.

Manuel Noriega proved to be a very capable head of intelligence.

37.

Manuel Noriega kept files on several officials within the military, the government, and the judiciary, allowing him to blackmail them later.

38.

Manuel Noriega held the positions of head of the political police and head of immigration.

39.

Manuel Noriega's tenure was marked by intimidation and harassment of opposition parties and their leaders.

40.

Manuel Noriega was described as doing much of Torrijos's "dirty work".

41.

For instance, Manuel Noriega ordered the death of Jesus Hector Gallego Herrera, a priest whose work at an agricultural cooperative was seen as a threat by the government.

42.

Manuel Noriega made an effort during this period to portray Panama as a hub of enforcement against drug smuggling, possibly as a result of pressure from Torrijos.

43.

Manuel Noriega served as the US emissary to Cuba during negotiations following the Johnny Express incident in December 1971.

44.

Manuel Noriega was given access to CIA contingency funds, which he was supposed to use to improve his intelligence programs, but which he could spend with little accountability.

45.

The CIA was aware that Manuel Noriega was selling intelligence on the US to Cuba while he was working for it.

46.

Manuel Noriega undertook a number of activities while nominally working for the CIA that served his own ends at the expense of the US government.

47.

Journalist Frederick Kempe wrote in 1990 that Manuel Noriega had been linked to a series of bombings targeting the US territory in the Panama Canal Zone during the prelude to the US Presidential election in 1976 after the administration of US President Gerald Ford stepped back from negotiations about the Panama Canal.

48.

Bush, then Director of Central Intelligence, Manuel Noriega flatly denied involvement, instead suggesting that the CIA was responsible.

49.

Manuel Noriega discovered this operation in early 1976, and instead of making it public, bribed the US agents and bought the tapes himself; the incident came to be known as the "Singing Sergeants affair".

50.

Manuel Noriega's drug-related activities came to the US government's attention during the ratification process for the Panama Canal treaties, but were downplayed by the US intelligence services in order to get the treaty ratified by the US Senate.

51.

Manuel Noriega arranged for weapons purchased in the US to be shipped to the Sandinista forces, a deal on which he made a profit.

52.

Manuel Noriega reformed the National Guard as the Panama Defense Forces, and with the financial assistance of the US, expanded and modernized it.

53.

However, Paredes never received the political support he expected, and after assuming his new position Manuel Noriega reneged on the deal, telling Paredes he could not contest the election.

54.

Manuel Noriega preferred to remain behind the scenes, rather than become president, and to avoid the public scrutiny that came with the post.

55.

Manuel Noriega did not have a particular social or economic ideology, and used military nationalism to unify his supporters.

56.

Manuel Noriega compelled the Panamanian National Assembly to pass Law 20 of 1983, which was supposedly aimed at protecting the Panama Canal from communists, and allowed a huge influx of US weapons to the Panamanian military.

57.

When Manuel Noriega created the PDF in 1983, he brought into its control Panama's customs and immigration apparatus, as well as the country's whole transportation network.

58.

Manuel Noriega took control of most major newspapers by either buying a controlling stake in them or forcing them to shut down.

59.

The newspaper La Prensa, which remained independent and was frequently critical of Manuel Noriega, had its staff intimidated and its offices damaged; eventually, it too was forced to close.

60.

In May 1984, Manuel Noriega allowed the first presidential elections in 16 years.

61.

Manuel Noriega's rule became increasingly repressive, even as the US government of Ronald Reagan began relying on him in its covert efforts to undermine Nicaragua's Sandinista government.

62.

Manuel Noriega acted as a conduit for US support, including funds and weapons, to the Contra rebels in Nicaragua.

63.

Manuel Noriega allowed the CIA to establish listening posts in Panama, and helped the US-backed Salvadoran government against the leftist Salvadoran insurgent Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front.

64.

Manuel Noriega permitted these activities despite the Panama Canal treaties restricting the use of the US bases to protecting the canal.

65.

Manuel Noriega had a working relationship with US Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North by 1985.

66.

Manuel Noriega offered to assassinate or sabotage Sandinista leaders in return for North helping Manuel Noriega improve his image with the US government.

67.

In January 1991, federal prosecutors filed a financial report indicating that Manuel Noriega had received a total of $322,000 from the United States Army and the CIA over a 31-year period from 1955 to 1986.

68.

Manuel Noriega became intimately involved with their drug trafficking and money-laundering operations, and received considerable sums as protection money, bribes, or shared of profits.

69.

Hersh reported unnamed US officials as saying that Manuel Noriega had amassed a personal fortune in European banks as a result of his illegal activities, as well as owning two homes in Panama and one in France.

70.

Many of the operations Manuel Noriega benefited from were run by associates such as Floyd Carlton and Cesar Rodriguez.

71.

Large sums from drug revenues were brought in from Miami and elsewhere to Panama for laundering, and Manuel Noriega received protection payments in these instances as well.

72.

Dinges writes that at the time of the 1984 election, Kalish was preparing to ship a load of marijuana worth US $1.4 million through Panama, for which Manuel Noriega had agreed to provide false Panamanian customs stamps; Manuel Noriega was to be paid $1 million for this exercise.

73.

Manuel Noriega ordered a crackdown on money laundering by Colombian cartel figures Jorge Ochoa and Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela.

74.

Manuel Noriega was apparently one of these intermediaries but backed out on the deal as the ship and weapons were seized at a Panamanian port.

75.

Spadafora amassed evidence of corruption within the government by using his position as an ally of Torrijos to question Manuel Noriega's allies, including Rodriguez and Carlton.

76.

In September 1985 he accused Manuel Noriega of having connections to drug trafficking and announced his intent to expose him.

77.

Manuel Noriega's decapitated body was later found wrapped in a United States Postal Service mail bag showing signs of brutal torture.

78.

Manuel Noriega was widely believed to be responsible for the murder, and according to Koster and Sanchez, the US had intelligence implicating Manuel Noriega.

79.

Diaz Herrera considered using the uproar around Spadafora to seize power during a brief period that Manuel Noriega was traveling outside the country, but despite mobilizing some troops, eventually decided against following through with the coup, realizing he could not count on sufficient support.

80.

Furthermore, Manuel Noriega had made a deal with his deputy, to the effect that he would step down as military leader in 1987 and allow Diaz Herrera to succeed him.

81.

In 1987 Manuel Noriega went back on this agreement, announced he would be heading the military for the next five years, and assigned Diaz Herrera to a diplomatic post.

82.

Manuel Noriega charged Diaz Herrera with treason, and cracked down hard on the protesters.

83.

The Senate resolution had the effect of identifying the US with the effort to remove Manuel Noriega; Manuel Noriega exploited the rising anti-American sentiment to strengthen his own position.

84.

Hersh wrote in 1986 that US intelligence officials suspected that Manuel Noriega was selling intelligence to the Cuban government of Fidel Castro; his report received widespread attention.

85.

In 1988 Manuel Noriega was indicted by US federal grand juries in courts in Miami and Tampa on charges of drug-trafficking.

86.

Rather than publish the results, Manuel Noriega voided the election, claiming that "foreign interference" had tainted the results.

87.

Manuel Noriega initially planned to declare Duque the winner regardless of the actual result.

88.

In March 1988, the US government entered into negotiations with Manuel Noriega seeking his resignation.

89.

Negotiations collapsed after several months of lengthy and inconclusive talks; according to Dinges, Manuel Noriega had no intentions of ever resigning.

90.

The US government stated that Manuel Noriega's forces were harassing US troops and civilians.

91.

Manuel Noriega received several warnings about the invasion from individuals within his government; though he initially disbelieved them, they grew more frequent as the invasion drew near, eventually convincing Manuel Noriega to go on the run.

92.

Manuel Noriega used a number of subterfuges, including lookalikes and playbacks of his recorded voice, to confuse US surveillance as to his whereabouts.

93.

The last two days of his flight were spent partly with his ally Jorge Krupnick, an arms dealer wanted by the US Kempe reported that Manuel Noriega considered seeking sanctuary in the Cuban or Nicaraguan embassies, but both buildings were surrounded by US troops.

94.

Manuel Noriega was detained as a prisoner of war, and later taken to the United States.

95.

The trial was delayed until September 1991 over whether Manuel Noriega could be tried after his detention as a prisoner of war, the admissibility of evidence and witnesses, and how to pay for Manuel Noriega's legal defense.

96.

The trial ended in April 1992, when Manuel Noriega was convicted on eight of the ten charges of drug trafficking, racketeering, and money laundering.

97.

On July 10,1992, Manuel Noriega was sentenced to 40 years in prison.

98.

In pre-trial proceedings, the government stated that Manuel Noriega had received $322,000 from the US Army and the CIA.

99.

Manuel Noriega insisted that he had in fact been paid close to $10,000,000, and that he should be allowed to testify about the work he had done for the US government.

100.

The district court held that information about the operations in which Manuel Noriega had played a part supposedly in return for payment from the US was not relevant to his defense.

101.

Under Article 85 of the Third Geneva Convention, Manuel Noriega was considered a prisoner of war, despite his conviction for acts committed prior to his capture by the "detaining power".

102.

Manuel Noriega was tried in absentia in Panama for crimes committed during his rule.

103.

Finally, Manuel Noriega received a third 20-year sentence in 1996 for his role in the death of nine military officers supporting Giroldi; the group had been executed in a hangar at the Albrook air base after the coup attempt, in an incident that came to be known as the massacre of Albrook.

104.

Manuel Noriega was prosecuted over the 1968 disappearances of Luis Antonio Quiros and Everett Clayton Kimble Guerra in Chiriqui, and the 1971 death of Heliodoro Portugal.

105.

Manuel Noriega was convicted in absentia, but French law required a new trial after the subject of an in absentia sentence was apprehended.

106.

Manuel Noriega appealed his extradition because he claimed France would not honor his legal status as a prisoner of war.

107.

Later that month Manuel Noriega's attorney stated that he would travel to France and try to arrange a deal with the French government.

108.

Manuel Noriega's lawyers claimed the La Sante Prison, at which he was held, was unfit for a man of his age and rank; the French government refused to grant him prisoner of war status, which he had maintained in the United States.

109.

On July 7,2010, Manuel Noriega was convicted by the 11th chamber of the Tribunal Correctionnel de Paris and sentenced to seven years in jail.

110.

On September 23,2011, a French court ordered a conditional release for Manuel Noriega to be extradited to Panama on October 1,2011.

111.

Manuel Noriega was extradited to Panama on December 11,2011, and incarcerated at El Renacer prison to serve the sentences, totalling 60 years, that he had accumulated in absentia for crimes committed during his rule.

112.

On February 5,2012, Manuel Noriega was moved to Hospital Santo Tomas in Panama City because of high blood pressure and a brain hemorrhage.

113.

Manuel Noriega remained in the hospital for four days before being returned to prison.

114.

Dinges writes that though Manuel Noriega's regime saw a number of murders and crimes, they were similar in scale to those that occurred at the same time under the authoritarian governments of Guatemala, Chile, Argentina, and El Salvador; these governments never saw the level of condemnation from the US that Manuel Noriega's did.

115.

Manuel Noriega permitted and encouraged rumors that as Panama's chief of intelligence, he was in possession of negative information about everybody in the country.

116.

Manuel Noriega was perceived as a trusted collaborator in the war against drugs, even as the DEA was investigating him for involvement in smuggling.

117.

Manuel Noriega used the moniker "El Man" to refer to himself, but he was derogatorily known as cara de pina, or "pineapple face" in Spanish, as a result of pockmarked features left by an illness in his youth.

118.

Manuel Noriega detested the name, and it would later be the subject of a lawsuit.

119.

Manuel Noriega lived a lavish lifestyle during his time as the de facto ruler of Panama, described in an obituary as a "libertine life off drug-trade riches, complete with luxurious mansions, cocaine-fueled parties and voluminous collections of antique guns".

120.

Manuel Noriega was described as a deeply superstitious man, who placed trust in a number of talismans which he carried with him.

121.

Manuel Noriega was depicted in the video game Call of Duty: Black Ops II.

122.

Manuel Noriega, who filed the suit while in prison for murder, claimed he was portrayed as "a kidnapper, murderer and enemy of the state".