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62 Facts About Richard Haking

1.

General Sir Richard Cyril Byrne Haking was a senior British Army officer who is most notable for being the commander of XI Corps during the majority of the First World War.

2.

Richard Haking was the League of Nations High Commissioner for the Free City of Danzig in the early 1920s.

3.

Richard Haking attended the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, then was commissioned as a subaltern, with the rank of second lieutenant, into the 67th Regiment of Foot on 22 January 1881.

4.

Richard Haking married Rachel Burford-Hancock, daughter of Sir Henry James Burford-Hancock, on 28 September 1891; they had no children.

5.

Richard Haking studied at the Staff College, Camberley, from 1896 to 1897.

6.

Richard Haking was made a deputy assistant adjutant general for Cork District from 1898 to 1899.

7.

Richard Haking served on the staff in the Second Boer War, initially as a DAAG.

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8.

Richard Haking was then made a substantive colonel and became the 4th Division's assistant adjutant general, in succession to Colonel Henry Heath, in February 1906.

9.

Richard Haking was then general staff officer, grade 1, or chief of staff, of the 3rd Division until 1908, then, after being promoted to the temporary rank of brigadier general in June 1908, was brigadier general, general staff of Southern Command.

10.

Richard Haking was honoured with the Companion of the Order of the Bath in June 1910.

11.

Richard Haking argued that the attacker would have the advantage over the defender, even if numerically inferior, and deprecated the idea that modern weapons had made defence superior to attack.

12.

Richard Haking was given command of the 5th Infantry Brigade, part of the 2nd Division, in September 1911.

13.

Still in command of the brigade in the summer of 1914, when the First World War began, Richard Haking took it to the Western Front, with the division itself forming part of Lieutenant General Douglas Haig's I Corps.

14.

Richard Haking helped force the Petit Morin during the Battle of the Marne.

15.

Richard Haking's division took part in the Battle of Aubers Ridge in May 1915, where the three attacking divisions suffered a total of 11,600 casualties, almost 4,000 of them being from Haking's 1st Division alone, and where he argued for further attacks despite the clear failure of the first assault.

16.

Richard Haking was not blamed for what Simpson describes as the "flawed artillery plan and lack of artillery support" at Aubers Ridge.

17.

Richard Haking's corps took part as a reserve in the Battle of Loos in September 1915.

18.

Richard Haking later told the Official Historian, James Edward Edmonds, that he had thought Haig wanted XI Corps to fill the gap between Hubert Gough's I Corps and Henry Rawlinson's IV Corps in the offensive, not act as a reserve at all.

19.

Richard Haking assured his commanders that there would be no German resistance once their line had been broken.

20.

Richard Haking was ordered to submit plans for it to attack the next day.

21.

The next day Haig wanted to call off the attack, but Richard Haking felt it would not be possible to do so in time.

22.

Lloyd argues that Richard Haking "proved unequal to the task" of welding XI Corps into a fighting formation.

23.

Richard Haking now wrote that "the most careful arrangements were made by First Army to ensure that the roads were kept clear".

24.

Lloyd writes "it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Richard Haking was deliberately falsifying or "cooking" his evidence to make it more palatable to ".

25.

Richard Haking insisted that the attacking brigades be given precise orders as to their objectives, and the direction and timing of their advance.

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26.

Richard Haking persuaded himself that the enemy were "shaken and disorganised" and that enough artillery and gas was now available to win a decisive victory.

27.

Once again Richard Haking gave a series of highly optimistic speeches to the attacking brigades.

28.

Richard Haking ignored advice from Haig to suggest that this had been a bad idea, although in accordance with Army doctrine at the time Haig delegated the decision to Richard Haking as the "man on the spot".

29.

Richard Haking appears to have thought that High Explosive fire might disperse British gas, but he wanted to give the Germans "a chance to run away".

30.

Richard Haking later complained that he and his troops had been "hurried into the trenches" with barely enough time "to become acquainted with the actual position".

31.

Richard Haking overruled his wish to launch a careful step-by-step attack, telling him that he would "reach Fosse 8 without firing a shot".

32.

In Lloyd's description Richard Haking was "seriously misleading the troops under his command" or else "simply ignorant".

33.

The future Air Vice Marshal Philip Game, then serving as GSO1 to 46th Division, wrote frequently in letters to his wife of how Richard Haking interfered frequently with his planning.

34.

Richard Haking claimed in May 1916 that no division could be considered a fighting unit until they had carried out a successful trench raid.

35.

Richard Haking launched what John Bourne describes as "an unnecessary and unsuccessful attack" against a German position called the Boar's Head.

36.

Richard Haking suggested a First Army attack towards Fromelles, not towards Lille as originally planned.

37.

Richard Haking's plan did not take into account the earlier failure on the same ground in May 1915.

38.

Richard Haking "was most optimistic" about the upcoming Somme offensive.

39.

At a conference of his corps commanders Charles Monro said that the Battle of the Somme was progressing "favourably", but ordered Richard Haking to prepare a plan on the assumption that he was to be assisted by a division of Second Army and some extra artillery.

40.

Richard Haking presented a scheme to Monro for a two-division attack over a front of 4,200 yards, aiming to capture part of Aubers-Fromelles Ridge, which lay a mile or so behind the German line.

41.

Richard Haking now learned that Second Army were only allocating him the equivalent of two divisions' worth of artillery, not three as promised.

42.

Richard Haking was concerned at the shortage of ammunition and the inexperience of the Australian gunners.

43.

Richard Haking therefore reduced the planned width of the attack to around 3,500 yards, apparently in the belief that he had sufficient artillery to cover this effectively.

44.

Richard Haking issued a letter "to be read to all troops", although he "trust them not to disclose it to anyone".

45.

Richard Haking launched an attack by two divisions which cost 7,000 casualties.

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46.

Whilst 58th Australian Battalion were attacking, Richard Haking changed his mind again on the basis of fresh information: McCay informed him that 8th and 14th Brigades were holding their positions in the German lines, whilst an Royal Flying Corps plane had misinterpreted flares, probably let off by Germans, as indicating the presence of BEF troops.

47.

Monro and Richard Haking concurred with McCay's veto of a proposal that an informal local truce be negotiated in the Australian sector to allow the wounded to be collected, although this was in accordance with official GHQ policy at the time.

48.

Richard Haking wrote that 61st Division was "not sufficiently imbued with the offensive spirit to go in like one man at the appointed time".

49.

Richard Haking claimed that "the lessons to be learnt from the attack apply more to the Divisions which took part than to ordinary trained Divisions".

50.

Elliott later criticised Richard Haking for exaggerating the amount of artillery that would be available, and for attacking without surprise.

51.

Richard Haking exonerated McCay and argued that Haking, after Major Howard's report had persuaded Monro, who in turn persuaded Butler, and that Haking had been keen to win glory for himself.

52.

Richard Haking stressed how Haking had ignored suggestions from Monro that the attack be postponed because of the rain, and was scornful of Haking's after-battle report.

53.

Gary Sheffield describes Richard Haking as acquiring a reputation as a "butcher" and an organiser of pointless "stunts".

54.

Richard Haking was one of the few First World War generals to have gained this label while the fighting was still taking place rather than after the war ended.

55.

Haig placed Richard Haking in acting command of First Army from 7 August to 29 September 1916.

56.

Richard Haking was honoured with the Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath in January 1916.

57.

Liddell Hart later claimed that Richard Haking had reported Lieutenant-General Robert Broadwood in early 1917 for "lack of fighting spirit".

58.

Richard Haking protested to Horne on 18 March 1917 about how he was expected to hold a four-division stretch of front with two divisions, putting too much strain on the units involved.

59.

Richard Haking conducted a successful attack at La Bassee in June 1918.

60.

Richard Haking was honoured with the Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George in 1918.

61.

Richard Haking became GOC British Troops in Egypt from 1923 to 1927, during which time he was appointed colonel of the Hampshire Regiment in July 1924 and was promoted to the rank of general in May 1925.

62.

Richard Haking died of secondary colon cancer on 9 June 1945 at Old Mill Cottage, Bulford, Wiltshire.