Strategic Tactical voting is observed due to non-proportionality, electoral thresholds and quotas.
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Strategic Tactical voting is observed due to non-proportionality, electoral thresholds and quotas.
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Since then tactical voting has become a consideration in British politics as is reflected in by-elections and by the growth in sites such as tacticalvote.
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Academic analysis of tactical voting is based on the rational voter model, derived from rational choice theory.
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Tactical voting relies heavily on voters' perception of how other voters intend to vote, campaigns in electoral methods that promote compromise frequently focus on affecting voter's perception of campaign viability.
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Tactical voting is highly dependent on the voting method being used.
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Arrow's impossibility theorem and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem prove that any useful single-winner Tactical voting method based on preference ranking is prone to some kind of manipulation.
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Tactical voting by compromising is exceedingly common in plurality elections.
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All cardinal Tactical voting methods fail the later-no-harm criterion due to favoring consensus options.
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Tactical voting voters are faced with the initial tactic as to how highly to score their second-choice candidate.
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Instant runoff Tactical voting is vulnerable to push-over and compromising strategies.
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Bullet Tactical voting is ineffective under Instant-runoff, since Instant-runoff satisfies the later-no-harm criterion.
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