112 Facts About Dean Rusk

1.

David Dean Rusk was the United States secretary of state from 1961 to 1969 under presidents John F Kennedy and Lyndon B Johnson, the second-longest serving Secretary of State after Cordell Hull from the Franklin Roosevelt administration.

2.

Dean Rusk had been a high government official in the 1940s and early 1950s, as well as the head of a leading foundation.

3.

Dean Rusk is cited as one of the two officers responsible for dividing the two Koreas at the 38th parallel.

4.

Dean Rusk served as a staff officer in the China Burma India Theater, becoming a senior aide to Joseph Stilwell, the top American general.

5.

Dean Rusk became Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs in 1950.

6.

In 1952, Dean Rusk left to become president of the Rockefeller Foundation.

7.

Dean Rusk was a quiet advisor to Kennedy, rarely making his own views known to other officials.

8.

Dean Rusk supported diplomatic efforts during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and, though he initially expressed doubts about the escalation of the US role in the Vietnam War, he became known as one of its strongest supporters.

9.

Dean Rusk left the Secretary role in January 1969, and taught international relations at the University of Georgia School of Law.

10.

David Dean Rusk was born in rural Cherokee County, Georgia.

11.

The Dean Rusk ancestors had emigrated from Northern Ireland around 1795.

12.

Dean Rusk left the ministry to become a cotton farmer and school teacher.

13.

Dean Rusk had graduated from public school, and was a school teacher.

14.

When Dean Rusk was four years old, the family moved to Atlanta, where his father worked for the US Post Office.

15.

Dean Rusk came to embrace the stern Calvinist work ethic and morality.

16.

Dean Rusk had an intense reverence for the military and throughout his later career, he was inclined to accept the advice of generals.

17.

Dean Rusk was educated in Atlanta's public schools, and graduated from Boys High School in 1925, spending two years working for an Atlanta lawyer before working his way through Davidson College, a Presbyterian school in North Carolina.

18.

Dean Rusk was active in the national military honor society Scabbard and Blade, becoming a cadet lieutenant colonel commanding the Reserve Officers' Training Corps battalion.

19.

Dean Rusk studied international relations, taking an MA in PPE.

20.

Dean Rusk immersed himself in English history, politics, and popular culture, making lifelong friends among the British elite.

21.

Dean Rusk's rise from poverty made him a passionate believer in the "American Dream", and a recurring theme throughout his life was his oft-expressed patriotism, a place in which he believed that anyone, no matter how modest their circumstances, could rise up to live the "American Dream".

22.

Dean Rusk married Virginia Foisie on June 9,1937.

23.

Dean Rusk taught at Mills College in Oakland, California, from 1934 to 1949, and he earned an LL.

24.

Dean Rusk was called to active duty in December 1940 as a captain.

25.

Dean Rusk served as a staff officer in the China Burma India Theater.

26.

Dean Rusk returned to America to work briefly for the War Department in Washington.

27.

Dean Rusk joined the Department of State in February 1945, and worked for the office of United Nations Affairs.

28.

Dean Rusk was a supporter of the Marshall Plan and of the United Nations.

29.

In 1950, Dean Rusk was made assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, at his own request, arguing that he knew Asia the best.

30.

Dean Rusk played an influential part in the US decision to become involved in the Korean War, and in Japan's postwar compensation for victorious countries, as shown in the Rusk documents.

31.

Dean Rusk was a cautious diplomat and always sought international support.

32.

Dean Rusk favored support for Asian nationalist movements, arguing that European imperialism was doomed in Asia, but the Atlanticist Acheson favored closer relations with the European powers, which precluded American support for Asian nationalism.

33.

Dean Rusk dutifully declared it was his duty to support Acheson.

34.

When question arose as to whether the United States should support France in maintaining control over Indochina against the Communist Viet Minh guerrillas, Dean Rusk argued for support of the French government, stating that the Viet Minh were just the instruments of Soviet expansionism in Asia and to refuse to support the French would amount to appeasement.

35.

In May 1951, Dean Rusk gave a speech at a dinner sponsored by the China Institute in Washington, which he had not submitted to the State Department in advance, where he implied the United States should unify Korea under Syngman Rhee and should overthrow Mao Zedong in China.

36.

For embarrassing Acheson, Dean Rusk was forced to resign and went into the private sector as the director of the Rockefeller Foundation.

37.

On December 12,1960, Democratic President-elect John F Kennedy nominated Rusk to be Secretary of State.

38.

Dean Rusk had recently written an article titled "The President" in Foreign Affairs calling for the president to direct foreign policy with the secretary of state as a mere adviser, which had Kennedy's interest after it was pointed out to him.

39.

Dean Rusk himself was not particularly interested in running the State Department as the annual pay for secretary of state was $25,000 while his job as director of the Rockefeller Foundation paid $60,000 per year.

40.

Dean Rusk only agreed to take the position out of a sense of patriotism after Kennedy insisted that he take the job.

41.

Dean Rusk was an acceptable last choice, with the right credentials and the right backers.

42.

Dean Rusk took charge of a department he knew well when it was half the size.

43.

Dean Rusk had faith in the use of military action to combat communism.

44.

Just as had under the Truman administration, Dean Rusk tended to favor hawkish line towards Vietnam and frequently allied himself in debates in the Cabinet and on the National Security Council with equally hawkish Defense Secretary Robert McNamara.

45.

Dean Rusk expressed considerable disgust when he learned that neither side in the Lao civil war fought very hard, citing a report that both sides had broken off combat to go celebrate a water festival for ten days before resuming their battle.

46.

Dean Rusk, who had much experience of Southeast Asia during World War Two, expressed much doubt if bombing alone would stop the Pathet Lao, saying it was his experience that bombing only worked with ground troops to hold the ground or advance.

47.

Dean Rusk did not pass on the memo to Kennedy nor did he himself speak out against the Bay of Pigs invasion, even when his own military experience had convinced him that a single brigade "did not stand a snowball's chance in hell" of toppling's Cuba's government.

48.

Dean Rusk stated that International Control Commission consisting of diplomats from India, Poland and Canada which was supposed to enforce the Geneva Accords should not be informed of the deployment and the advisers "be placed in varied locations to avoid attention".

49.

Dean Rusk opened the Geneva conference on neutralizing Laos and predicted to Kennedy that the negotiations would fail.

50.

Dean Rusk continued his Rockefeller Foundation interest in aiding developing nations and supported low tariffs to encourage world trade.

51.

Dean Rusk drew the ire of supporters of Israel after he let it be known that he believed the USS Liberty incident was a deliberate attack on the ship, rather than an accident.

52.

On March 24,1961, Dean Rusk released a brief statement saying his delegation was to travel to Bangkok and the SEATO nations' responsibility should be considered if peace settlements were not realized.

53.

In 1961, Dean Rusk disapproved of the Indian invasion of Goa, which he regarded as an act of aggression against NATO ally Portugal, but was overruled by Kennedy who wanted to improve relations with India and who noted the Portuguese had no other option but to be allied to the United States.

54.

In regards to the West New Guinea dispute about the Netherlands New Guinea, Dean Rusk favored supporting the NATO ally Netherlands against Indonesia as he saw Sukarno as pro-Chinese.

55.

Dean Rusk accused Indonesia of aggression by attacking the Dutch forces in New Guinea in 1962 and believed that Sukarno had violated the United Nations charter, but was again overruled by Kennedy.

56.

However, at the same time, Dean Rusk argued to Kennedy to Nasser was a spoiler who wanted to play off the Soviet Union against the United States to get the best possible bargain for Egypt, and if he leaned in a pro-Soviet direction, it was because the United States refused to sell Egypt arms out of the fear that they might be used against Israel whereas the Soviets by contrast were willing to sell Egyptians any arms they wanted short of nuclear weapons.

57.

Dean Rusk noted the United States still had significant leverage over Egypt in the form of the PL 480 law that allowed the United States to sell surplus American agricultural production to any "friendly nation" in the local currency instead of US dollars.

58.

Dean Rusk argued that to Kennedy and later Johnson that they should resist congressional pressure to end the PL 480 food sales to Egypt, stating that ending the PL 480 sales would only push Nasser closer to the Soviet Union and end the leverage that kept the peace between Egypt and Israel.

59.

When Nasser sent 70,000 Egyptian troops into Yemen in September 1962 to support the republican government against the royalist guerrillas supported by Saudi Arabia, Dean Rusk approved of increased arm sales to Saudi Arabia, which were an indirect way of supporting the Yemeni royalists.

60.

In common with decision-makers in Washington, Dean Rusk felt that the United States had to support Saudi Arabia against Egypt, but he advised Kennedy against pushing Nasser too hard, saying that it would only drive him closer to the Soviet Union.

61.

Dean Rusk stated he would consider adopting it if Rusk gave his approval first.

62.

Dean Rusk, who had gone to New York to attend a session of the United Nations, cautiously gave approval out of the impression that Kennedy had approved it first.

63.

Much to Kennedy's annoyance, Dean Rusk maintained a stony silence, refusing to take a side.

64.

The author of the story wrote that Dean Rusk "was not known for his force and decisiveness" and asserted that Bundy was "the real Secretary of State".

65.

Sorensen said that the president often expressed impatience with Dean Rusk and felt him under-prepared for emergency meetings and crises.

66.

Rumors of Dean Rusk's dismissal leading up to the 1964 election abounded prior to President Kennedy's trip to Dallas in 1963.

67.

Shortly after Kennedy was assassinated, Rusk offered his resignation to the new president, Lyndon B Johnson.

68.

However, Johnson liked Dean Rusk and refused his resignation, He remained secretary throughout Johnson's administration.

69.

In June 1964, Dean Rusk met with Herve Alphand, the French ambassador in Washington, to discuss a French plan for neutralization of both Vietnams, a plan which Dean Rusk was skeptical about.

70.

Just after the Gulf of Tonkin incident, Dean Rusk supported the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.

71.

Dean Rusk advised caution, arguing that Johnson should embark on military measures only after diplomacy had been exhausted.

72.

Dean Rusk did not press on this information on Johnson, saying to take part in the planned talks in Burma would have signaled "the acceptance or the confirmation of aggression".

73.

Dean Rusk told Ambassador Taylor that with the elections occurring in less than 48 hours, Johnson did not want to act, but after the election there would be "a more systematic campaign of military pressure on the North with all implications we have always seen in their course of action".

74.

In May 1965, Dean Rusk told Johnson that the "Four Points" presented by the North Vietnam premier Dong as peace terms were deceptive because "the third of those four points required the imposition of the National Liberation Front on all South Vietnam".

75.

In June 1965, when General William Westmoreland requested of Johnson 180,000 troops to Vietnam, Dean Rusk argued to Johnson that the United States had to fight in Vietnam to maintain "the integrity of the US commitment" throughout the world, but wondered aloud if Westermoreland was exaggerating the extent of the problems in South Vietnam in order to have more troops under his command.

76.

At another meeting, Dean Rusk stated the United States should have committed itself to Vietnam more heavily in 1961, saying that if US troops had been sent to fight then, the present difficulties would not exist.

77.

Dean Rusk came into conflict with his Undersecretary of State, George Ball, about Vietnam.

78.

At meetings of the National Security Council, Dean Rusk consistently argued against Ball.

79.

In 1964 and again in 1965, Dean Rusk approached the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson to ask for British troops to go to Vietnam, requests that were refused.

80.

The normally Anglophile Dean Rusk saw the refusal as a "betrayal".

81.

Shortly before his death, Adlai Stevenson, the American ambassador to the UN, mentioned in an interview with the journalist Eric Severeid the aborted peace terms in Rangoon in 1964, saying the UN Secretary General U Thant was disappointed that Dean Rusk had rejected the terms.

82.

When Johnson asked Dean Rusk about the matter, the latter replied that in diplomacy "there is a difference between rejecting a proposal and not accepting it", a distinction that maintained that U Thant had missed.

83.

In December 1965, when McNamara first told Johnson that the "military action approach is an unacceptable way to a successful conclusion" and urged him to pause the bombing of North Vietnam, Dean Rusk advised the president that there was only a 1 in 20 chance that a bombing pause would lead to peace talks.

84.

Dean Rusk who served as Johnson's principal spokesman on Vietnam was sent by the president together with General Maxwell Taylor to serve as his rebuttal witnesses before the Foreign Relations Committee.

85.

Dean Rusk testified that the war was a morally justified struggle to halt "the steady extension of Communist power through force and threat".

86.

Historian Stanley Karnow wrote the televised hearings were a compelling "political theater" as Fulbright and Dean Rusk verbally dueled about the merits of the Vietnam war with both men pouncing on any weaknesses in the other's argument.

87.

Dean Rusk equated withdrawal from Vietnam as "appeasement", through at times he was willing to advise Johnson to open peace talks as a way to rebut domestic criticism that Johnson was unwilling to consider alternative ways to end the war.

88.

In 1967, Dean Rusk was opposed to the Operation Pennsylvania peace plan flouted by Henry Kissinger, saying "Eight months pregnant with peace and all of them hoping to win the Nobel Peace Prize".

89.

Dean Rusk considered resignation in the summer of 1967, because "his daughter planned to marry a black classmate at Stanford University, and he could not impose such a political burden on the president", after it became known that his daughter, Peggy, planned to marry Guy Smith, "a black Georgetown grad working at NASA".

90.

In October 1967, Dean Rusk told Johnson that he believed the March on the Pentagon was the work of "the Communists", and pressed Johnson to order an investigation to prove it.

91.

Unlike the abrasive McNamara, who was widely disliked at the Pentagon, Dean Rusk was sufficiently liked by his colleagues in the State Department that none leaked their concerns about his drinking to the media.

92.

On January 5,1968, notes by Dean Rusk were delivered to Ambassador of the Soviet Union to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin, pleading support from the US to "avoid recurrence of" claimed bombing of Russian cargo ships in the Haiphong North Vietnam port the day prior.

93.

When Senator Claiborne Pell asked if the war was worth all the suffering, Dean Rusk charged that he was suffering from "moral myopia" about "the endless struggle for freedom".

94.

Just before the peace talks in Paris were due to open on 13 May 1968, Dean Rusk advocated bombing North Vietnam north of the 20 parallel, a proposal strongly opposed by the Defense Secretary Clark Clifford who stated it would wreck the peace talks.

95.

Dean Rusk continued his advocacy of bombing north of 20 parallel, telling Johnson on 21 May 1968 "We will not get a solution in Paris until we prove they can't win in the South".

96.

Dean Rusk who attended the meeting agreed with Richard Nixon's statement that bombing provided leverage in the Paris peace talks, saying: "If the North Vietnamese were not being bombed, they would have no incentive to do anything".

97.

Nixon won the election and Dean Rusk prepared to leave office January 20,1969.

98.

On December 1,1968, citing the halt of bombing in North Vietnam, Dean Rusk said that the Soviet Union would need to come forward and do what it could to forward peace talks in southeast Asia.

99.

On January 2,1969, Dean Rusk met with five Jewish American leaders in his office to assure them the US had not changed its policy in the Middle East of recognizing the sovereignty of Israel.

100.

One of the leaders, the American-Israeli Public Affairs committee's Irving Kane, said afterward that Dean Rusk had successfully convinced him.

101.

Unable to work, Dean Rusk was supported throughout 1969 by the Rockefeller Foundation who paid him a salary as a "distinguished fellow".

102.

On July 27,1969, Dean Rusk voiced his support for the Nixon administration's proposed anti-ballistic missile system, saying that he would vote for it, were he a senator, from an understanding that further proposals would be reviewed if any progress would be made in Soviet Union peace talks.

103.

Dean Rusk was emotionally exhausted after 8 years as Secretary of State and narrowly survived a nervous breakdown in 1969.

104.

Dean Rusk found that the return to teaching in 1970 and the resumption of the academic career he had abandoned in 1940 was emotionally satisfying.

105.

In 1973, Dean Rusk eulogized Johnson when he lay in state.

106.

Dean Rusk spoke about what he called the "so-called freedom of the press", as he maintained that journalists from The New York Times and The Washington Post only wrote what their editors told them to write, saying, if there were true freedom of the press, both newspapers would have portrayed the war more positively.

107.

Cohen noted that in contrast to his years with Kennedy, Dean Rusk was warmer and more protective towards Johnson, whom he clearly got on better with than he ever did with Kennedy.

108.

Dean Rusk died of heart failure in Athens, Georgia, on December 20,1994, at the age of 85.

109.

Dean Rusk Eating House, the first women's eating house at Davidson College, was founded in 1977 and is named in his honor.

110.

The consensus of historians is that Dean Rusk was a very intelligent man, but very shy and so deeply immersed in details and the complexities of each case that he was reluctant to make a decision and unable to clearly explain to the media what the government's policies were.

111.

Dean Rusk established only a distant relationship with President Kennedy but worked more closely with President Johnson.

112.

Dean Rusk is a shy and reticent man, who as Secretary of State sipped scotch to loosen his tongue for press conferences.