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facts about walter model.html

83 Facts About Walter Model

facts about walter model.html1.

Walter Model first came to Hitler's attention before World War II, but their relationship did not become especially close until 1942.

2.

Otto Moritz Walter Model was born in Genthin, Saxony, the son of Otto Paul Moritz Model, a music teacher at a local girls' school, and his wife Marie Pauline Wilhelmine Demmer.

3.

Walter Model had a brother, Otto, who was seven years older.

4.

Walter Model was promoted to on 19 November 1909, and was admitted to the army officer cadet school in Neisse, where he was an unexceptional student, and was commissioned a in the 52nd Infantry Regiment on 22 August 1910.

5.

Walter Model made few friends among his fellow officers and soon became known for his ambition, drive, and blunt outspokenness.

6.

Walter Model became the adjutant of his regiment's 1st Battalion in October 1913.

7.

Walter Model was wounded again on 26 April 1916 in the Battle of Verdun, this time by shell fragments in the right thigh.

8.

Walter Model's deeds brought him to the attention of his divisional commander who, despite misgivings about his "uncomfortable subordinate", recommended Walter Model for German General Staff training.

9.

Walter Model completed the abbreviated eight-month staff officers' course and returned to the 5th Division as adjutant of the 10th Infantry Brigade.

10.

Walter Model was promoted to Hauptmann in March 1918, and soon after was assigned to the staff of the Guard Ersatz Division as division supply officer.

11.

Walter Model considered leaving the army, but was dissuaded by his uncle Martin.

12.

Walter Model then joined the staff of the 7th Brigade in Westphalia.

13.

On 1 October 1921, Walter Model was posted to the 18th Infantry Regiment in Munich, where he commanded the regimental machine gun company.

14.

In October 1925, following the standard alternation of staff duty with troop duty, Walter Model assumed command of the 9th Company, 3rd Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment.

15.

Walter Model returned to staff duty in September 1928, as an officer in the training section at 3rd Division headquarters.

16.

Walter Model lectured in tactics and war studies for the basic General Staff training course, with presentations on the First Battle of the Marne and the Battle of Tannenberg, and authored a 1929 study of August Neidhardt von Gneisenau.

17.

Walter Model became close friends with Friedrich Paulus, a fellow officer on the staff.

18.

Walter Model spent a fortnight with the Red Army's 9th Rifle Division at Rostov, and this formed the basis of a paper he wrote on the Red Army's weapons technology.

19.

Walter Model returned to troop duty in November 1933, as commander of a battalion of the 2nd Infantry Regiment, part of the 1st Division, which was stationed at Allenstein in East Prussia.

20.

In October 1935, Walter Model was appointed to head the 8th Department of the, the revived Army general staff.

21.

Walter Model was one of the officers who advocated for the creation of armoured divisions and corps.

22.

Walter Model led a test firing of the 21 cm Morser 18 on mock Czech fortifications, which did not impress Adolf Hitler.

23.

Walter Model was an ardent supporter of the Nazi Party, to which he owed his advancement to an army command ahead of several more senior officers, despite his undistinguished record of service in Poland.

24.

Walter Model, who was promoted to on 1 April 1940, had to cope with the Sixteenth Army's composition being completely changed in March and April.

25.

The Sixteenth Army's mission was still to cover the flank, but its frontage became much wider, and the imperative for a rapid advance meant that Walter Model spent much of his time overseeing logistical arrangements.

26.

Walter Model was engaged in planning for the Operation Sea Lion, the German invasion of Britain, in which the Sixteenth Army was slated to play a major role.

27.

Walter Model ignored formalities of organization and command, which endeared him to his men and exasperated his staff, who often had to clean up the mess he left behind.

28.

Walter Model instituted a combined arms training program where his men were thrown together in various ad-hoc groupings regardless of their parent unit: tankers trained with infantry, engineers with reconnaissance units, and so on.

29.

Walter Model thus anticipated by some months the regular German use of Kampfgruppen in World War II.

30.

On 26 October 1941, Walter Model was placed in command of XLI Panzer Corps vice Georg-Hans Reinhardt, who stepped up to command of the 3rd Panzer Group, of which the XLI Panzer Corps was a part.

31.

The attack had begun on 2 October 1941, and Walter Model arrived at his new command on 14 November, in the midst of the battle.

32.

Walter Model was a whirlwind of energy, touring the front and exhorting his troops to greater efforts: he ran roughshod over the niceties of protocol and chains of command, and, in general, left his staff trailing in his wake.

33.

Walter Model continued to advocate similar tactics throughout the remainder of his career.

34.

On 31 January 1942, Walter Model was awarded the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross and promoted to generaloberst.

35.

The expediency of preparing rearward defence lines, although these went against the express wishes of Hitler, meant that Walter Model's influence was felt even when he was absent from the battlefield.

36.

Walter Model was on convalescent leave, having been hit by a chance rifle shot while flying over the front.

37.

Walter Model ordered the creation of scratch battle groups made up of soldiers returning from leave and threw them into the fighting.

38.

Walter Model emerged from a year of fighting around Rzhev with an enhanced reputation as a "Lion of defence".

39.

On 5 July 1943, Walter Model led the northern assault on Kursk during Operation Citadel, a plan which had caused great controversy within the German high command.

40.

Walter Model was skeptical of the plan's chances, pointing out that Konstantin Rokossovsky's Central Front was strongly dug in and outnumbered him two to one in men, tanks and artillery.

41.

Walter Model's assault was a failure, as Ninth Army quickly became enmeshed in the elaborate Soviet fortifications.

42.

Walter Model threw his armour into the fray, but with little effect, beyond incurring more casualties.

43.

Walter Model had anticipated the possibility of a Soviet attack into the Orel Salient, and had constructed extensive defensive works to meet such an attack.

44.

Walter Model's relief is believed not to have been a sign that he had lost Hitler's confidence, but rather that he had gained it, Hitler wanting him available should another emergency break out which needed his attention.

45.

Walter Model cracked down on such talk, instituting a new policy he called Shield and Sword.

46.

Regardless, the "temporary" loss of ground usually became permanent, as Walter Model conducted a fighting withdrawal to the Panther Line.

47.

Walter Model delegated responsibility for the Narva front to Johannes Friessner commanding Army Detachment Narva, while he concentrated on extricating Eighteenth Army from its predicament.

48.

Walter Model was promoted to ' on 30 March 1944, backdated to 1 March.

49.

On 30 March 1944, Walter Model was placed in command of Army Group North Ukraine in Galicia, which was withdrawing under heavy pressure from Zhukov's 1st Ukrainian Front, vice Manstein, who had fallen out of favour with Hitler.

50.

The general consensus is that the German position was doomed, regardless of what Walter Model could have done, but Hitler refused to sanction either Fourth Army's escape or a general withdrawal, until it was too late.

51.

On 17 August 1944, Walter Model received Diamonds from Hitler to go with his Knight's Cross with Oakleaves and Swords, in recognition of his shoring up of the Eastern Front.

52.

Walter Model was thus able to rescue a high proportion of the units involved, albeit at the cost of nearly all their armor and heavy materiel.

53.

Walter Model initially thought they were trying to capture him and his staff, but the seemingly vast scale of the assault soon convinced him otherwise.

54.

Walter Model believed that the situation represented not just a threat, but an opportunity to counter-attack and possibly clear the Allies out of the Southern Netherlands.

55.

The Sixth Panzer Army met heavy Allied resistance, and while the Fifth Panzer Army managed to make a deep thrust into the Allied line, Walter Model was unable to exploit the breakthrough there.

56.

Walter Model had failed to capture a vital road junction at Bastogne, and this, in combination with poor weather and difficult terrain, caused the German columns to back up into huge traffic jams on the roads behind the front.

57.

Walter Model shot himself in the head in a forest on 21 April 1945.

58.

Walter Model was buried in the place where he shot himself.

59.

Unlike Erwin Rommel, another field marshal who preferred to lead from the front, Walter Model was almost universally disliked by those who had to work with him.

60.

Walter Model made a habit of being abusive and foul-mouthed, micromanaging his subordinates, changing plans without consultation, and bypassing the chain of command when it suited him.

61.

Walter Model was oblivious to the niceties of etiquette, often reprimanding or castigating his officers in public.

62.

Walter Model was considered a thorough and competent leader but known to "demand too much, and that too quickly", accepting no excuses for failure from either his own men or those who outranked him.

63.

Walter Model's troops were said to have "suffered under his too-frequent absences and erratic, inconsistent demands", for he frequently lost sight of what was or was not practically possible.

64.

Walter Model is regarded as being an excellent defensive commander of the Third Reich, and having an "outstanding talent for improvisation".

65.

Walter Model had a formidable memory and eye for detail, which allowed him to dominate his staff officers, especially those in charge of specialist areas such as artillery, transport and communications.

66.

Walter Model fought nearly all his battles in the northern and central parts of the Eastern Front; he was never tested on the steppes of southern Russia, where the open terrain would have made mobile warfare a more attractive proposition.

67.

Walter Model had the reputation of a ruthless commander, willing to inflict and take casualties to stabilize his front.

68.

The splitting up of units was continually practiced by Walter Model and took place on the regimental and divisional level.

69.

From an operational viewpoint this allowed Walter Model to achieve defensive successes, which would not have been possible otherwise.

70.

Walter Model was aware of the negative effects of the splitting up of units.

71.

Walter Model held himself to the same high standard as he held those around him, saying: "Walter Model who leads troops has no right to think about himself".

72.

Walter Model was the master of the type of defense which can be called 'defense limited in time'; in which one defends as long as possible but then retreats to avoid breakthrough and destruction.

73.

Walter Model was always at the critical points and took away battlegroups or even single battalions from less threatened sectors.

74.

Immediately, Walter Model drove back from Rzhev to Vyazma in a raging blizzard and boarded a plane for East Prussia.

75.

Hitler, shocked at the defiance of his newest army commander, tried to find another solution favorable for both, but Walter Model still was not satisfied.

76.

Importantly Walter Model never challenged Hitler on political issues: a point that has been identified as the secret to their successful relationship.

77.

Walter Model frequently disputed, ignored or bypassed orders that he felt unsupportable: at Rzhev and Oryol he had constructed defensive fortifications in defiance of a ban, and his use of Shield and Sword tactics while at Army Group North proved to be simply a cover for a staged withdrawal.

78.

Walter Model frequently harangued his troops to have faith in the Fuhrer and uphold the virtues of National Socialism.

79.

Walter Model accepted the offer of SS-Gruppenfuhrer Hermann Fegelein to appoint a Waffen-SS officer as his adjutant at Army Group North in 1944, after the Heerespersonalamt had refused him an adjutant, and filled the Nation zialistischer Fuhrungsoffizier post at Army Group B that had been vacant before his arrival.

80.

Walter Model was well aware of Speidel's political leanings, as were his predecessors at Army Group B, Erwin Rommel and Gunther von Kluge.

81.

Walter Model stated that the revolt arose from the mistreatment of the Polish population by the Nazis and the army should have nothing to do with it.

82.

The historian Gerhard Weinberg states that Walter Model had benefited from the hastening of the evolution that occurred in the relationship of Hitler to the military following the defeat at Stalingrad.

83.

The historian Ben H Shepherd opines that Model was "not the most fanatical Nazi".