21 Facts About GE Moore

George Edward GE Moore was an English philosopher, who with Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein and earlier Gottlob Frege was among the founders of analytic philosophy.

GE Moore was said to have an "exceptional personality and moral character".

George Edward GE Moore was born in Upper Norwood, in south-east London, on 4 November 1873, the middle child of seven of Daniel GE Moore, a medical doctor, and Henrietta Sturge.

GE Moore was educated at Dulwich College and in 1892 went up to Trinity College, Cambridge, to read classics and moral sciences.

GE Moore became a Fellow of Trinity in 1898 and went on to hold the University of Cambridge chair of Mental Philosophy and Logic from 1925 to 1939.

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GE Moore is best known today for defending ethical non-naturalism, his emphasis on common sense in philosophical method, and the paradox that bears his name.

GE Moore was admired by and influenced among other philosophers, and by the Bloomsbury Group, but unlike his colleague and admirer Russell, who for some years thought he fulfilled his "ideal of genius", mostly unknown today outside of academic philosophy.

GE Moore's essays are known for their clarity and circumspection of writing style and methodical and patient approach to philosophical problems.

GE Moore was critical of modern philosophy for lack of progress, which he saw as a stark contrast to the dramatic advances in the natural sciences since the Renaissance.

GE Moore was an important and admired member of the secretive Cambridge Apostles, a discussion group drawn from the British intellectual elite.

From 1918 to 1919 GE Moore chaired the Aristotelian Society, a group committed to systematic study of philosophy, its historical development and its methods and problems.

GE Moore was cremated at Cambridge Crematorium on 28 October 1958 and his ashes interred at the Parish of the Ascension Burial Ground in the city.

GE Moore asserted that philosophical arguments can suffer from a confusion between the use of a term in a particular argument and the definition of that term .

GE Moore contends that, even if such arguments are correct, they do not provide definitions for the term 'good'.

GE Moore concludes from this that any analysis of value is bound to fail.

GE Moore contended that goodness cannot be analysed in terms of any other property.

GE Moore argued that, once arguments based on the naturalistic fallacy had been discarded, questions of intrinsic goodness could be settled only by appeal to what he called "moral intuitions": self-evident propositions which recommend themselves to moral reflection, but which are not susceptible to either direct proof or disproof .

GE Moore wished to distinguish his view from the views usually described as "Intuitionist" when Principia Ethica was written:.

GE Moore distinguished his view from the view of deontological intuitionists, who held that "intuitions" could determine questions about what actions are right or required by duty.

GE Moore holds that right actions are those producing the most good.

GE Moore is remembered for drawing attention to the peculiar inconsistency involved in uttering a sentence such as "It is raining, but I do not believe it is raining", a puzzle now commonly called "GE Moore's paradox".