97 Facts About Hermann Hoth

Hermann Hoth was a German army commander, war criminal, and author.

Hermann Hoth served as a high-ranking panzer commander in the Wehrmacht during World War II, playing a prominent role in the Battle of France and on the Eastern Front.

Hermann Hoth was a strong believer in Nazism, and units under his command committed several war crimes including the murder of prisoners of war and civilians.

When World War II broke out, Hermann Hoth successfully led the XV Army Corps during the German invasions of Poland and France.

Hermann Hoth commanded the 3rd Panzer Group during Operation Barbarossa in 1941, a position in which he assisted in the destruction of several Soviet armies.

From October 1941, Hermann Hoth headed the 17th Army, a period during which he advocated for a war of annihilation against the Soviet Union, the merciless destruction of partisans, and the murder of Jews.

Hermann Hoth led the German defense in eastern Ukraine during the Battle of the Dnieper, but was sacked by Adolf Hitler due to the surprise Soviet reconquest of Kiev in November 1943.

Hermann Hoth was sentenced to 15 years in prison, but released on parole in 1954.

Hermann Hoth subsequently became an author, writing about armoured warfare, the development of West Germany's military, and in support of the myth of the clean Wehrmacht.

Hermann Hoth's parents were Hermann Hoth, a Prussian staff officer surgeon, and Margarethe Hoth.

Hermann Hoth was commissioned as a Leutnant in the Prussian Army in 1903, but his rise in the ranks was slow.

Hermann Hoth attended the Prussian Staff College from 1910 to 1913, where he learned Russian, and was appointed Oberleutnant in 1912 and Hauptmann in 1914.

Hermann Hoth's first son, Hans Joachim, was born in 1913.

Hermann Hoth spent almost all of World War I as a staff officer on higher headquarters and only four weeks on the front line.

Hermann Hoth served under Generalfeldmarschall Paul von Hindenburg during this period, including during the Battle of Tannenberg, and came to greatly admire his superior.

Hermann Hoth was awarded both classes of the Iron Cross during the war.

When Germany surrendered in 1918 amid growing internal turmoil, Hermann Hoth felt more loyalty to Hindenburg than the newly formed democratic government in Berlin.

Hermann Hoth believed that the failure of the right-wing Kapp Putsch proved that the military had to prevent its misuse in politics.

Hermann Hoth remained in the Reichswehr in the interwar period, serving at the organization department of the General Staff.

Three years later, Hermann Hoth was sent to the Soviet Union as part of secret military cooperation missions.

Hermann Hoth's views changed with the 1930 German federal election when the Nazi Party became the second-strongest political force.

Hermann Hoth started to view Hitler's nationalist ambitions with approval, and admired the Nazis' attention to workers which he viewed as unusual for a right-wing party.

Hermann Hoth was among the officers who were most favorably disposed toward Hitler's seizure of control, regarding it as a chance to improve the military.

Hermann Hoth generally approved of the aims and achievements of the Nazi Party, although he expressed some disquiet about the elimination of German Jews.

Hermann Hoth was regarded as one of the most modern Wehrmacht officers at the time, advocating motorization and other modernization.

Hermann Hoth was promoted to Generalleutnant in 1936, followed by General der Infanterie two years later.

Hermann Hoth was given command of the XV Motorised Corps in 1938, leading it in the invasion of Poland the following year.

Hermann Hoth believed that the XV Motorised Corps, including its "light" divisions, had "exceeded high expectations" during the invasion of Poland.

Hermann Hoth continued to lead the XV Army Corps during the invasion of France from May 1940.

Hermann Hoth's corps consisted of the 5th and 7th Panzer Divisions, the latter commanded by Generalmajor Erwin Rommel.

Hermann Hoth commanded the 3rd Panzer Group during Operation Barbarossa in 1941.

From a moral and ideological standpoint, Hermann Hoth believed that Russia had been overtaken by "Jewish Bolshevism", causing the country to turn away from its European heritage, transforming it into an expansionist, Asiatic, and despotic state as well as setting it on an unavoidable collision course with Germany.

Hurter argued that Hermann Hoth's beliefs showcased remarkable similarities with Hitler's.

Hermann Hoth tried to convince his superior, Generalfeldmarschall Fedor von Bock, commander of Army Group Center, that the 3rd Panzer Group had to operate with greater flexibility and prepare to strike deeper into the Soviet Union than intended by the high command.

Regardless of his misgivings, Hermann Hoth generally adhered to the decided-upon plans and Bock's commands during the invasion.

At this point, Hermann Hoth again argued that the 3rd Panzer Group should move deeper into the Soviet territory and encircle more enemy troops before closing the pocket.

Alongside Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group, Hermann Hoth then pushed further to attack Smolensk, believing that they had to continue their advance to not allow the Red Army to reorganize.

Hermann Hoth ordered the 3rd Panzer Group's officers to subject such individuals to a limited examination; if the officers concluded that the prisoners were Red Army soldiers, they were to be shot.

Hermann Hoth was then redirected north to capture Rzhev and Kalinin, even though this effectively removed the 3rd Panzer Group from the Battle of Moscow.

Hermann Hoth was an active supporter of the war of annihilation against the Soviet Union, calling on his men to understand the need for "harsh punishment of Jewry".

Hurter argued that this order reflected that Hermann Hoth was fully aware of the ongoing Holocaust, and evidently urged his troops to kill Jews not just due to their alleged support for anti-German elements, but to prevent them from taking revenge in the future.

Hermann Hoth advised subordinate officers to cultivate the growing hatred for Soviet troops among the common German soldiers.

Hermann Hoth ordered the shooting of any civilians encountered in the woods, as these could potentially support or be partisans.

Hermann Hoth agreed with and ordered the mass requisitioning of food, despite causing starvation in occupied cities.

Hermann Hoth believed that the Ukrainians would become part of the new order in Europe.

In early January 1942, Hermann Hoth became the acting commander of the entire Army Group South, just before the start of the Soviet winter offensives.

Bock interpreted these proposals as Hermann Hoth threatening to move his entire army westward, and ordered him to remain where he was until reserves arrived.

Significant pockets of resistance remained in the city, but Hitler ordered Hermann Hoth to keep advancing.

The 4th Panzer Army was thus not properly reinforced, but Hermann Hoth was still able to organize an effective defense.

On his part, Hermann Hoth reacted to the change of plans by working out an operation of the 4th Panzer Army to encircle Stalingrad.

Hermann Hoth's tanks attempted to flank Stalingrad from the south-west through the Kalmyk Steppe, forcing the Soviet Stalingrad Front commander Andrey Yeryomenko to concentrate most of his forces to slow down the 4th Panzer Army.

Hermann Hoth was one of the few German commanders who realized that a possible Soviet attack from south of Stalingrad could pose a grave threat to the 6th Army.

Hermann Hoth's warnings regarding the 6th Army's southern flank were largely ignored.

The Red Army subsequently attacked south of Stalingrad, breaking through Axis lines as Hermann Hoth attempted to muster a defense.

Outside the pocket, the remainder of the 4th Panzer Army and the Romanian VI and VII Corps were designated "Army Group Hermann Hoth" and attempted to slow the Red Army's advance north of Kotelnikovo.

Hermann Hoth was instead directed to help shore up the German defenses as the Soviet Operation Little Saturn threatened Army Group Don's rear.

Hermann Hoth then met with Manstein at Dnipropetrovsk where he was informed that the 4th Panzer Army was being refounded, consisting of two tank corps, two tank divisions, two infantry divisions, and Waffen-SS units, including the II SS Panzer Corps, Das Reich and Totenkopf.

In July 1943, Hermann Hoth commanded the 4th Panzer Army in the Battle of Kursk as part of Army Group South.

At this point, Hermann Hoth was considered one of the Wehrmacht's most experienced senior-level tank commanders, but his leadership was less effective compared to earlier periods of the war.

When Operation Citadel started, Hermann Hoth's divisions, reinforced by the II SS Panzer Corps under Paul Hausser, penetrated several Soviet defensive lines, before being brought to a halt in the Battle of Prokhorovka.

Hermann Hoth was unable to destroy the Soviet bridgeheads across the river.

In September 1943, Hermann Hoth's army was operationally penetrated by Red Army units and was unable to maintain a continuous front line even in retreat.

The rapid loss of Kiev "humiliated" Hermann Hoth who was blamed by Hitler for this defeat.

Historian Earl F Ziemke contended that by this point Hitler "wanted generals who would hold without giving an inch", whereas Hoth was an expert in mobile defense.

In November 1943, Hermann Hoth was put on leave, officially "to unwind", and relieved of command on 10 December 1943.

Forczyk argued that the German failures in the battle of the Dnieper had resulted from both Hitler's interferences in tactical matters as well as the inability of the Wehrmacht commanders, including Hermann Hoth, to anticipate Soviet actions.

Hermann Hoth was appointed commander of the Saale, and ordered to defend the Halle-Leipzig area until the 12th Army was combat-ready again.

Hermann Hoth organized a defensive line at Mulde and Elbe and offered some resistance to the advancing United States Armed Forces before his forces broke.

Hermann Hoth insisted that no physical harm came to civilians as the result of this measure, which his troops executed with "clean hands".

Hermann Hoth maintained that if any Jews had been killed it was due to their connection to crimes against the German forces.

Hermann Hoth believed this argument to sufficiently justify the brutality of the German occupation.

In regards to the criminal Commissar Order, Hermann Hoth claimed that he had been "compelled" to transmit it to the troops under his command, as otherwise he would have been replaced by a more compliant officer.

Hermann Hoth denied having demanded that the Commissar Order be carried out, maintaining that he had opposed it.

Hermann Hoth expressed the view that his subordinates would have known of his disapproval of the order even though he had never actually voiced any opposition to it.

Hermann Hoth maintained that any orders by Hitler superseded Section 48 of the German Military Penal Code which affirmed that soldiers were under no obligation to adhere to clearly criminal orders.

Hermann Hoth instead posited that only partisans were executed, while blaming the brutality of partisan warfare on Soviet leader Joseph Stalin.

The tribunal concluded that he was thus fully aware of the SD's murder of Jews, but the 17th Army under Hermann Hoth still continued to hand over prisoners to the SD and continued to cooperate with the agency.

Furthermore, there was clear evidence that Hermann Hoth had transmitted the Commissar Order with his full knowledge and approval, and several reports confirmed that he had been aware of the execution of hundreds of captured commissars.

Hermann Hoth had ordered POWs to be used for forced labour and as ammunition loaders.

Hermann Hoth was convicted under count two relating to the Commissar Order and the unlawful treatment of POWs.

Hermann Hoth was convincted under count three for war crimes and crimes against humanity consisting of crimes against civilians in regards to the murder of civilians suspected to be associated with partisans and Jews.

Hermann Hoth's testimony tends to show that his subordinates should have cathoderay-tubes in their brains, enabling them to grasp the ideas that resulted from his honourable character.

Hermann Hoth thought that they should have the courage to disobey an order, while he himself lacked such courage.

Hermann Hoth served his time in the prison of Landsberg am Lech.

Hermann Hoth complied with his prison duties, though continued to maintain his innocence.

In January 1951, Hermann Hoth's sentence was reviewed with no changes.

Hermann Hoth was released on parole in April 1954; his sentence was reduced to time served in 1957.

Hermann Hoth took up walking the Harz mountains as a hobby, and began writing on topics related to World War II.

In one of these articles, Hermann Hoth made an "almost hysterical" appeal for the Bundeswehr, West Germany's new armed forces, to mobilize strong tank divisions.

Hermann Hoth maintained contacts with Wehrmacht officers who had been recruited into the Bundeswehr such as Friedrich Foertsch.

Hermann Hoth claimed that German veterans were the ones who should have the "greater right" to shape the perception on the war.

Hermann Hoth spent his last years trying to "preserve" the German military's public perception, giving interviews to journalists and historians.

From 1965, Hermann Hoth developed close contacts with Ulrich de Maiziere, Inspector General of the Bundeswehr.

Ziemke argued that Hermann Hoth displayed "mastery of the mobile defense" in his campaigns.

Researcher Linden Lyons, translator of Panzer Operations, argued that Hermann Hoth "was undoubtedly one of the most brilliant tank commanders of the Second World War, yet this is overshadowed by his strong enthusiasm for the expansionist and racist ideology of Nazism".

In course of the war, Hermann Hoth had written down extensive notes, comparable in length to The Halder Diaries.

For instance, Hermann Hoth documented Hitler's speech to his high-ranking officers before Operation Barbarossa in much more detail than any other source, outlining German strategic and ideological aims.