19 Facts About Japanese surrender


Japanese surrender policy-making centered on the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War, the so-called "Big Six"—the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of the Army, Minister of the Navy, Chief of the Army General Staff, and Chief of the Navy General Staff.

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Japanese surrender leaders had always envisioned a negotiated settlement to the war.

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The Japanese surrender hoped that the Soviet Union could be persuaded to act as an agent for Japan in negotiations with the United States and Britain.

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Japanese surrender suggested a political solution and asked about warning the Japanese of the atomic bomb.

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The Japanese would have to surrender unconditionally to all the Allies.

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Japanese surrender hoped that preserving Hirohito's central role could facilitate an orderly capitulation of all Japanese troops in the Pacific theatre.

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The Japanese surrender force tasked with defending Hokkaido, the 5th Area Army, was under strength at two divisions and two brigades, and was in fortified positions on the east side of the island.

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Japanese surrender intelligence was predicting that US forces might not invade for months.

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However, the senior leadership of the Japanese surrender Army took the news in stride, grossly underestimating the scale of the attack.

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However the Japanese surrender leadership had no way to know the size of the United States' stockpile, and feared the United States might have the capacity not just to devastate individual cities, but to wipe out the Japanese surrender people as a race and nation.

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Indeed, Anami expressed a desire for this outcome rather than Japanese surrender, asking if it would "not be wondrous for this whole nation to be destroyed like a beautiful flower".

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Japanese surrender cabinet considered the Allied response, and Suzuki argued that they must reject it and insist on an explicit guarantee for the imperial system.

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The Japanese had been instructed that they could transmit an unqualified acceptance in the clear, but instead they sent out coded messages on matters unrelated to the surrender parlay.

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Japanese surrender gathered his officers and walked out of the NHK studio.

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Japanese surrender went there and confronted the rebellious officers, berating them for acting contrary to the spirit of the Japanese army.

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Low quality of the recording, combined with the Classical Japanese surrender language used by the Emperor in the Rescript, made the recording very difficult to understand for most listeners.

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Public reaction to the Emperor's speech varied—many Japanese simply listened to it, then went on with their lives as best they could, while some Army and Navy officers chose suicide over surrender.

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The Japanese surrender pilots were acting without authorization from the Japanese surrender government.

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Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu signed on behalf of the Japanese surrender government followed by the uniformed General Yoshijiro Umezu, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

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