40 Facts About Overland Campaign

1.

Overland Campaign, known as Grant's Overland Campaign and the Wilderness Campaign, was a series of battles fought in Virginia during May and June 1864, in the American Civil War.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,664
2.

Overland Campaign included two long-range raids by Union cavalry under Maj.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,665
3.

Overland Campaign chose to make his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac, although Meade retained formal command of that army.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,666
4.

Overland Campaign began as Grant's forces crossed the Rapidan River on May 4,1864.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,667
5.

Overland Campaign planned to use the same tactics with Hancock's entire corps.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,668
6.

Overland Campaign was completely unaware, of course, that this was exactly the place Grant intended to attack.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,669
7.

Overland Campaign planned to reorient his lines and shift the center of potential action to the east of Spotsylvania, where he could renew the battle.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,670
8.

Overland Campaign ordered the V and VI Corps to move behind the II Corps and take positions past the left flank of the IX Corps.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,671
9.

Overland Campaign kept up his movement down the Brook Pike, not realizing that he was boxing himself into a potential trap.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,672
10.

Overland Campaign's left flank was against the swollen Chickahominy, and Confederate cavalry threatened his rear, hoping to capture the Union force.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,673
11.

Overland Campaign's men poured forth a destructive fire, halting the final Confederate advances, assisted by some of Wilson's men who turned the flank of the attacking column.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,674
12.

Overland Campaign designated Hancock's II Corps to head southeast from Spotsylvania to Milford Station, hoping that Lee would take the bait and attack this isolated corps.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,675
13.

Overland Campaign cautiously extended Ewell's Corps to the Telegraph Road and notified Breckinridge, who was en route to join Lee, to stop at Hanover Junction and defend the North Anna River line until Lee could join him.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,676
14.

Overland Campaign was convinced that Lee had demonstrated the weakness of his army by not attacking when he had the upper hand.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,677
15.

Benjamin Butler's Bermuda Hundred Overland Campaign was a fort at Wilson's Wharf, at a strategic bend in the James River in eastern Charles City, overlooked by high bluffs.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,678
16.

Overland Campaign's soldiers freed and recruited slaves and in one case whipped a plantation owner who had a reputation for harshness to his slaves.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,679
17.

Overland Campaign ordered that his supply depots at Belle Plain, Aquia Landing, and Fredericksburg be moved to a new base at Port Royal, Virginia, on the Rappahannock River.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,680
18.

Overland Campaign sent a small brigade of North Carolina cavalry down the southern bank of the Pamunkey to scout and harass the Union advance wherever possible.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,681
19.

Overland Campaign's condition was serious enough that he was temporarily replaced in command by Maj.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,682
20.

Overland Campaign now knew that Grant had crossed the Pamunkey in force, although he was still unclear on the next steps that Grant might take and therefore waited for further developments.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,683
21.

Overland Campaign directed Crawford's division to move south along a farm track to Old Church Road, where they erected simple breastworks.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,684
22.

Overland Campaign blamed Anderson for not arriving in time to assist, but the soldiers blamed Ramseur, who had ordered the charge without sufficient reconnaissance.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,685
23.

Overland Campaign placed his brigade in a good defensible position on the north bank of Matadequin Creek and sent a squadron to a forward position at the Barker farm, south of the creek.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,686
24.

Overland Campaign's attack flanked the Confederates on both ends of the line.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,687
25.

Overland Campaign launched a powerful assault at 6 am that overran the Confederate skirmishers but mistakenly thought he had pierced the first line of earthworks and halted his corps to regroup before moving on, which he planned for that afternoon.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,688
26.

Overland Campaign planned to cross to the south bank of the river, bypassing Richmond, and isolate the capital by seizing the railroad junction of Petersburg to the south.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,689
27.

Overland Campaign pulled Breckinridge's division from Cold Harbor and sent it toward Lynchburg to parry Hunter.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,690
28.

Overland Campaign correctly guessed that the Union targets were the railroad junctions at Gordonsville and Charlottesville, and knew that he would have to move quickly to block the threat.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,691
29.

Overland Campaign found the station totally unguarded, occupied only by Hampton's trains—supply wagons, caissons containing ammunition and food, and hundreds of horses.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,692
30.

Overland Campaign charged with two brigades, pushing Hampton's men back all the way to the station, while a third brigade swung into Fitzhugh Lee's exposed right flank, thus pushing him back.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,693
31.

Overland Campaign received intelligence that Breckinridge's infantry had been sighted near Waynesboro, effectively blocking any chance for further advance, so he decided to abandon his raid and return to the main army at Cold Harbor.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,694
32.

Overland Campaign successfully diverted Confederate attention from Grant's crossing of the James, but was unsuccessful in his objective of cutting the Virginia Central Railroad, a critical supply line to the Confederate capital and Lee's army.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,695
33.

Overland Campaign suffered relatively heavy casualties—particularly in his officer corps—and lost a large number of his horses to battle and heat exhaustion.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,696
34.

Overland Campaign had succeeded in protecting the railroads and, indirectly, Richmond.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,697
35.

Overland Campaign achieved tactical victories on the second day of Trevilian Station and against Gregg at Samaria Church, but failed to destroy the Union cavalry or its trains.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,698
36.

Overland Campaign was a thrust necessary for the Union to win the war, and although Grant suffered a number of setbacks, the campaign turned into a strategic success for the Union.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,699
37.

Overland Campaign made mistakes, but the overall pattern of his campaign reveals an innovative general employing thoughtful combinations of maneuver and force to bring a difficult adversary to bay on his home turf.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,700
38.

The overall strategy of the Overland Campaign depended on using Grant's numerical superiority to allow progressive shifts to the left by "spare" Union corps while Confederate forces were relatively pinned in their positions by the remaining Union forces.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,701
39.

Overland Campaign had to choose one among three possibilities: attack, shift to the right and thus back toward Washington, or cross the James to get at Lee's supply lines.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,702
40.

Overland Campaign attempted the first, then did the third, as the second was unacceptable.

FactSnippet No. 2,019,703