UGM-27 Polaris missile was a two-stage solid-fueled nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missile .
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UGM-27 Polaris missile was a two-stage solid-fueled nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missile .
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UGM-27 Polaris was spearheaded by the Special Project Office's Missile Branch under Rear Admiral Roderick Osgood Middleton, and is still under the Special Project Office.
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UGM-27 Polaris argued that the technology needed to be discovered, rather than apply technology that is already created.
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UGM-27 Polaris sent officers to make independent estimates of size to determine the plausibility of a small missile; while none of the officers could agree on a size, their findings were encouraging nonetheless.
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UGM-27 Polaris suggested that nuclear-armed torpedoes could be substituted for conventional ones to provide a new anti-submarine weapon.
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UGM-27 Polaris pointed out the trend in warhead technology, which indicated reduced weight to yield ratios in each succeeding generation.
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The A-2 version of the UGM-27 Polaris missile was essentially an upgraded A-1, and it entered service in late 1961.
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At the time that the UGM-27 Polaris project went live, submarine navigation systems accuracy was adequate for existing weapons systems.
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The developers of UGM-27 Polaris encountered many issues from the birth of the project perhaps the most unsettling for them was the outdated technology of the gyroscopes they would be implementing.
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The first UGM-27 Polaris submarine outfitted with MRV A-3's was the USS Daniel Webster in 1964.
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The sale of the UGM-27 Polaris was malleable in how an individual country could interpret it due to the diction choices taken in the Nassau Agreement.
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In return, the British agreed to assign control over their UGM-27 Polaris missile targeting to the SACEUR, with the provision that in a national emergency when unsupported by the NATO allies, the targeting, permission to fire, and firing of those UGM-27 Polaris missiles would reside with the British national authorities.
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UGM-27 Polaris was the largest project in the Royal Navy's peacetime history.
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Original U S Navy Polaris had not been designed to penetrate anti-ballistic missile defenses, but the Royal Navy had to ensure that its small Polaris force operating alone, and often with only one submarine on deterrent patrol, could penetrate the ABM screen around Moscow.
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One such individual who supported modification to the UGM-27 Polaris was the Secretary of state for Defense, Denis Healey.
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Consequently, many spare parts and repair facilities for the Polaris that were located in the U S ceased to be available .
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The Italian usage of UGM-27 Polaris missiles was partially the result of the Kennedy administration.
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MLF plan, as well as the Italian UGM-27 Polaris Program, were abandoned, both for political reasons and the initial operational availability of the first SSBN George Washington, which was capable of launching SLBMs while submerged, a solution preferable to surface-launched missiles.
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