192 Facts About Zhou Enlai

1.

Zhou Enlai was a Chinese statesman who served as the first Premier of the People's Republic of China from September 1954 until his death in January 1976.

2.

Zhou Enlai helped devise policies regarding disputes with the United States, Taiwan, the Soviet Union, India, Korea, and Vietnam.

3.

Zhou Enlai survived the purges of other top officials during the Cultural Revolution.

4.

Amid these events, Zhou Enlai was elected to the vacant position of First Vice Chairman of the Communist Party by the 10th Central Committee in 1973 and thereby designated as Mao's successor, but still struggled internally against the Gang of Four over leadership of China.

5.

Zhou Enlai then fell out of the public eye for medical treatment and died one year later.

6.

Zhou Enlai was born in Huai'an, Jiangsu province, on 5 March 1898, the first son of his branch of the Zhou family.

7.

The Zhou Enlai family was originally from Shaoxing in Zhejiang province.

8.

Panlong apparently passed the provincial examinations, and Zhou Enlai later claimed that Panlong served as magistrate governing Huai'an county.

9.

Zhou Enlai Yineng had a reputation for honesty, gentleness, intelligence and concern for others, but was considered "weak" and "lacking in discipline and determination".

10.

Zhou Enlai was unsuccessful in his personal life, and drifted across China doing various occupations, working in Beijing, Shandong, Anhui, Shenyang, Inner Mongolia and Sichuan.

11.

Zhou Enlai later remembered his father as being always away from home and generally unable to support his family.

12.

Zhou Yigan died soon after the adoption, and Zhou Enlai was raised by Yigan's widow, whose surname was Chen.

13.

Madame Chen taught Zhou Enlai to read and write at an early age, and Zhou Enlai later claimed to have read the famous vernacular novel Journey to the West at the age of six.

14.

Zhou Enlai's father was working in Hubei, far from Jiangsu, so Zhou Enlai and his two younger brothers returned to Huai'an and lived with his father's remaining younger brother Yikui for the next two years.

15.

The family in Huai'an agreed, and Zhou Enlai was sent to stay with his uncle in Manchuria at Shenyang, where Zhou Enlai Yigeng worked in a government office.

16.

In Shenyang, Zhou Enlai attended the Dongguan Model Academy, a modern-style school.

17.

Zhou Enlai's talents attracted the attention of Yan Xiu and Zhang Boling.

18.

Yan in particular thought highly of Zhou Enlai, helping to pay for his studies in Japan and later France.

19.

Zhou Enlai later expressed the reasons for his decision not to marry Yan's daughter to his classmate, Zhang Honghao.

20.

Zhou Enlai said that he declined the marriage because he feared that his financial prospects would not be promising, and that Yan would, as his father-in-law, later dominate his life.

21.

Zhou Enlai did well in his studies at Nankai; he excelled in Chinese, won several awards in the school speech club, and became editor of the school newspaper in his final year.

22.

Zhou Enlai was very active in acting and producing dramas and plays at Nankai; many students who were not otherwise acquainted with him knew of him through his acting.

23.

At the school's tenth commencement in June 1917, Zhou Enlai was one of five graduating students honored at the ceremony, and one of the two valedictorians.

24.

Zhou Enlai left Nankai with a great desire to pursue public service, and to acquire the skills required to do so.

25.

Zhou Enlai's studies were supported by his uncles, and apparently Nankai founder Yan Xiu as well, but their funds were limited; during this period, Japan suffered from severe inflation.

26.

Zhou Enlai originally planned to win one of the scholarships offered by the Chinese government; these scholarships required Chinese students to pass entrance examinations in Japanese universities.

27.

Zhou Enlai took entrance examinations for at least two schools, but failed to gain admission.

28.

Zhou Enlai's reported anxieties were compounded by the death of his uncle, Zhou Enlai Yikui, his inability to master Japanese, and the acute Japanese cultural chauvinism that discriminated against Chinese.

29.

Zhou Enlai began to read avidly Chen Duxiu's progressive and left-leaning magazine, New Youth.

30.

Zhou Enlai read early Japanese works on Marx, and it has been claimed that he even attended Kawakami Hajime's lectures at Kyoto University.

31.

However, it now seems unlikely that Zhou Enlai met him or heard any of his lectures.

32.

Zhou Enlai's diaries show his interest in Chinese student protests in opposition to the Sino-Japanese Joint Defence Agreement in May 1918, but he did not actively participate in them or return to China as part of the "Returning Home Movement".

33.

Zhou Enlai returned to Tianjin sometime in the spring of 1919.

34.

In July 1919 Zhou Enlai became editor of the Tianjin Student Union Bulletin, apparently at the request of his Nankai classmate, Ma Jun, a founder of the Union.

35.

When Nankai became a university in August 1919, Zhou Enlai was in the first class, but was an activist full-time.

36.

Zhou Enlai assumed a more prominent active role in political activities over the next few months.

37.

On 23 January 1920, a confrontation over boycott activities in Tianjin led to the arrest of a number of people, including several Awakening Society members, and on 29 January Zhou Enlai led a march on the Governor's Office in Tianjin to present a petition calling for the arrestees' release.

38.

The arrestees were held for over six months; during their detention, Zhou Enlai supposedly organized discussions on Marxism.

39.

Zhou Enlai left Shanghai for Europe on 7 November 1920 with a group of 196 work study students, including friends from Nankai and Tianjin.

40.

In London in January 1921, Zhou Enlai witnessed a large miners' strike and wrote a series of articles for the Yishi bao examining the conflict between workers and employers, and the conflict's resolution.

41.

Still interested in academic programs, Zhou Enlai traveled to Britain in January 1921 to visit Edinburgh University.

42.

Zhou Enlai knew Zhang through Zhang's wife, Liu Qingyang, a member of the Awakening Society.

43.

Zhou Enlai has sometimes been portrayed at this time as uncertain in his politics, but his swift move to Communism suggests otherwise.

44.

The cell Zhou Enlai belonged to was based in Paris; in addition to Zhou Enlai, Zhang, and Liu it included two other students, Zhao Shiyan and Chen Gongpei.

45.

Zhou Enlai was apparently not one of the occupying students and remained in France until February or March 1922, when he moved with Zhang and Liu from Paris to Berlin.

46.

Zhou Enlai's move to Berlin was perhaps because the relatively "lenient" political atmosphere in Berlin made it more favorable as a base for overall European organizing.

47.

Zhou Enlai returned to Paris by June 1922, where he was one of the twenty two participants present at the organization of the Chinese Youth Communist Party, established as the European Branch of the Chinese Communist Party.

48.

Zhou Enlai helped draft the party's charter and was elected to the three member executive committee as director of propaganda.

49.

Zhou Enlai wrote for and helped edit the party magazine, Shaonian, later renamed Chiguang.

50.

The party went through several reorganizations and name changes, but Zhou Enlai remained a key member of the group throughout his stay in Europe.

51.

Zhou Enlai left Europe probably in late July 1924, returning to China as one of the most senior Chinese Communist Party members in Europe.

52.

Zhou Enlai returned to China in late August or early September 1924 to join the Political Department of the Whampoa Military Academy, probably through the influence of Zhang Shenfu, who had previously worked there.

53.

The exact positions Zhou Enlai held at Whampoa and the dates he held them are not clear.

54.

The Political Department, where Zhou Enlai worked, was responsible for political indoctrination and control.

55.

Concurrent with his Whampoa appointment, Zhou Enlai became secretary of the Communist Party's Guangdong Provincial Committee, and at some point a member of the Provincial Committee's Military Section.

56.

Zhou Enlai soon arranged for a number of other prominent Communists to join the Political Department, including Chen Yi, Nie Rongzhen, Yun Daiying, and Xiong Xiong.

57.

Zhou Enlai played an important role in establishing the Young Soldiers Association, a youth group which was dominated by the Communists, and Sparks, a short-lived Communist front group.

58.

Zhou Enlai thus recruited numerous new Communist party members from cadet ranks, and eventually set up a covert Communist Party branch at the academy to direct the new members.

59.

When Nationalists concerned with the increasing number of Communist members and organizations at Whampoa set up a "Society for Sun Yat-senism", Zhou Enlai attempted to squelch it; the conflict between these student groups set the background for Zhou Enlai's removal from the academy.

60.

Zhou Enlai participated in two military operations conducted by the Nationalist regime in 1925, later known as the first and second Eastern Expeditions.

61.

Zhou Enlai accompanied the Whampoa cadets on the expedition as a political officer.

62.

Zhou Enlai had kept in touch with Deng Yingchao, whom he had met in the Awakening Society while in Tianjin; and, in January 1925, Zhou Enlai asked for and received permission from CCP authorities to marry Deng.

63.

Zhou Enlai's time in Whampoa was a significant period in his career.

64.

Zhou Enlai's pioneering work as a political officer in the military made him an important Communist Party expert in this key area; much of his later career centered on the military.

65.

Zhou Enlai did extensive work in these areas until the final separation of the Nationalist and Communist parties and the end of the Soviet-Nationalist alliance in 1927.

66.

Zhou Enlai was transferred to Shanghai to assist in these activities, probably in late 1926.

67.

The partial documentation available for this period shows that Zhou Enlai headed the Communist Party Central Committee's Military Commission in Shanghai.

68.

Zhou Enlai himself was nearly killed in a similar trap, when he was arrested after arriving at a dinner held at the headquarters of Si Lie, a Nationalist commander of Chiang's Twenty-sixth Army.

69.

Zhou Enlai was finally only released after the intervention of a representative of the Twenty-sixth Army, Zhao Shu, who was able to convince his commanders that the arrest of Zhou Enlai had been a mistake.

70.

Zhou Enlai was sent to oversee the event, but the moving figures seem to have been Tan Pingshan and Li Lisan, while the main military figures were Ye Ting and He Long.

71.

Zhou Enlai himself contracted malaria during the campaign, and was secretly sent to Hong Kong for medical treatment by Nie Rongzhen and Ye Ting.

72.

KMT control was so tight that many Chinese delegates attending the Sixth Congress were forced to travel in disguise: Zhou Enlai himself was disguised as an antiquarian.

73.

At the Sixth Congress, Zhou Enlai delivered a long speech insisting that conditions in China were not favorable for immediate revolution, and that the main task of the CCP should be to develop revolutionary momentum by winning over the support of the masses in the countryside and establishing a Soviet regime in southern China, similar to the one that Mao Zedong and Zhu De were already establishing around Jiangxi.

74.

Xiang Zhongfa was made secretary general of the Party, but was found incapable of fulfilling his role, so Zhou Enlai emerged as the de facto leader of the CCP.

75.

Zhou Enlai finally returned to China, after more than a year abroad, in 1929.

76.

At the Sixth Congress in Moscow, Zhou Enlai had given figures indicating that, by 1928, fewer than 32,000 union members remained who were loyal to the Communists, and that only ten percent of Party members were proletarians.

77.

In early 1930, Zhou Enlai began to disagree with the timing of Li Lisan's strategy of favoring rich peasants and concentrating military forces for attacks on urban centers.

78.

Zhou Enlai did not openly break with these more orthodox notions, and even tried to implement them later, in 1931, in Jiangxi.

79.

Zhou Enlai "acknowledged" his mistakes in compromising with Li in January 1931 and offered to resign from the Politburo, but was retained while other senior CCP leaders, including Li Lisan and Qu Qiubai, were removed.

80.

Zhou Enlai often disguised himself as a businessman, sometimes wearing a beard.

81.

Zhou Enlai was careful that only two or three people ever knew his whereabouts.

82.

Zhou Enlai disguised all urban Party offices, made sure that CCP offices never shared the same buildings when in the same city, and required all Party members to use passwords to identify one another.

83.

Zhou Enlai restricted all of his meetings to either before 7AM or after 7PM.

84.

Zhou Enlai never used public transportation, and avoided being seen in public places.

85.

In November 1928, the CCP established its own intelligence agency, which Zhou Enlai subsequently came to control.

86.

One of Zhou Enlai's agents working in Nanjing, Qian Zhuangfei, intercepted a telegram requesting further instructions from Nanjing on how to proceed, and abandoned his cover to personally warn Zhou Enlai of the impending crackdown.

87.

Zhou Enlai attempted to prevent Xiang's expected extradition to KMT-controlled China by having his agents bribe the chief of police in the French Concession, but the KMT authorities appealed directly to the authorities of the French Concession, ensuring that the chief of police could not intervene.

88.

Zhou Enlai later succeeded in secretly purchasing a copy of Xiang's interrogation records.

89.

The entire campaign occurred while Zhou Enlai was still in Shanghai.

90.

Zhou Enlai's resolution was passed and adopted on 7 January 1932, and the campaign gradually subsided.

91.

Zhou Enlai moved to the Jiangxi base area and shook up the propaganda-oriented approach to revolution by demanding that the armed forces under Communist control actually be used to expand the base, rather than just to control and defend it.

92.

In December 1931, Zhou Enlai replaced Mao Zedong as Secretary of the First Front Army with Xiang Ying, and made himself political commissar of the Red Army, in place of Mao.

93.

Zhou Enlai, who had come to appreciate Mao's strategies after the series of military failures waged by other Party leaders since 1927, defended Mao, but was unsuccessful.

94.

Zhou Enlai was accepted as leader largely because of his organizational talent and devotion to work, and because he had never shown any overt ambition to pursue supreme power within the Party.

95.

Zhou Enlai sent Pan Hannian to negotiate for safe passage with General Chen, who subsequently allowed the Red Army to pass through the territory that he controlled without fighting.

96.

Mao and Zhou Enlai would retain their positions within the CCP until their deaths in 1976.

97.

Zhou Enlai made contact with one of the most senior KMT commanders in the northwest, Zhang Xueliang.

98.

Zhou Enlai established a "northeast working committee" for the purpose of promoting cooperation with Zhang.

99.

Ever the diplomat, Zhou Enlai maintained his composure and eloquently defended his position.

100.

Under cover of its association with the Eighth Route Army, Zhou Enlai used the Yangtze Bureau to conduct clandestine operations within southern China, secretly recruiting Communist operatives and establishing Party structures throughout KMT-controlled areas.

101.

Zhou Enlai agreed to these orders, and applied his considerable organizational talents to completing them.

102.

Zhou Enlai was successful in organizing large numbers of Chinese intellectuals and artists to promote resistance against the Japanese.

103.

The largest propaganda event that Zhou Enlai staged was a week-long celebration in 1938, following the successful defense of Taierzhuang.

104.

Zhou Enlai himself donated 240 yuan, his monthly salary as deputy director of the Political Department.

105.

Zhou Enlai established and maintained contacts with over forty foreign journalists and writers, including Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong and Rewi Alley, many of whom became sympathetic to the Communist cause and wrote about their sympathies in foreign publications.

106.

In sympathy with his efforts to promote the CCP to the outside world, Zhou Enlai arranged for a Canadian medical team, headed by Norman Bethune, to travel to Yan'an, and assisted the Dutch film director Joris Ivens in producing a documentary, 400 Million People.

107.

Zhou Enlai was unsuccessful in averting the public defection of Zhang Guotao, one of the founders of the CCP, to the KMT.

108.

Zhou Enlai used his influence within the Military Committee to promote Nationalist generals that he believed were capable, and to promote cooperation with the Red Army.

109.

When Chiang was hesitant to commit troops to the defense of Tai'erzhuang, Zhou Enlai convinced Chiang to do so by promising that the Communist Eighth Route Army would simultaneously attack the Japanese from the north, and that the New Fourth Army would sabotage the Tianjin-Pukou railroad, cutting off Japanese supplies.

110.

Zhou Enlai came upon the sixteen-year-old Sun crying outside of the Eighth Route Army Liaison Office because she had been refused permission to travel to Yan'an, due to her youth and lack of political connections.

111.

Zhou Enlai pursued a career in acting and direction, and later became the first female director of spoken drama in the PRC.

112.

In 1938, Zhou Enlai met and befriended another orphan, Li Peng.

113.

Zhou Enlai demanded that the causes of the fire be thoroughly investigated by authorities, that those responsible be punished, that reparations be given to the victims, that the city be thoroughly cleaned up, and that accommodations be provided for the homeless.

114.

Zhou Enlai reached Chongqing in December 1938, and resumed the official and unofficial operations that he had been conducting in Wuhan in January 1938.

115.

Zhou Enlai's activities included those required by his formal positions within the Nationalist government, his running of two pro-Communist newspapers, and his covert efforts to form reliable intelligence networks and increase the popularity and organization of CCP organizations in southern China.

116.

In July 1939, while in Yan'an to attend a series of Politburo meetings, Zhou Enlai had an accident horseback riding in which he fell and fractured his right elbow.

117.

Zhou Enlai arrived in Moscow too late to mend the fracture, and his right arm remained bent for the rest of his life.

118.

Zhou Enlai remained in Moscow after Zhou left in order to study for a career in theatre.

119.

Under the cover of the Office of the Eighth Route Army, Zhou Enlai adopted a series of measures to expand the CCP intelligence network.

120.

Zhou Enlai responded to the rift between the KMT and CCP by directing Party leaders to conduct their operations more secretly.

121.

Zhou Enlai maintained propaganda efforts via the newspapers that he directed and kept in close contact with foreign journalists and ambassadors.

122.

Zhou Enlai increased and improved CCP intelligence efforts within the KMT, Wang Jingwei's Nanjing government, and the Empire of Japan, recruiting, training, and organizing a large network of Communist spies.

123.

Zhou Enlai cultivated a close personal friendship with General Feng Yuxiang, making it possible for Zhou Enlai to circulate freely among the officers of the Nationalist Army.

124.

Zhou Enlai befriended the General He Jifeng, and convinced He to secretly become a member of the CCP during an official visit to Yan'an.

125.

Zhou Enlai convinced another Sichuanese general, Li Wenhui, to covertly install a radio transmitter that facilitated secret communication between Yan'an and Chongqing.

126.

Zhou Enlai befriended Zhang Zhizhong and Nong Yun, commanders in the Yunnan armed forces, who became secret CCP members, agreed to cooperate with the CCP against Chiang Kai-shek, and established a clandestine radio station that broadcast Communist propaganda from the provincial government building in Kunming.

127.

Zhou Enlai remained the primary CCP representative to the outside world during his time in Chongqing.

128.

Zhou Enlai struck visitors as charming, urbane, hard-working, and living a very simple lifestyle.

129.

In 1941, Zhou Enlai received a visit from Ernest Hemingway and his wife, Martha Gellhorn.

130.

Zhou Enlai undertook to start and run a number of businesses throughout KMT- and Japanese- controlled China.

131.

Zhou Enlai's businesses grew to include several trading companies operating in several Chinese cities, a silk and satin store in Chongqing, an oil refinery, and factories for producing industrial materials, cloths, Western medicines, and other commodities.

132.

Zhou Enlai was labelled, along with the generals Peng Dehuai, Liu Bocheng, Ye Jianying, and Nie Rongzhen, as an "empiricist" because he had a history of cooperating with the Comintern and with Mao's enemy, Wang Ming.

133.

Zhou Enlai defended himself by engaging in a long series of public reflections and self-criticisms, and he gave a number of speeches praising Mao and Mao Zedong Thought and giving his unconditional acceptance of Mao's leadership.

134.

Zhou Enlai joined Mao's allies in attacking Peng Shuzhi, Chen Duxiu, and Wang Ming, who Mao viewed as enemies.

135.

Mao and Zhou Enlai welcomed this mission and held numerous talks in the interests of gaining American aid.

136.

In 1944, Zhou Enlai wrote to General Joseph Stilwell, the American commander of the China Burma India war theater, attempting to convince Stilwell of the need for the Americans to supply the Communists, and of the Communist's desire for a united Chinese government after the war.

137.

Zhou Enlai took control over Mao's security detail, and his subsequent inspections of their plane and lodgings found nothing.

138.

Mao and Zhou Enlai traveled together to receptions, banquets, and other public gatherings, and Zhou Enlai introduced him to numerous local celebrities and statesmen that he had befriended during his earlier stay in Chongqing.

139.

Zhou Enlai returned to Yan'an on 27 November 1945, when major skirmishes between the Communists and Nationalists made future negotiations pointless.

140.

The top leadership within the CCP, including Zhou Enlai, viewed Marshall's nomination as a positive development, and hoped that Marshall would be a more flexible negotiator than Hurley had been.

141.

Zhou Enlai represented the Communists, Marshall represented the Americans, and Zhang Qun represented the KMT.

142.

Zhou Enlai signed these agreements in the knowledge that neither side would be able to implement these changes.

143.

Zhou Enlai welcomed Chiang's statements and expressed his opposition to civil war.

144.

Mao expressed a desire to visit the United States, and Zhou Enlai received orders to manipulate Marshall in order to advance the peace process.

145.

Zhou Enlai turned his focus from diplomatic to military affairs, while retaining a senior interest in intelligence work.

146.

Zhou Enlai worked directly under Mao as his chief aide, as the vice chairman of the Military Commission of the Central Committee, and as the general chief of staff.

147.

Zhou Enlai responded that the CCP would not accept a bogus peace dictated by Chiang, and asked whether Zhang had come with the necessary credentials to implement the terms desired by the CCP.

148.

Zhou Enlai was able to convince Zhang Zhizhong to accept a position inside the PRC in 1949, after Zhou Enlai's underground network successfully escorted Zhang's family to Beijing.

149.

All of the other members of the KMT delegation that Zhou Enlai had negotiated with in 1949 accepted similar terms.

150.

Zhou Enlai did not share Kim's confidence that the war would end quickly, and became increasingly apprehensive that the United States would intervene.

151.

Zhou Enlai commanded Chai Chengwen to conduct a topographical survey of Korea, and directed Lei Yingfu, Zhou Enlai's military advisor in North Korea, to analyze the military situation there.

152.

At the meeting, Zhou Enlai was one of the few firm supporters of Mao's position that China should send military aid, regardless of the strength of American forces.

153.

Immediately on his return to Beijing on 18 October 1950, Zhou Enlai met with Mao Zedong, Peng Dehuai, and Gao Gang, and the group ordered the 200,000 Chinese troops along the border to enter North Korea, which they did on 25 October.

154.

Zhou Enlai chose Li Kenong and Qiao Guanhua to head the Chinese negotiating team.

155.

In 1952, Peng Dehuai succeeded Zhou Enlai in managing the Central Military Commission.

156.

In 1956, after the eighth Party Congress, Zhou Enlai formally relinquished his post in the Military Commission and focused on his work in the Standing Committee, the State Council, and on foreign affairs.

157.

In 1952, Zhou Enlai signed an economic and cultural agreement with the Mongolian People's Republic, giving de facto recognition of the independence of what had been known as "Outer Mongolia" in Qing times.

158.

Zhou Enlai worked to conclude an agreement with Kim Il Sung in order to help the postwar reconstruction of North Korea's economy.

159.

Zhou Enlai was interpreted by onlookers as turning this moment of possible humiliation into a small victory by giving only a small, "Gallic-style" shrug to this behaviour.

160.

Zhou Enlai was equally effective in countering Dulles' insistence that China not be given a seat at the sessions.

161.

At the conference, Zhou Enlai skillfully gave the conference a neutral stance that made the United States appear as a serious threat to the peace and stability of the region.

162.

Zhou Enlai complained that, while China was working towards "world peace and the progress of mankind", "aggressive circles" within the United States were actively aiding the Nationalists in Taiwan and planning to rearm the Japanese.

163.

Zhou Enlai avoided the attempt when he changed planes at the last minute, but all 11 of the flight's other passengers were killed, with only three crew members surviving the crash.

164.

Zhou Enlai hoped that the incident would improve Britain's relationship with the PRC, and damage Britain's relationship with the ROC.

165.

From December of 1963 until January 1964, Zhou Enlai made diplomatic visitations to all of the North African countries.

166.

Zhou Enlai emerged from the Bandung conference with a reputation as a flexible and open-minded negotiator.

167.

In 1971, Zhou Enlai met secretly with President Nixon's security advisor, Henry Kissinger, who had flown to China to prepare for a meeting between Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong.

168.

Zhou Enlai has been described by Frank Dikotter as the "midwife" of the Great Leap Forward, who "transformed nightmares into reality".

169.

The combination of his personal eccentricities and industrialization policy failures produced criticism from such veteran revolutionaries as Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, and Zhou Enlai, who seemed less and less to share an enthusiasm for his vision of continuous revolutionary struggle.

170.

Zhou Enlai gave his backing to the establishment of radical Red Guard organizations in October 1966 and joined Chen Boda and Jiang Qing against what they considered "leftist" and "rightist" Red Guard factions.

171.

Zhou Enlai ordered a PLA battalion to guard the Forbidden City and protect its traditional artifacts from vandalism and destruction by Red Guards.

172.

At the latest stages of the Cultural Revolution, in 1975, Zhou Enlai pushed for the "Four Modernizations" in order to undo the damage caused by the Mao's policies.

173.

In 1975, Zhou Enlai's enemies initiated a campaign named "Criticizing Song Jiang, Evaluating the Water Margin", which encouraged the use of Zhou Enlai as an example of a political loser.

174.

Zhou Enlai continued to conduct work during his stays in the hospital, with Deng Xiaoping, as the First Deputy Premier, handling most of the important State Council matters.

175.

Zhou Enlai then fell out of the public eye for more medical treatment.

176.

Zhou Enlai died from cancer at 09:57 on 8 January 1976, aged 77.

177.

Foreign correspondents reported that Beijing, shortly after Zhou Enlai's death, looked like a ghost town.

178.

Zhou Enlai was open and aboveboard, paid attention to the interests of the whole, observed Party discipline, was strict in "dissecting" himself and good at uniting the mass of cadres, and upheld the unity and solidarity of the Party.

179.

Zhou Enlai maintained broad and close ties with the masses and showed boundless warmheartedness towards all comrades and the people.

180.

The most notorious regulations prohibiting Zhou Enlai from being honoured were the poorly observed and poorly enforced "five nos": no wearing black armbands, no mourning wreaths, no mourning halls, no memorial activities, and no handing out photos of Zhou Enlai.

181.

Years of resentment over the Cultural Revolution, the public persecution of Deng Xiaoping, and the prohibition against publicly mourning Zhou Enlai became associated with each other shortly after Zhou Enlai's death, leading to popular discontent against Mao and his apparent successors.

182.

On 25 March 1976, a leading Shanghai newspaper, Wenhui Bao, published an article stating that Zhou Enlai was "the capitalist roader inside the Party [who] wanted to help the unrepentant capitalist roader [Deng] regain his power".

183.

On this occasion, the people of Beijing honoured Zhou Enlai by laying wreaths, banners, poems, placards, and flowers at the foot of the Monument.

184.

Zhou Enlai was known for his tireless and dedicated work ethic, and his unusual charm and poise in public.

185.

Zhou Enlai was reputedly the last Mandarin bureaucrat in the Confucian tradition.

186.

Deng Xiaoping was quoted as saying Zhou Enlai was "sometimes forced to act against his conscience in order to minimize the damage" stemming from Mao's policies.

187.

Zhou Enlai has been depicted as unconditionally submissive and extremely loyal to Mao and his allies, going out of his way to support or permit the persecution of friends and relatives in order to avoid facing political condemnation himself.

188.

Zhou Enlai received a great deal of praise from American statesmen who met him in 1971.

189.

Mao thought of himself as a philosopher; Zhou Enlai saw his role as an administrator or a negotiator.

190.

Mao was eager to accelerate history; Zhou Enlai was content to exploit its currents.

191.

The park includes a reproduction of Xihuating, Zhou Enlai's living and working quarters in Beijing.

192.

Stamps commemorating the first anniversary of Zhou Enlai's death were issued in 1977, and in 1998 to commemorate his 100th birthday.