129 Facts About Lin Biao

Lin Biao was a Chinese politician and Marshal of the People's Republic of China who was pivotal in the Communist victory during the Chinese Civil War, especially in Northeast China from 1946 to 1949.

Lin Biao crossed the Yangtze River in 1949, decisively defeated the Kuomintang and took control of the coastal provinces in Southeast China.

Lin Biao abstained from taking an active role in politics after the war ceased in 1949.

Lin Biao led a section of the government's civil bureaucracy as one of the co-serving Vice Premiers of the People's Republic of China from 1954 onwards, becoming First Vice Premier from 1964.

Lin Biao became more active in politics when named one of the co-serving Vice Chairmen of the Chinese Communist Party in 1958.

Lin Biao held the three responsibilities of Vice Premier, Vice Chairman and Minister of National Defense from 1959 onwards.

Lin Biao became instrumental in creating the foundations for Mao Zedong's cult of personality in the early 1960s, and was rewarded for his service in the Cultural Revolution by being named Mao's designated successor as the sole Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, from 1966 until his death.

Lin Biao died on 13 September 1971, when a Hawker Siddeley Trident he was aboard crashed in Ondorkhaan in Mongolia.

The exact events of this "Lin Biao incident" have been a source of speculation ever since.

Lin Biao was the son of a prosperous merchant family in Huanggang, Hubei.

Lin Biao's father opened a small handicrafts factory in the mid-late 1910s, but was forced to close the factory due to "heavy taxes imposed by local militarists".

Lin Biao entered primary school in 1917, and moved to Shanghai in 1919 to continue his education.

Lin Biao transferred to Wuchang Gongjin High School at 15.

Lin Biao joined a satellite organization of the Communist Youth League before he graduated high school in 1925.

At Whampoa, Lin Biao studied under Zhou Enlai, who was eight years older than Lin Biao.

Lin Biao had no contact with Zhou after their time in Whampoa, until they met again in Yan'an in the late 1930s.

When he was twenty, Lin Biao married a girl from the countryside with the family name "Ong".

When Lin Biao left the Kuomintang to become a communist revolutionary, Ong did not accompany Lin Biao, and their marriage effectively ended.

Lin Biao became one of the most senior military field commanders within the Jiangxi Soviet.

Lin Biao commanded the First Army Group, and achieved a degree of power comparable to that of Peng Dehuai, who commanded the Third Army Group.

Between 1930 and 1933, Lin Biao's forces captured twice the number of prisoners of war and military equipment as the Third and Fifth Army Groups combined.

Lin Biao believed that the best way to destroy enemy soldiers was not to pursue them or defend strategic points, but to weaken the enemy through feints, ambushes, encirclements, and surprise attacks.

Snow's account focused more on the role of Peng than Lin Biao, evidently having had long conversations with, and devoting two whole chapters to, Peng.

Lin Biao did not present the bluff, lusty face of Peng Dehuai.

Lin Biao was ten years younger, rather slight, oval-faced, dark, handsome.

In 1932, Lin Biao was given command of the 1st Red Army Corps, which then numbered about 20,000 rifles.

In 1937, Lin Biao married one of the students there, a girl named Liu Ximin, who had earned the nickname "University Flower".

In 1938, while he was still leading Chinese forces in Shanxi, Japanese soldiers who had joined the Communists and were serving under Lin Biao's command presented Lin Biao with a Japanese uniform and katana, which they had captured in battle.

Lin Biao then put the uniform and katana on, jumped onto a horse, and rode away from the army.

The bullet grazed Lin Biao's head, penetrating deep enough to leave a permanent impression on his skull.

Lin Biao remained in Moscow until February 1942, working on Comintern affairs and writing for its publication.

Lin Biao was accompanied by his wife, Liu Ximin, but their relationship deteriorated in Moscow, and Lin Biao eventually returned to Yan'an without her.

Lin Biao divorced Liu Ximin after returning to China, and married another woman, Ye Qun, in 1943.

Lin Biao was absent for most of the fighting during World War II, but was elected the sixth-ranking Central Committee member in 1945 based on his earlier battlefield reputation.

The KMT estimated that Lin Biao had access to 100,000 irregular auxiliaries, whose membership was drawn mainly from unemployed factory workers.

Lin Biao avoided decisive confrontations throughout 1945, and he was able to preserve the strength of his army despite criticism from his peers in the Party and the PLA.

Lin Biao disagreed with this position, but was ordered by Mao to draw the KMT into a decisive battle and "not give an inch of land" around Siping, Jilin.

When Du led the majority of his forces to attack Communist forces on the Korean border in January 1947, Lin Biao finally ordered 20,000 of his soldiers to cross the Songhua River, where they staged guerrilla raids, ambushed relief forces, attacked isolated garrisons, and avoided decisive confrontations with strong units Du sent to defeat them.

Lin Biao ordered his forces to besiege Siping, but they suffered very high casualties and made little progress, partially due to the defenders' strong entrenched position and air support, and due to the attackers' poor artillery support.

Lin Biao's forces broke into the city twice and engaged in street-to-street fighting, but were driven back both times with heavy casualties.

Lin Biao criticized his commander at Siping, Li Tianyou, for demonstrating poor tactics and for lacking "revolutionary spirit".

Chen's forces remained static and reactionary, at the end of 1947, Lin Biao led his armies back south in his final Liaoshen Campaign, the Winter Offensive.

Chen sent reinforcements to relieve Fakui, and when the Communist ambush failed, Lin Biao ordered his forces to withdraw and join in the siege of Zhangwu.

Lin Biao ordered his forces to attack targets in northern Liaoning on 1 January 1948, and on 3 January, Lin successfully encircled the isolated Nationalist 5th Corps.

When Chiang airlifted reinforcements to defend Jinzhou, Lin Biao ordered his army to abandon the siege and return to Changchun, but Mao disagreed and overruled him, and Lin Biao was ordered to engage the defenders in a decisive confrontation.

Forces under Lin Biao were responsible for winning two of the three major military victories responsible for the defeat of the Kuomintang.

Lin Biao suffered from ongoing periods of serious illness throughout the campaign.

The Pingjin Campaign saw Lin Biao remove a total of approximately 520,000 enemy troops from the enemy's battle lines.

Lin Biao crossed the Yangtze River in the Spring of 1949 and decisively defeated the defending KMT army stationed in central China during the Yangtze River Crossing Campaign.

Lin Biao's armies continued to defeat KMT armies farther south, finally occupying all KMT positions on mainland China by the end of 1949.

The last position occupied by Lin Biao's forces was the tropical island of Hainan.

Lin Biao was considered one of the Communists' most brilliant generals after the founding of the People's Republic of China, in 1949.

Lin Biao was the youngest of the "Ten Marshals" named in 1955, a title that recognized Lin Biao's substantial military contributions.

Lin Biao continued to suffer from poor health after 1949, and chose to avoid high-profile military and political positions.

Lin Biao's status led him to be appointed to a number of high-profile positions throughout most of the 1950s, but these were largely honorary and carried few responsibilities.

Lin Biao generally delegated or neglected many of the formal political responsibilities that he was assigned, usually citing his poor health.

Dr Li Zhisui, then one of Mao's personal physicians, believed that Lin Biao suffered from neurasthenia and hypochondria.

Lin Biao became ill whenever he perspired, and suffered from phobias about water, wind, cold, light, and noise.

Lin Biao was said to become nervous at the sight of rivers and oceans in traditional Chinese paintings, and suffered from diarrhea, which could be triggered by the sound of running water.

Li's account of Lin Biao's condition is notably different from the official Chinese version.

Lin Biao suffered from excessive headaches, and spent much of his free time consulting Chinese medical texts and preparing traditional Chinese medicines for himself.

Lin Biao suffered from insomnia, and often took sleeping pills.

Lin Biao ate simple meals, did not smoke, and did not drink alcohol.

Some accounts have suggested that Lin Biao became a drug addict, either to opium or morphine.

Lin Biao's passivity made him difficult to connect with at any meaningful level: "usually he just sat there, blankly".

Lin Biao later declined to lead forces in Korea, citing his ill health.

In early October 1950, Peng Dehuai was named commander of the Chinese forces bound for Korea, and Lin Biao went to the Soviet Union for medical treatment.

Lin Biao flew to the Soviet Union with Zhou Enlai and participated in negotiations with Joseph Stalin concerning Soviet support for China's intervention, indicating that Mao retained his trust in Lin Biao.

In 1958 Lin Biao joined the Politburo Standing Committee and became one of China's Vice-chairmen.

Lin Biao became the senior leader most publicly supportive of Mao following the Great Leap Forward, during which Mao's economic policies caused an artificial famine in which tens of millions of people starved to death.

For example, Lin Biao publicly defended Mao during the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference in 1962.

Lin Biao initially refused to replace Peng, but eventually accepted the position at the insistence of Mao Zedong.

The most important figures to whom Lin Biao deferred the day-to-day operations of China's armed forces were Luo Ruiqing, Chief of Staff, and He Long, the Central Military Vice-chairman.

Lin Biao attempted to reform China's armed forces based on political criteria: he abolished all signs and privileges of rank, purged members considered sympathetic to the USSR, directed soldiers to work part-time as industrial and agricultural workers, and indoctrinated the armed forces in Mao Zedong Thought.

Lin Biao implemented these reforms in order to please Mao, but privately was concerned that they would weaken the PLA.

Lin Biao used his position as Minister of Defense to flatter Mao by promoting Mao's cult of personality.

Lin Biao devised and ran a number of national Maoist propaganda campaigns based on the PLA, the most successful of which was the "learn from Lei Feng" campaign, which Lin Biao began in 1963.

Mao encouraged Ye to act on Lin Biao's behalf, giving her an unusual amount of power and responsibility.

When Lin Biao discovered that Ye had done so, he was angry at Ye, but powerless to alter Luo's disgrace.

Lin Biao often read speeches prepared by others, and allowed his name to be placed on articles that he did not write, as long as these materials supported Mao.

Lin Biao made no promise that China would fight other people's wars, and foreign revolutionaries were advised to depend mainly on "self-reliance".

Lin Biao worked closely with Mao, promoting Mao's cult of personality.

Lin Biao directed the compilation of some of Chairman Mao's writings into a handbook, the Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong, which became known as the Little Red Book.

Lin Biao's support impressed Mao, who continued to promote Lin Biao to higher political offices.

Lin Biao attempted to avoid this promotion, but accepted it on Mao's insistence.

Privately, Lin Biao opposed the purging of Liu and Deng Xiaoping, on the grounds that they were "good comrades", but was not able to publicly oppose Mao's condemnation of them.

Lin Biao privately admired Liu, and once told his daughter that Liu had "a better understanding of theory than Mao".

Lin Biao was not present at the conference where it was decided to name him vice chairman.

In 1966 all other candidates for the position were removed, and Lin Biao accepted the position as sole Vice-chairman, replacing Liu Shaoqi as Mao's unofficial successor.

When Lin Biao received the rejection letter, he was so angry that he tore the letter up and threw it in the garbage.

Lin Biao avoided expressing any opinion, or making any decision on any matter, until Mao's own opinions and positions on that matter were clear, after which Lin Biao would adhere as closely to Mao's direction as possible.

Lin Biao made sure that, whenever he and Mao were scheduled to appear in the same place, Lin Biao would always arrive earlier than Mao, waiting to greet the chairman.

Lin Biao attempted to make all observers believe that he was Mao's closest follower, always appearing beside Mao in all of Mao's public appearances with a copy of Mao's Little Red Book.

Privately, Lin Biao had no interest in promoting the Cultural Revolution, and attended government meetings only when Mao demanded that he do so.

Those colleagues closest to Lin Biao noted that Lin Biao avoided talking about the Cultural Revolution in any context other than public speeches, and when pressed would only make very brief and ambiguous statements.

Lin Biao did not take an active role in government, but allowed his secretaries to read short summaries of selected documents for half an hour in the morning and half an hour in the afternoon.

Lin Biao's passivity was part of a calculated plan to survive the Cultural Revolution alive and well.

When Lin Biao perceived that his longtime subordinate, Tao Zhu, was in danger of being purged in the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, Lin Biao sent a letter to warn Tao, advising Tao to be "passive, passive, and passive again".

Lin Biao continued to support the Red Guards until May 1967, when Mao accepted Zhou Enlai's appeals to moderate their radical activity through military intervention.

Lin Biao moderated some of the most radical activity within the PLA; but, from 1967 to 1969,80,000 officers were purged, 1,169 of whom died from torture, starvation, or execution.

Lin Biao believed that both superpowers were equally threatening to China, and that they were colluding to thwart China's interests.

Lin Biao was supported by Jiang Qing in his opposition to pursuing a relationship with the United States, but was not able to permanently disrupt Zhou's efforts to contact the American officials.

Lin Biao issued a report labeling the Soviet Union a "chauvinist" and "social imperialist" power, and issuing orders warning Chinese troops to be wary of an impending Soviet attack.

Lin Biao's followers attempted to use the hysteria generated by the incident in an effort to deepen the power that they had gained during the Cultural Revolution, disregarding and acting against the interests of Zhou Enlai and his supporters.

Lin Biao officially became China's second-in-charge in April 1969, following the first plenary session of the 9th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

At the 9th Central Committee, Lin Biao's faction was unquestionably dominant within the Politburo.

Lin Biao's support surpassed the number of members aligned with Jiang Qing, and far surpassed those aligned with Zhou Enlai.

The group of Lin Biao-supporting military leaders known as the "Lin Biao clique" were at the forefront of expanding China's defense capacity.

The Lin Biao clique sought to create major industrial complexes in China's hinterlands and therefore strongly supported the Third Front campaign.

At the Second Plenum, Lin Biao advocated that Chairman Mao take the position of President, which had not been filled in since the removal of Liu Shaoqi, but Mao dismissed this appeal, suspecting Lin Biao of using it to increase his own power.

Lin Biao kept his position, but the events of the Lushan Conference revealed a growing distrust between Lin Biao and Mao.

Mao was displeased with comments that Lin Biao had made about his wife, Jiang Qing, at the Lushan Conference.

Generals loyal to Lin Biao refused to accept Mao's criticism of them, and Mao began to question whether Lin Biao continued to follow him unconditionally.

Mao wanted Lin Biao to make a self-criticism, but Lin Biao stayed away from Beijing and resisted doing so.

The official narrative from the Chinese government is that Lin Biao had launched a failed coup against Mao, known as "Project 571".

However, the exact circumstances surrounding Lin Biao's death remain unclear, due to a lack of surviving evidence.

Many of the original government records relevant to Lin Biao's death were destroyed.

Western historians have contended Lin Biao did not have either the intention or the ability to usurp Mao's place within the government or the Party.

Lin Biao was survived by Doudou and one other daughter.

The official purge of Lin Biao's supporters continued until it was closed by the 10th Central Committee in August 1973.

The news of Lin Biao's death was announced to all Communist Party officials in mid-October 1971, and to the Chinese public in November.

Mao became nostalgic about some of his revolutionary comrades whose purging Lin had supported, and backed Zhou Enlai's efforts to conduct a widespread rehabilitation of veteran revolutionaries, and to correct some of the excesses of the Cultural Revolution.

The clause in the Party constitution indicating that Lin Biao was Mao's successor was not officially amended until the 10th Central Committee in August 1973.

Much of this propaganda campaign involved the creative falsification of history, including details about how Lin Biao had opposed Mao's leadership and tactics throughout his career.

In 1981, the government released their verdict: that Lin Biao must be held, along with Jiang Qing, as one of the two major "counter-revolutionary cliques" responsible for the excesses of the late 1960s.

Lin Biao was found to be primarily responsible for using "false evidence" to orchestrate a "political frame-up" of Liu.

Lin Biao has been officially remembered as one of the greatest villains of modern China since then.

Lin Biao was never politically rehabilitated, so the charges against him continue to stand.

In 2007, a big portrait of Lin Biao was added to the Chinese Military Museum in Beijing, included in a display of the "Ten Marshals", a group considered to be the founders of China's armed forces.