42 Facts About Abwehr

Abwehr was the German military-intelligence service for the Reichswehr and the Wehrmacht from 1920 to 1944.

The initial purpose of the Abwehr was defence against foreign espionage: an organizational role which later evolved considerably.

The OKW formed part of the Fuhrer's personal "working staff" from June 1938 and the Abwehr became its intelligence agency under Vice-Admiral Wilhelm Canaris.

Abwehr was created in 1920 as part of the German Ministry of Defence when the German government was allowed to form the Reichswehr, the military organization of the Weimar Republic.

The first head of the Abwehr was Major Friedrich Gempp, a former deputy to Colonel Walter Nicolai, the head of German intelligence during World War I, who proved mostly ineffectual.

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Abwehr's successes did not stop the other branches of the military services from developing their own intelligence staffs.

Heydrich, who headed the Sicherheitsdienst from 1931, had a negative attitude towards the Abwehr—shaped in part by his belief that Germany's defeat in the First World War was primarily attributable to failures of military intelligence, and by his ambitions to control all political intelligence-gathering for Germany.

For instance, Canaris's Abwehr controlled the Armed Forces Deciphering operation, while the navy maintained its own listening service, known as the B-Dienst.

Accordingly, special SS teams, accompanied by burglary experts from the criminal police, broke into the secret files of the General Staff and the Abwehr and removed documents related to German-Soviet collaboration.

Abwehr liaisons were established with the army, navy and Luftwaffe High Commands, and these liaisons would pass on specific intelligence requests to the operational sections of the Abwehr.

Each local Ast could recruit potential agents for missions and the Abwehr employed freelance recruiters to groom and vet potential agents.

In neutral countries the Abwehr frequently disguised its organisation by attaching personnel to the German Embassy or to trade missions.

In neutral but friendly Spain for example, the Abwehr had both an Ast and a KO while Ireland had neither.

Whether he was deeply troubled by Hitler's comment or not, Canaris and the Abwehr still busied themselves preparing the ideological groundwork for the annexation of Austria which occurred in March 1938.

Month later, Canaris and the Abwehr were set to work subverting the Czechs as part of Hitler's strategy to acquire the Sudetenland.

Under Canaris, the Abwehr expanded and proved to be efficient during the early years of the war.

Agents in Norway and Denmark successfully penetrated their military thoroughly enough to determine the disposition and strength of land forces in both countries and deep-cover Abwehr operatives kept the German forces, particularly the Luftwaffe, intimately informed during the invasion of Norway.

Against both of these nations, the Abwehr mounted what one would call a successful intelligence operation of some scale and proved itself critical to the success of German military endeavors there.

Late assessments from the Abwehr contributed to military overconfidence and their reporting mechanism said nothing of the massive mobilization capability of the Soviet Union, an oversight that arguably contributed to the German defeat since time-tables were so important for German success.

Abwehr soon set up a network of agents and wireless stations gathering information in Libya and in the surrounding French territories.

Just how committed to German victory were typical members of the Abwehr is difficult to assess, but if its leadership tells a story, it is not one of conviction.

The Abwehr suffered a very public debacle in Operation Pastorius, which resulted in the executions of six Abwehr agents sent to the United States to sabotage the American aluminum industry.

The Abwehr attempted use of coercion as a means to infiltrate the United States when they 'recruited' a naturalized American citizen visiting Germany, William G Sebold, by Gestapo threats and blackmail, code-naming him TRAMP, and assigning him the task of "serving as radio and microfilm channel for Major Nikolaus Ritter, head of the Abwehr Hamburg post's air intelligence section".

Not every spy the Abwehr sent was captured or converted in this manner, but the Americans, and especially the British, proved mostly successful in countering the efforts of the German Abwehr officers, and used them to their advantage.

Abwehr was impaired by agents who aided the Allies in whatever covert means were necessary.

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For several months before the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Abwehr was key in deception operations set up to convince the British and the Soviets that Great Britain was under threat of imminent invasion, an undertaking which helped soften the eastern territories for Operation Barbarossa.

Abwehr officer maintained close liaison with Frontaufklaerungskommando III in order to be well informed about counterintelligence conditions, especially as far as the non-German population was concerned.

Major Abwehr failure occurred when the existence of a resistance group and spy ring, which operated out of Austria and had been working with the Allies, was uncovered by the Gestapo; a failing for which the Abwehr was embarrassed.

Dulles communicated with the Abwehr concerning their intrigue against Hitler and even attempted discussions about a separate peace, but President Franklin D Roosevelt would have none of it, preferring instead a policy of unconditional surrender for the Nazi government.

Machinations against the National Socialists by the Abwehr were considerable in terms of the chain of command.

Foreknowledge and penetration of the Abwehr was such that Dulles reported later in February 1944 that the Abwehr was going to be absorbed by the SD.

SS continually undermined the Abwehr by putting its officers under investigation, believing them to be involved in anti-Hitler plots.

The SS accused Canaris of being defeatist in his intelligence assessments, especially on the Russian campaign and the Abwehr was under investigation for treason related to the earlier attack on Belgrade.

Likewise, a group of White Russians under General Anton Turkul sought asylum in Germany and offered to provide radio intelligence for the Germans and worked with the Abwehr in getting the necessary communication links established.

MAX was not the intelligence mechanism the Abwehr believed it to be, instead, it was "a creature of the NKGB", through which information was regularly disseminated concerning Foreign Armies East and Foreign Air Forces East and troop movements.

Hitler had long suspected that the Abwehr had been infiltrated by anti-Nazi defectors and Allied agents, and the defection of Vemehren after the Solf Circle arrests all but confirmed it.

Abwehr was arrested on 23 July 1944, in the aftermath of the "20 July Plot" against Hitler and executed shortly before the end of the war, along with Oster, his deputy.

The functions of the Abwehr were then fully absorbed by Amt VI, SD-Ausland, a sub-office of the RSHA, which was part of the SS.

Many historians agree that, in general, the Abwehr had a poor reputation for the quality of its work and for its unusually decentralized organization.

American historian Robin Winks says that the Abwehr was "an abysmal failure, failing to forecast Torch, or Husky, or Overlord".

Abwehr adds that it was under the "negligent rule" of Admiral Canaris, who was "more interested in anti-Nazi intrigue than in his official duties".

Whatever successes the Abwehr enjoyed before the start of the Second World War, there were virtually none once the war began and worse, the British successfully ran 19 double agents through the Abwehr which fed them false information, duping the German intelligence service to the very end.